

## MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

## I.—THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD.

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By the *right* in the following pages I must at once explain that I mean *rectum*; I am saying nothing here about the notion of *ius*. Thus I am using the word *right* in the sense in which its extension is identical with *obligatory*. (In intension, I agree with Kant that there is a difference between the two; the right is also for me the obligatory, that which is *binding* upon me, just because I am a creature whose will can, and often does, conflict with it; if I always consented fully to it "in the inner man", I should still be aware of it as right and as contrary to wrong. But I should not apprehend this rightness as involving any restraint on my liberty; I should not think of the right as something to which I am *obliged*. I do not, of course, mean by saying this to agree with the utilitarian thesis that a "penal sanction" is part of the very meaning of obligation. My view is rather that of Hobbes that the law and its penalties "*tie a man being bound*". When I judge that I ought to implement my promise to pay a certain sum for a certain article on delivery, this judgement of itself imposes a restriction, which would not exist but for my previous promise, on my moral freedom to lay out my available money at my good pleasure.<sup>1</sup> All that the "penal sanction" does is to bind me more tightly with a chain

<sup>1</sup> In the old phraseology withholding of the payment is not *morally* possible.

of a different material, if the first chain should prove too weak to hold me. Being what I am, I already feel the first chain as a chain ; if my will were morally perfect I should not ; I should no more be conscious of it as a check than I am normally conscious of the pressure of the atmosphere.)

This being premised, I propose to discuss certain questions raised by the new deontology, as it may fairly be called, of Prof. Prichard, the Provost of Oriel, and their younger supporters. I am not undertaking a formal criticism of the doctrine of either of the two writers named precisely in the form which they have given to it. I am not sure how far either has been successful in being strictly consistent with himself, or how far either would accept all the positions I propose to discuss without modification. It is a certain perceptible tendency in recent writing about ethics, and not the express utterances of any one particular writer, in which I am interested. My remarks are thus to be taken as standing to the work of Messrs. Ross and Prichard much as Bradley explained that his essay on *Duty for Duty's Sake* is related to the actual teaching of Kant.

Also I would say at the outset that in one respect I sympathise strongly with the tendency which I propose to criticise. It is true, in my own opinion, that the notions of *right* and *duty* are absolutely fundamental in ethics, and that under the combined influence of Utilitarianism and Hegelianism, their significance was unhappily obscured in much of the most widely influential moral teaching of the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. Our moralists were badly in need of a restatement of the characteristic thought of Kant, that we do not serve in the army of virtue as gentlemen-volunteers accompanying an expedition at our own good pleasure, but as regulars subject to the full discipline of the camp. I trust that nothing in what I proceed to say will be found inconsistent with this admission.

The characteristic positions of the new deontologists which I propose to examine are these. (As I said before, I am thinking of a doctrine which seems to be growing up in various quarters around us, and I do not hold either Prichard or Ross responsible for any of the positions in question any further than so far as they have expressly adopted them. Still less, of course, do I regard either of them as responsible for utterances of the other) :—

(1) There is a general tendency to disparage the whole great moral tradition, going back, through Plato and Aristotle, to Socrates, which treats ethics as an inquiry into the character

of the *Summum Bonum*. So much so that Prichard, greatly daring, has accused Plato of founding moral philosophy from the first on a "mistake". The nature of the mistake appears, from the explanations of Prichard and his followers—I do not undertake here to discriminate closely between them—to be this. Plato in the *Republic*—the argument seems to confine itself particularly to that dialogue to an extent which goes far to justify Burnet's assertion that it is the only one really familiar to most of the scholars who write about Plato—supposes him self to be answering the question *What reason is there why we ought to do what we ought to do?* But he is all the time confusing this with a second very different question, *What reason is there for thinking that the things we ought to do are the things which men commonly hold that we ought to do?* The first of these questions is, in fact, an absurd one, since it is simply asking why right is right, and the only answer to it is "because it is so", or, if you like to put it in a longer form, "because right, like everything else, is what it is and not another thing". The second question is an intelligible one, since it means, Are the things respectable men commonly consider right really right? But so far as Plato answers it, he gives a wrong and irrelevant answer. All that he proves about the things he is anxious to show to be right is that they are well-chosen means to *εὐδαιμονία*, that is, to "happiness", and, in fact, some urge, to the *private* happiness of the individual agent. Hence we find Mr. Foster in *MIND* pronouncing Plato a Utilitarian, and Mr. L. A. Garrard, in his recent book, *Duty and the Will of God*, going still further and definitely suggesting that Plato, and by consequence all subsequent Greek moralists, including the Christian Fathers so far as they continue the Greek succession, are really "egoistic hedonists".<sup>1</sup>

(2) Kant was therefore perfectly justified in his refusal to make the obligatoriness of right action dependent on the goodness

<sup>1</sup> Garrard, *op. cit.*, p. 8, "He [Plato] assumes, in fact, without discussion, that whenever we act deliberately we do so because we think the action will be for *our own good*, by which he means *for our ultimate happiness*" (italics mine). P. 9: "We are left with an uncomfortable feeling that he [Aristotle] considered our conviction that we have absolutely binding duties too silly to need refutation." P. 132: "We can hardly escape the conclusion that his ethic [that of Clement of Alexandria] suffers from the same defect as that of the Stoics, and is little more than a refined form of hedonism." P. 176: Hedonism "was never wholly absent from Greek moral philosophy nor from the teaching of the Christian moralists who had accepted the Greek frame-work." Mr. Prichard is not, of course, responsible for these utterances, but they show how a confessed and enthusiastic disciple interprets his teacher.

of either such action itself or any results to which it leads. But Kant's own doctrine is itself unsatisfactory to our contemporary deontologists, though the reasons for dissatisfaction seem to be different according to different writers. Partly, it seems to be held, so far as Kant identifies the action which is right and obligatory with that which approves itself to "reason in its practical use", he is doing what Prichard had accused Plato of doing, pretending to give what is absurd to ask for, a reason why it is right to do right. He is saying that we ought to do that which is right *because* this is also the rational thing to do. But in truth there is no reason why we ought to do what is obligatory, beyond the fact that it is obligatory that we ought to do it. In some of those who urge this point there is more than an insinuation that to find the source of the obligation to the right course in its rationality is to fall into a refined form of the naturalism which, pretending to explain obligation, really explains it away. In a sense, it is admitted, we may loosely speak of something as that which ought to be done, meaning merely that it is the reasonable line of conduct. But this "ought", we are told, is not a *moral* "ought" at all, since it only means that the course indicated, and no other, will succeed in achieving a proposed end. The properly *moral* "ought", it seems to be meant, is irrational, or non-rational.

Kant goes wrong again, we are told, in so far retaining traces of the Greek "eudaemonistic" way of thinking, in that he ascribes value, and value of a unique kind, *moral* worth, to the discharge of duty, whereas Ross at any rate does not scruple (though here some of his admirers part company with him) to assert that though morality is wholly concerned with rightness of conduct, the doing of right acts as such has no value whatever. To admit that it has is to reaffirm once more the *essential* connection between rightness and goodness which the new deontology is anxious to deny. The deed which is my bounden duty, it is maintained, often neither has any goodness of its own nor promotes any kind of goodness; it must therefore be wrong to say, as Kant does, that moral *worth* is inseparable from the doing of duty.

(3) Kant is further censured on grounds of a third kind. An internal contradiction is found in his doctrine, though the precise character of this contradiction is stated slightly differently by different critics. Prichard in particular puts it thus. By demanding that an act shall be done not merely according to duty, but from duty, Kant is committing a circle in his reasoning. He is contending that all my duty as a moral agent is to do



whatever is my duty simply because I recognise it as such. But before I can recognise a thing as my duty, it must already *be* my duty. You cannot intelligibly say that there is one and only one duty, that of being devoted to duty. The inconsistency is found at the same point in Kant's teaching, though its character is rather differently expressed, when it is further urged by Prichard and others that Kant, by his formula, includes in the discharge of duty not only the performance of an action, but the performance of it from a specific "motive". It is, he says, my duty to act from the best "motive" (that of reverence for duty). But we cannot "summon up motives" at will, and where this best "motive" is not already present, I cannot will to act from it; this contradicts Kant's standing assumption that the doing of my duty is always possible, and that it is never my duty to do what I cannot do. (The difference between this version of the alleged contradiction and the other is that, according to the first version of the criticism, the contradiction is inherent in Kant's very conception of dutiful action; in the second case it is not, but is merely created in many, perhaps most, cases of action by the incidental circumstance that my state of mind at the moment of acting precludes the kind of action Kant demands of me. If we take the first objection to Kant, we shall have to say that respect for *duty* can never be the "motive" to the performance of the dutiful act, though respect for *right* can be and should be, since it is respect for right which makes a man a dutiful man; if we take the second, we shall only say that respect, whether for duty or for right, when it is present, may be the "motive" to action, but cannot be evoked at will, and therefore cannot be itself a duty, if it is true that it is never a duty to perform the impossible.) Those who raise this objection in either of the forms just considered will contend then, against Kant, that it is not a duty to have a particular motive, whether "the best" or any other, and that what duty requires of us is always simply to do or refuse to do an act, never to have, or not to have, a "motive". And this is, in fact, said by both Prichard and Ross. The new deontology is thus at one with the Utilitarianism of Mill in holding that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the act". Indeed, I am not sure that it does not go beyond Mill, who was ready to admit that the "motive" does make a difference to the morality of the act in cases where it makes the act itself a different one.

In attempting to discuss the general attitude to moral questions which I have called the "new deontology" I am afraid I must begin by some strictures on the allegations made,

particularly by Prichard, against the teaching both of the Greeks and of Kant. If they will not bear examination, the motives for a reconstruction of ethics which leads to apparently paradoxical conclusions will at least be invalidated.

(1) And first as to the Greek moralists in general and Plato in particular. The defects charged upon the argument of the *Republic* are, I contend, not really to be found there, unless we first distort the plain utterances of the text by unwarranted importations. In particular, I should urge, it is quite untrue to say that Plato ever sets himself to answer the frivolous question why we ought to do what we ought to do. In the "teleological" terminology of the Greeks, to raise that question would be to ask "Why is good good?" and this is really a senseless question, as much as it would be to ask why white is white and not black, or why an even number is an even one and not an odd one. Modesty itself would suggest that we should credit Plato with intelligence enough to see, what we can all, even though we are not Platos, see for ourselves, that the question is absurd. And in point of fact it is not the question which Socrates had been asked at the opening of *Republic* II to consider. The question really put to him was a different one, and it is this. It is the general assumption implied in all our moral theorising, not that *good* is good, but that *δικαιοσύνη* is good, and though *δικαιοσύνη* is not, at the outset, a fully defined term, it is taken for granted that we know its general meaning; we know that, at least, it means reciprocal recognition of rights as embodied in a system of social law. Thrasymachus, who denies that *δικαιοσύνη* is good at all, implies that this is what *δικαιοσύνη* means no less than Glaucon, who undertakes to state the argument against its goodness in a less exaggerated and more carefully reasoned form; and what Socrates is asked to do is to satisfy his audience, or at any rate to satisfy Glaucon, not that what is good is good, but that *δικαιοσύνη*, strict regard for the rights of the other man, is good, irrespective of any consequences or "rewards" it may bring in to its observer. This is what he regards himself as having done when he has reached the end of *Republic* IV. He has done it, in his own opinion, by showing how the outward *δικαιοσύνη* incarnated in the institutions and ordinances of the "city" reflects and expresses an inner state of personal character, *δικαιοσύνη*, "in the individual"; and he leaves it to the immediate judgement of the auditor who has followed and accepted the "analogy between the city and the individual" to pronounce on inspection that this condition of soul is eminently good. It is not *demonstrated* to be good by the use of some

"middle term"; it is *seen* to be good, much as Kant supposed that geometrical propositions are seen to be true, as the result of a "construction", only that Plato's construction is avowedly an intellectual one, independent of anything like the "pure intuition" which Kant in one of his conflicting ways of stating his doctrine, treats as something intermediate between sensation and thinking. There is thus no question of any "naturalistic fallacy" about the argument. Glaucon is no more expected to infer that δικαιοσύνη is good from knowing that it has some other character than the deontologists expect us to infer that veracity or honesty is right from knowledge that some other character belongs to it.

And as to the second of the two questions which Mr. Prichard accuses Plato of confusing, it is, I think, Mr. Prichard himself who confuses matters by corrupting Plato's line of reasoning. It is true enough that Plato does answer the question why a particular way of living or acting is good, and therefore incumbent on us, by saying, not that it is a *means* to, but that it is a constituent of, εὐδαιμονία. But to extract from his text the utilitarian doctrine that the reason why it is our duty to live cleanly, speak the truth, or act justly is that the *results* of doing so will add to "our own happiness", you have to commit two quite unhistorical errors. When you render εὐδαιμονία "*my own happiness*", you are smuggling into Plato's reasoning, probably from your own recollections of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, a sharp contrast between "*my good*" and the good of "*others*" to which no one in the *Republic* attaches any importance, except indeed Thrasymachus, who had made a point of depreciating δικαιοσύνη as ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, "the other fellow's good". Plato, I suspect, since he always says of virtue simply that it is "good", not that it is "good for" some one, would have agreed with Prof. Moore that if it is good that I should be virtuous or healthy, then my being virtuous or being healthy is good *simpliciter*, and the addition of the words "for me" is unmeaning, or worse.

What is still more serious is the misconception revealed by the statement that Plato regards moral virtue as a *means* to εὐδαιμονία, "agreeable results", and as thus deriving its goodness from these results. His point, like that of Aristotle in the discussion of the "goods of fortune" in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is not that virtue is a means to εὐδαιμονία, but that it is a constituent of it, and not merely a constituent, but its indispensable foundation, though, since baffled or ineffectual virtue is so clearly not the best of all things, he, like

Kant himself, refuses to confuse the foundation with the whole building.

The attempt to make a utilitarian of either Plato or Aristotle seems to me, in fact, to involve a complete misunderstanding of what they really mean by *εὐδαιμονία*. There is a striking passage in John Grote's *Examination of Mill*<sup>1</sup> in which he reproaches Mill and the utilitarians in general, for taking it for granted that there is only one question which a moralist has to answer, *What do men desire?* Even if it were true, Grote says, that pleasure is the only thing men desire, it is certainly not the only thing they can think about; they can think, and they do think, also of themselves as beings placed in the world to do a specific work, and it may well be that the question what work we are here to do, is at least as important for the moralist as the other question, what we should like to get. To talk of Plato as Prichard does is quite definitely to assume that he, like Mill, holds that the only question for ethics is what we desire, and that *εὐδαιμονία* is called the "good" simply because it is taken for granted that we desire it. But this is to overlook the point that both Plato (in *Republic* I) and Aristotle (in the first book of the *Ethics*) definitely start from the other question, the one which, as Grote said, the real utilitarian does not ask. *εὐδαιμονία*, for both of them, is not primarily getting something which I desire; it is living the kind of life which I have been constructed to live, doing the "work of man", and if we want to know what life rather than any other should be pronounced *εὐδαιμων*, we have to begin by asking what is the "work" which man, and only man, in virtue of his very constitution can do. It is true, no doubt, that Plato holds that all of us also do desire *εὐδαιμονία*, if only most of us were not as unaware as we are of the real nature of our most deep-seated desires. But the very reason why we all have this insuperable *desiderium naturale* for a certain kind of life is that it is the life we have been constructed by God or by Nature to lead. We are unhappy, without clearly knowing why, so long as we are living any other kind of life, for the same reasons that a fish is unhappy out of water. The true way to discover what it is that we really want out of life is to know what kind of life we have been sent into the world to lead. We do not lead that life as a "means" to the "enjoyable results" of doing so, any more than the fish lives in the water, or the bird in the air as a means to the pleasure of such a life; we enjoy the pleasure (as the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* explains) because we are living the kind of life for which we were made.

<sup>1</sup> P. 69.

Such elementary considerations should, I think, dispose of the view that either Plato or Aristotle was an "utilitarian", or meant by *δεῖ τοῦτο ποιεῖν* no more than the so-called "non-moral" ought which only amounts to saying that to do this or that is requisite as a *means* to the obtaining of some desired "result". (Indeed, those who say this seem to forget that Aristotle commits himself to the statement not only that there are certain acts—*e.g.*, adultery—which we ought never to do, but certain *feelings* which a man "ought" to have, or "ought" not to have; there is a rightness not only in *πράξεις* but in *πάθη*.) If the "obligation" conveyed in the use of the words *δεῖ* and *χρή* is to be called "improper" and "non-moral", we must be prepared to support the charge not by mistaking Plato and Aristotle for "utilitarians", but on the more general ground that they hold, as they certainly do, that the obligatoriness of the "best life" is a consequence of the fact that it *is* best. We must "go the whole hog" and maintain that there is no essential connexion between the right and (morally and properly) obligatory and the good. The consequences to which such a position would commit us may be considered later on; for the moment I would content myself with merely asking whether it does not amount to a formal admission that obligation (in the "moral" and proper sense) is irrational, and whether we can be really satisfied with the view that the only reason why we are bound to act or to live in one way rather than another is that *hukmat hai, es ist ein Befehl*. Those who do resign themselves to that view do so, I believe, because they think that the only alternative would be to rob the moral law of its "sublimity" by degrading it into a rule for getting something out of right living. But when a moralist, at least a moralist of the great Greek tradition, says that we ought to live the best life because it is the best, he does not mean "because we shall get something other than itself out of it": he means just what he says, that it itself, not something else which might conceivably come of it, is best: its goodness is intrinsic to it, and its claim on our allegiance is thus due, not to an "order", which conceivably might have been issued in an exactly contrary sense, but to its inherent character. If it is seriously intended to dethrone the Greek tradition in morals for its rationality or intellectuality, I am afraid the sort of deontology which is to replace it will leave us with no source of the moral law more "sublime" than the merely arbitrary God of Ockham, who could have made blasphemy, murder, adultery and theft the cardinal virtues by merely giving the order to commit them. If morality would

be destroyed by converting right action into the prudent choice of means to some non-moral "value", such as pleasure, or power, or physical existence, practical *reason*, I fear, has abdicated in favour of some irrational blind will when *right* is pronounced to be independent of moral good.

(2) To pass to the already mentioned strictures on Kant. I can, of course, quite understand why a deontological purist should be dissatisfied with even Kant's treatment of duty. In spite of his devotion to the view that we have as moralists to formulate the law of duty before we may proceed to raise the question what the *summum bonum* is, Kant did not for a moment doubt the essential interconnexion of right and good. On the contrary, he insisted on it, and his whole moral doctrine, with all its rigorism, is deduced from the principle that there is just one and only one *good* thing which is unique, in virtue of the fact that it is always and unconditionally good—a will which directs itself in a certain way. The unique and super-excellent *goodness* of such a will is precisely the foundation-stone borrowed by Kant from "the common knowledge" of morality for the whole edifice of his ethics. Any deontologist who treats the notions of *right* and *good* as independent of each other, or ventures the declaration that doing right "has no value", if he means what he says, has broken with Kant once and for all *ab initio*.

But the particular objections we have found urged against Kant are not such that I can imagine Kant would have felt himself very deeply touched by them. As to the particular "circle" which Prichard finds in his doctrine of "duty for duty's sake", it would be enough, I think, for him to admit that he had here, as he so often does, used his terminology a little loosely. For the circle disappears at once if we re-word the Kantian thesis in the form "my duty is to do what I see to be *right*, and to do it because I see it to be *right*". And this, I take it, is obviously what Kant really meant. When he is speaking more carefully, he distinguishes duty from right action by saying that right action appears as duty (as something to which one is constrained in a unique way), to an agent who has to do the right "under subjective hindrances" arising from his possession of a nature which is not wholly rational. It is because we are none of us perfectly rational that right action can be felt as a constraint, and that we have the peculiar "deprimment" emotion of reverence in the contemplation of the moral law. God, who is perfectly rational, for that very reason always does right, but never with the sense of constraint; God

does not *reverence* the law, and it would be an impiety to speak of His acts, right as they always are, as the performance of duties. Now clearly Kant never meant to say that the reason why we ought to do what is right is that we do it with a sense of restraint and because we have a "lower nature" which is tempted to refuse to do it. It is to be done because it is right, is what is indicated by practical reason revealing itself in the moral law; but because we have a "lower nature", this recognition of right as right is accompanied in us with reverence and a sense of constraint, and the action is not only a right action, but *to us* a duty. So stated ("it is my duty to do the right for the sake of the right") Kant's proposition appears to me to involve no circle at all, and the slight verbal inaccuracy of substituting the word *duty* for *right* twice over in the sentence is the veriest trifle by comparison with the much worse examples of slovenly expression which commentators have been able to discover on almost every page of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. (I do not suppose that any one was ever seriously misled about the meaning of the language, or that any one less lynx-eyed than Mr. Prichard would ever have given more than passing notice to the verbal inaccuracy; whereas the hopeless confusion, for example, of the words *transcendent* and *transcendental* must have been a very real stumbling-block to students of the first *Critique*.)

There is more, on the face of it, to be said in support of the other allegation that Kant's inclusion of dutifulness as a motive as part of that which is "commanded" by the law is inconsistent with his own standing assumption that a man can always do his duty if he wills to do so. It does, at first sight, sound conclusive to say that, as our emotional moods are not wholly under our own control, a man cannot "summon up a given motive at will", whereas he must be able to do so if it can be reasonably demanded of him that he shall not only do a prescribed act, but do it from a specified "motive", and is morally blameworthy for failure of either kind. But I would ask, are these first impressions really borne out by a closer inspection either of the facts of our moral life or of the text of Kant? I confess to a doubt on both points.

To begin with the second of them. Does Kant really suppose, when he speaks of our duty always to do right for its own sake, that we can "summon up" a given motive by merely willing to do so? It seems plain that if a "motive" be taken to be an emotional mood or a sentiment—and I think this is the sense put on the word by those who press this criticism—Kant meant



nothing of the kind. As the deontologists themselves point out, he was emphatic on the point that "feelings" cannot be manufactured to order, and gave this as his reason for denying that the love to God and our neighbour which is commanded by Christianity can be "pathological". Yet according to him it can be, and is, commanded that we should do right *gern*, wholeheartedly, and the man who does an act of true moral worth is obeying this command at the very time that he is also lamenting that his moral imperfection prevents him from finding the fullness of joy in his obedience. (Gott lieben heisst in dieser Bedeutung, seine Gebote *gerne* thun; den Nächsten lieben heisst alle Pflicht gegen ihn *gerne* ausüben. Das Gebot aber das dieses zur Regel macht, kann auch nicht diese Gesinnung in pflichtmässigen Handlungen zu *haben*, sondern *blos* darnach zu *streben* gebieten. *K d. pr.* V, 148.)<sup>1</sup> So much is, of course, admitted on both sides; the question is only whether, in making this distinction between having *diese Gesinnung* and striving towards it, Kant is saying anything inconsistent with his own presuppositions. I do not think myself that he is doing so. It is not wholly clear to me that he held it always in my power at any moment to perform an act of perfect discharge of duty if only I please to do so; his language, both in the second *Critique*, and in the work on Religion, about moral "incurables", who have made themselves so by some mysterious "noumenal" choice of evil, tends to throw a good deal of doubt on the matter. And in any case, what he regards as demanded by the moral law is not a *sentiment* but a *motive*, and Kant, at any rate, does not confuse the two things. A "motive" with him is a "ground of the determination of my will", or *conative* attitude; and it is obvious that when I decide to do what I judge to be right, and to do it however much it may be "against the grain", I am willing not merely to do the act, but to do it with my recognition of it as right as the "ground of the determination of my will". The morally right motive—if we use the word *motive* correctly, as Kant does—can be "summoned up at will"; it can be counted on to be there when we will it to be there, for, as St. Augustine says, *imperat ut velit qui non imperaret nisi vellet* (*Conf.*, VIII, 9, 21). The difficulty in the case of Kant's "incurables" themselves is not that they could not will the dutiful motive as well as the dutiful act, if they chose, but that they do not choose, that "to will" is *not* present with them.

<sup>1</sup> I quote by the original paging, which is reproduced in Vorländer's edition. In Hartenstein's second edition of Kant's works the words will be found at VI, 87-88.



Even if we take the word *motive*, in a loose and slovenly way, not for a conative attitude but for a mere feeling, or emotion, or sentiment, one might fairly ask those who deny that we can "call up a particular motive at will", how they know that feelings, emotions and sentiments are as purely independent of a man's volition as they assume them to be. Experience seems to me, on the whole, to tell a different tale. I find that I can apparently very largely choose for myself, for example, from what particular point of view I will contemplate the doings of my fellow-men. This is, no doubt, done most easily when one is contemplating a record of deeds which already belong to past history. I can choose to look at the conduct of the Long Parliament either as that of a "people rightly struggling to be free" or as that of a group of squires bent on making themselves and the squirearchy to which they belonged absolute masters in civil and ecclesiastical affairs. I can see Strafford and Charles I as their opponents saw them, as the great enemies of a nation's liberties, or as they saw themselves, as defenders of an inherited constitution under which the "little men" were ensured of justice and protection against the oligarchy of the wealthy squires. And it is certain that my feelings, as I read the history of the struggle, will be different according as I have chosen to put myself at the one point of view or the other. If I put myself at the point of view of Macaulay, I shall find nothing but a record of misery, oppression and failure in the story of Charles's eleven years of "personal government"; if at that of Mr. Belloc, I shall, like him, pronounce them "golden" years. It is not so easy to do the same thing in the contemplation of contemporary history which is still in the making, and may involve any of us in the end as victors or vanquished. But it can be at least attempted, and ought to be attempted. I shall feel very differently about recent events in Spain according as I make the effort to enter into the mental outlook of General Franco, or of the members of the late Barcelona government; and about what is happening now in central Europe, according as I look at things with the eye of a Czech, a Sudeten German, or a Hungarian included against his will in the territory of Czechoslovakia as constituted at Versailles. And I think no one will deny that if I am to feel, as well as to judge, rightly, I ought first to have made the attempt to enter intelligently and with sympathy into all the conflicting points of view. I may end, in a particular case, by deciding that one side to a dispute has no claim to sympathy at all; but to have the right to pronounce such a verdict, I must first have tried to sympathise

and find intelligible reasons in justification of my failure to do so. Walter Scott, we are told, refused to write a life of Mary Stewart on the ground that his judgement and his feelings with respect to her were so completely at variance. But we must not, I submit, suppose that his feelings were just what they would have been if his judgement had been different, or his judgement just what it would have been if his feelings had been different. It is rather likely to be the case that any serious effort, such as we can make if we will, to understand any agent and his situation will regularly make some difference to our emotions and sentiments. There thus seems to me to be plain proof that the popular allegation that volition has no command over our feelings and therefore none over our "motives", is a grave "terminological inexactitude".

The same conclusion is suggested by any serious reflection on the demands made on us by the morality we all recognise. Nothing can be clearer than that it enjoins and prohibits not only overt deeds, but wishes and even thoughts, which never reach fulfilment in deed. We do wrong if we commit theft, adultery, murder. We also do wrong, though not so grievously, if we allow ourselves to covet, to indulge in licentious or homicidal wishes. And even if we never get so far as the actual wish, we do wrong again, in some degree at any rate, by merely harbouring licentious thoughts or uncharitable thoughts. Common morality does not regard the thought or the wish as something morally innocent in itself, and only dangerous because it may pave the way to something else which is wrong; it is at least a paradox, and therefore, in a question of morality, suspect, to deny that I have an actual duty to check the "motions" of wanton desire, and to divert my attention from wanton thoughts when they arise. And experience, I submit, shows that the thing can be done by the man who sets himself to do it. Consequently the psychological premiss that "we have no power to control our motives", from which writers like Prichard derive their conclusion that it can never be part of our duty to act from reverence for right as such, or from any other specified "motive", seems to me actually false. And I am the better pleased to be able to take this view since it seems to me that by adopting the other our modern deontologists end by betraying the very cause they set out to defend. Their attack on all "teleological" versions of ethics derives most of its persuasive force from its appeal to our general feeling that a utilitarian morality is at best a poor one because it divorces performance from personal character. To say that "the motive has nothing to do with

the morality of the act", as we cannot avoid feeling, amounts to saying that so long as you *do* certain things, it does not matter what sort of person you *are*; "truth in the inward parts", though it may be admitted to be an attractive and desirable thing, is at least declared to be no part of what is *required* in morality, and morality itself is thus reduced to mere legality. It is chiefly because we are so unwilling to accept the reduction, that the deontologist finds an ally within each of us when he attacks the importance attached by the classical tradition in ethics to the notion of an *end* or *good*. But when he further goes on to say that it can never be a duty to act from one motive rather than from another, or even, with Ross, to distinguish *action* from *act* and to restrict the moral law to the mere commanding or forbidding of *acts* (that is, apparently, of so-much movement of such and such muscles), he has himself done the very thing we looked to him to save us from, reduced morality to legality, and stripped what the rest of us mean by an *act* of everything that distinguishes it from a mere physical event.

How he comes to do this is, I think, clear enough. He ascribes to the "teleological" moralist a view which the teleologist may hold, and will hold if he is a utilitarian, that the moral worth of a deed always depends on something other than the deed itself, the "result" to which it conduces (or to which the doer may be presumed to have expected it to conduce), and rightly, in my judgement, condemns this view as amounting to the doctrine that wrong ceases to be wrong when it leads up to "good" consequences. I am entirely at one with him in this hostility to the anti-ethical doctrine that "the end justifies the means", as I hope I need hardly say. But what I find it impossible to accept is the alternative view by which the deontologist tries to save morality. His attitude, fully thought out, leads to the rejection of the whole notion of end or purpose as irrelevant to the properly moral judgement. In the moral judgement, according to him, my present action is to be judged for approval or censure solely out of itself, without reference to anything which may follow or anything which has gone before. Since there is to be no consideration of anything that may follow, the moral act must have nothing to do with any system of ends or purposes; it must, in rigour, be strictly purposeless. And since there is to be no consideration of anything that has gone before, and without some such consideration we can take no account of the inner disposition of soul of the agent, there must be no reference in the moral judgement to "motives". We thus find ourselves reduced to a kind of ethical atomism.

The agent's moral life is pulverised into a succession of momentary acts, and the ethical quality or worth of each momentary act is taken to be purely intrinsic to itself. From such a standpoint moral action must appear merely purposeless, and the *action* must be reduced, as it is by Ross, to the *act* (that is, to the movement momentarily being executed).

Do I need to protest that an atomism of this kind is a complete distortion of the facts of our moral life? It simply ignores the continuity of interest without which no moral life, good or bad, would be a life at all. The doings of which my life as a morally accountable being is composed are *not* "cut off from one another with a hatchet", any more than the "things" of the physical world are. You cannot say just where one "act" begins or ends, just because each springs out of what has gone before it and gives birth to what comes after. Isolate anything you please to regard as one such *act* from all others, and the result will be that all that could give it its *moral* justification as good or evil has vanished; it has its moral justification, and a justification which is intrinsic in the sense that it belongs to *it* and not to anything else, but it has this intrinsic justification because it is part of this context. To speak with Whitehead, it "prehends" the context to which it belongs in its own unique way. If it belonged to *no* definite context, there could be nothing for it to "prehend", and it could itself be nothing in particular. Just because, in virtue of this continuity of our moral life, no component in it would still be what it is if it were taken out of every context, any ethical doctrine which is to do justice to the facts must be teleological through and through and must require "motive" as well as performance to be taken into account. The virtuous man's acts can be neither purposeless nor unmotivated.

But it does *not* follow that a sound ethics must be utilitarian. What is wrong with the utilitarian is that he also, in his different way, is a believer in the atomic conception of human life. Hence he finds the "end" to which an act is conducive and by which he judges it right or wrong entirely outside the act itself, in some other atomic experience or experiences, just as the deontologist finds it entirely within the deed of the moment. The truth is that the moral purpose which gives an action its worth lies neither merely within nor merely without the "moment" of action. "I ought to do this, and to do it now" does not mean that by omitting to do the thing I shall forfeit some future "result" which might otherwise accrue to me: so far the doctrine that morality is a matter of categorical obligations is impregnable. But the very reason why it is

just this, and not something else, that it is imperative on me to do now is that the now and the thing to be done now are not atoms of temporality, or of action. They are set in a context, and their significance is inseparable from this setting. I must do this act now for its own sake, because it is the specific demand made on me now by loyalty to a pattern of life which, since it is "the best life" has the right to make the demand. It is right, for example, that I should periodically be punctual in discharging my accounts with the various tradesmen who supply me with the necessities and conveniences of life. I should be doing wrong if I did not settle with some of them, it may be, weekly, with some monthly, with others quarterly, and, perhaps, with still others annually. And I ought to make the payments not because if I do not I shall be refused further credit, or put to other inconveniences, but because it is right that I should do so. But the reason why this is right is just that neglect to do so would frustrate the standing purpose of living the "best life for man" which makes a rational unity of the successive passages of my own personal life, and a similar but wider rational unity of my own life and that of my "community". It is here that we must look for the explanation of the fact that it would be wrong both in me and in some of my tradesmen that the periodical settling should not be a monthly one, while in other cases no wrong is done on either side if payment is neither made nor asked more than once or twice a year. That arrangement will be the morally right one, in each case, which is dictated by the whole context, in other words, is called for for the embodiment of the ideal of the "best life".

This, I would suggest, is the way in which the notion of right is connected with that of good. The good, or "the best", is the ideal pattern of the life which is the *ἔργον ἀνθρώπου*, the life which the whole community of mankind is "constituted by its very nature", as a community of rational persons, to lead; the right is the act which must be done in this juncture and by this person if the pattern is to get the embodiment it demands. The right is, in fact, the concretion and particularisation of the good into a *hic et nunc*. (This is why it may, for example, not be even right that I should settle my account with my bookseller every week. It may be that his methods of transacting his business are such that it would hamper him, no less than myself, to have such a weekly settlement; and if that is the case, by insisting on making the payments weekly, I should be hindering "the good" from attaining effective embodiment.) If it is possible to hold some such view, it follows

at once that the two statements that the moral life is through and through purposive and that the right act is to be done *because* it is right are not in any way incompatible; each implies the other.<sup>1</sup>

I would particularly observe that a view of this kind (which seems to me to be that of the great Greek tradition) does not involve any "naturalism" in ethics, not even a "refined" naturalism. The real objection to naturalism in ethics is the obvious one that it is the pretence that an action is made right by the mere consideration that the agent wishes to do it. To take such a position would, to be sure, be destructive of all moral obligation, and, in spite of the title of a well-known essay of J. M. Guyau, where there is no obligation there is no morality. But it is one thing to say that what I wish to do is right because I wish to do it, and a very different thing to say that it is right because it embodies the *good*. If we take the second view, we are agreeing with John Grote, as against Mill, that the all-important question for the moralist is not what we desire, but what we are convinced we have been "sent into the world to do". It is only to the man who desires "the best" that you

<sup>1</sup> Kant is, I am sure, wrong in his confident pronouncement (*Religion, Pref.*, Hartenstein<sup>2</sup>, VI, 97) that "no end is needed in order to recognise what is our duty". He looks to be right because he has chosen his example conveniently for himself when he says that I can know that it is my duty not to give false evidence in a court of law without having to ask what *ends* will be furthered by giving truthful evidence. Certainly; I do not need to ask the question because I already know that the "ends of justice" will be furthered. As Kant says, I should be a *nichtswürdiger* if I "looked about me" for any other end. But suppose I knew that the "furtherance of justice" in the case in question was a mere euphemism for the removal of some person obnoxious to a "dictator", I might very properly evade appearance in the witness-box, or refuse to answer the questions put to me, and yet be no *nichtswürdiger*. Again, consider a definite concrete case, say the duty of the parties concerned in the fate of Roger Casement. The members of the court, in this case, have no occasion to perplex themselves with questions about ends. The offence alleged against the accused is clearly defined by the law, it is fully established that it has been committed, and the penalty for it is prescribed by law. There is only one verdict which can honestly be found and one sentence which can be pronounced. But it rests in the last resort with the heads of the executive to say whether the sentence shall be executed or the offender pardoned. The real ethical difficulty only arises when they have to decide whether Casement's case is a proper one for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. It is an imperative moral duty incumbent on them to answer this question, and it can only be properly answered by considering the effects of a decision either way. Except by taking *Zwecke* into account, they simply cannot tell *was Pflicht sei*, and that is precisely why we hold that they ought to treat the case "on its individual merits".

can say with Augustine *dilige et quod vis fac*. Nor do I see that we in any way endanger the foundations of moral obligation if we also hold with Socrates and Plato—to say nothing of any lesser names—that at heart—however little most of us may be alive to it at most moments of our lives—what we really desire, if we only knew our own minds thoroughly, is the *true* good. It is a commonplace that incompatible desires can and do exist together. Any of us can at once wish both to have wealth or knowledge or fame and also to have the freedom from that anxiety, fatigue, disappointment, and bondage to task-work without which none of these objects of his wishes can be attained. Any man can wish to combine the adventurousness and high spirits of youth with the cool judgement and long vision of riper years. Hence to say, in the Socratic way, that all men really desire the true good means neither that they desire it, for the most part, with more vehemence than they desire the satisfactions of the “passions and lusts”, nor, *a fortiori* that it is the only thing a man desires. In the main the desire is, like self-love or conscience in Butler, relatively deficient in *strength*, but, like them, it cannot be got rid of, whereas the “violent passions” are transitory as well as violent. The evidence that the true good is the object of an inextinguishable *desiderium naturale* is, indeed, simply the fact that the gratification of desires for other things, however fully attained, leaves us still unsatisfied for want of a *je ne sais quoi*. *Fecisti nos ad te*: how do we know that? only because *inquietum est cor nostrum donec in te requiescat*. The Socratic “paradox”, rightly understood, is not “naturalism”; it is the instinctive refusal of a metaphysically sane mind to admit of any real divorce between existence and value, or to concede that the moral law is, after all, only the projection of an imagination of our own devising. So far from tarnishing the “sublimity” of the moral law by making it into a mere device for getting “agreeable consequences”, it exalts that sublimity to the utmost by insistence on the thought that the moral law is built into the very foundations of the universe, and, in fact, of any conceivable universe. That Kant should not have seen this is excusable, since his knowledge of the Greek ethical tradition appears to have amounted to little more than an acquaintance with Cicero’s *de Officiis*; but misrepresentations venial in him are less pardonable in professors who undertake to instruct the *studiosa iuventus* of Oxford in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

In a word, then, my contention is that the *good* is, to use Kantian language, an “Idea of Reason”, the ideal of what



I ought to be, and ought to be just because I am a *rational* creature; the *right* is the particular act which this ideal imposes on me here and now, in my actual situation, because in that situation any other act would fall short of the requirements of the ideal. And I do not think that this view of the connexion between the two notions is disposed of by certain arguments which have figured only too prominently in recent controversies.<sup>1</sup>

We have been told, for example, that an act may be good without being right, or again may be right and yet not be good. But I cannot believe that these contentions will really stand examination. The examples commonly given of acts which are said to be good, but wrong, on examination all seem to be instances of acts which are commonly good, or would be good, if some feature of the situation in which they are done were other than it is. But the fact that action of a certain kind is most often good, or would be good if the situation in which it is done were in some important respects different, does not in the least prove that the act in question is good, any more than it is right, if taken in its actual context. Taken out of its context, it becomes a different action. Thus it is good to relieve the distress of a total stranger, and it is good to be merciful to offenders. That is, in most circumstances, these dispositions prompt to conduct which is not merely right but good. But is it good at all, any more than it is right, to give away to a casual applicant for "charity" money without which I cannot pay my tailor or my butcher what I owe him for the coat I wear and the dinner I have eaten? Is it good at all to indulge my

<sup>1</sup> It will be clear that in what I have said about ethical "atomism" I am in general accord with, and owe something to, Prof. L. A. Reid's *Creative Morality*. The present pages were written before the appearance of Prof. de Burgh's *From Morality to Religion*. My comment on the treatment of ethics in that valuable work would be that I quite agree with Prof. de Burgh that in our own personal history, as a consequence of early education in a moral tradition, we learn that actions are commanded as right or prohibited as wrong before we are mature enough to understand the goodness of what is commanded or the badness of what is prohibited. I had to be taught "you must not tell lies" before I could appreciate the worth of directness, candour and truth. Right is thus prior to good *πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. But I do not see that it is either independent of good or *πρότερον φύσει* to good. We become acquainted with the moral ideal as we become acquainted, according to Aristotle, with a *δύναμις*, by studying it in its product—in this case, the code of moral rules. But the very fact that we can and do go on to ask about some accepted rule (e.g., the rule that strict chastity is exacted from a young woman but not from a young man, or that strict veracity is expected from the second but not from the first) whether it is not a bad rule, seems to me to be fatal to the attempt to make right independent of good.



propensity for "mercy" by refusing to prosecute an habitual forger or blackmailer and so becoming accessory to his campaign against my fellow-citizens? I cannot for a moment believe that it is. In the first case it is really at the expense of my tradesman and not at my own that the needy applicant is being relieved, and however good it may be to deny myself in order to "give alms", it is a wholly different thing to impose the denial not on myself but on my creditor; benevolence may be good, but as there is no genuine benevolence in my act, the goodness of benevolence is no proof that *this* action is a good one. As to the second case, mercy is, no doubt, eminently good when it is shown to those who are proper recipients of mercy, and shown in the right degree and the right way; omit these qualifications, and the goodness of mercy becomes more than problematical.<sup>1</sup> I believe the same sort of considerations will apply to all the cases which are paraded before us of acts which are said to be good though not right. I know, of course, that everyone has "the defects of his qualities", and that it is by appealing to our best qualities that the enemy of souls baits his most ingenious traps. It is true enough that the way to hell is paved with "good intentions". In ill times it is partly the most high-minded among us and partly the most low-minded who are seduced into treasons and conspiracies in which the average man is less likely to be involved. But this is really not to the purpose. The wrong act into which I am beguiled by high courage, loyalty to a fallen master, or sympathy with the sufferings of the "oppressed masses" is not, taken in its context, a good act any more than it is a right one, and if you take it out of its context it becomes at once a different act. Most of the persons who were concerned, for example, in the great assassination plot against William III were men of low minds actuated by ignoble motives; if there were one or two among them—though I do not know who they can have been—whose motives were not merely sordid, still their act, in becoming parties to the projected murder of an unsuspecting and defenceless man, was as bad as it was wrong. And similarly, though there were men among the so-called "judges" of Charles I whom we must

<sup>1</sup> Of course I am not denying that the best of us needs mercy, or that there are occasions on which, and ways in which, it is a duty to show mercy to the worst. "Use every man after his desert and who shall 'scape whipping?" But, with Portia's pardon, the quality of mercy is "strained". It would be an abuse of it to deal so lightly with profitable offences as in effect to set a premium on them. When James II refused to spare the life of Monmouth he showed his usual political ineptitude, but he was right in holding that the case was not a proper one for "mercy".

perhaps pronounce to have been good men, their conduct on that occasion in making themselves parties to an illegal act of revenge disguising itself hypocritically under constitutional pretences was no more good than it was right.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, I can hardly account for the readiness of some of our recent writers on ethics to pronounce actions "wrong but good" except by supposing that some of them are misled by exclusive consideration of types of situation from which all that makes the individual situation concrete has been artificially excluded, and others are unconsciously under the influence of a Utilitarianism they profess to reject, and therefore call anything good which appears to have "felicific" consequences. (Thus, the giving in "charity" of money which ought to be paid to my creditors is, I suspect, regarded as a good act on the ground that it adds a good deal to the pleasures of the needy man and does not *much* diminish those of the tradesmen whom I put off.)

It seems to me equally preposterous to say of an act that it is right but not good. But here we must, I should say, be careful to distinguish the very different senses in which such a phrase may be intended. One might mean by such language that though the act in question was the one morally obligatory in the given situation, the situation itself is one which offers only a choice between alternatives none of which a wise and good man can find wholly satisfactory; the agent has chosen "the least evil" of two or more evils. Thus, for example, one might, like the wife of Intaphernes in Herodotus, have to choose between saving a husband's life and saving a brother's, on the understanding that one at least of the two must be sacrificed. The wife of Intaphernes, Herodotus tells us, chose to save the brother. Let us suppose, for the purpose of argument, that this was, in this case, the morally right choice, and that to choose the other way would have been wrong. What can be meant by saying that the choice, on this supposition, is a right act but not a good one? Only as it seems to me, that the situation is an *unfortunate* one which entails a natural (or non-moral) evil, the loss of a husband. The only course which could be pronounced wholly satisfactory from every point of view (and thus not merely from the standpoint of ethics) would be to preserve both brother and husband, but this is an option which the situation does not offer to the agent. Given the situation which restricts the alternatives to two, the agent

<sup>1</sup> They were all of them, as Acton says of Cromwell, accessories before or after the fact to "Pride's purge", and thus all guilty of fraudulently pretending to be a legally constituted court.

who chooses the right alternative has *eo ipso* done the *best* the situation allows of, and the act is not only right but *morally* the good act for this agent in this situation. You do not prove it not to be good by the irrelevant argument that it would not have been good in a different situation where there was a third alternative of saving both lives.

Or the meaning intended may be that the rightness of an act is independent of "motive", whereas its goodness is not so. To take Mill's example, the man who rescues me from drowning has done the right act equally whether he rescues me from a sense of duty to a fellow-creature, from personal attachment to myself in particular, from a desire to exhibit his own skill and daring as a swimmer, or in the hope of a reward. But, as Mill also held, he is a better man if his "motive" is duty or personal affection than if it is display or the getting of the reward; and I imagine Mill would allow us to add that the act itself is consequently not so good an act, though it is quite as *right*, when its "motive" is of the inferior kind. In this sense of the words *right* and *good* we might say, then, that an act is right without being good whenever its "motive" is an unworthy one. The distinction will then correspond closely to Kant's distinction between acts which are merely *according to* duty and those which are *from* duty, except that we are leaving it an open question whether all "motives" whatever are inferior in comparison with respect for duty. It will coincide still more closely with Aristotle's similar distinction between doing what a virtuous man would do in the situation and doing a virtuous act.

The question now reduces itself to this: When I do what is commonly called the right act but do it from an unworthy or inferior "motive" and, so far, fall short of doing what is good, am I *really* "doing right"? Now if to do right means to meet the situation with which I am confronted with the ideally appropriate response (and I do not see how we can make the words mean less than this), when my "motive" is an unworthy one, I am *not* doing right. The appropriateness of the response to the situation is not merely appropriateness of bodily gesture and movement, for the response itself is not mere gesture and movement; it is constituted by them taken along with a whole context of emotion and sentiment. An emotion or sentiment may be, no less than a gesture or a movement, appropriate or inappropriate to the situation which evokes it. And the claim of morality, as I understand it, is for an appropriateness which covers the whole of the psychophysical response of the embodied self to the situation. Hence so far as my response to

the situation is not wholly appropriate, so far, for example, as my behaviour is influenced by anticipation of a reward in a situation where no such influence ought to be present, I am not really doing the right act, but merely one which is less unlike it than something else might be. Kant's shop-keeper, for example, who only abstains from cheating his customers because he calculates that it will not pay him to do so is no more really acting honestly than he is an honest man ; all you can really say for him is that his outward behaviour is less glaringly unlike that of an honest man than it would be if he "took advantage" where he saw his way to do so safely. To say anything else is to reduce morality to the merest legality. The moral law is not really obeyed when it is obeyed for the sake of anything but itself ; the "right acting" which depends on unworthy "motives" is exactly what Plato calls the "virtue" of the many, a mere *σκιαγραφία* or optical illusion.

I confess, then, that if I could concede, as I cannot, the legitimacy of severing act from action and action from motive, I should feel compelled to accept Ross's *dictum* that right acts (in his sense of the word *acts*) have no value whatever, except a purely non-moral one. But to make the severance would be, as I conceive, to commit a gross injustice to countless multitudes of simple honest folk who loyally do their duty without theorising about the matter. The ordinary "honest" shop-keeper, to take Kant's illustration, probably does not consciously ask himself why he does not cheat his customer when he could safely do so. As he does not put the question to himself, he does not answer it by saying "because I reverence the moral law". But neither is it true, as Kant tended by his incautious language to suggest, that the decent shop-keeper has asked himself the question and given the answer "because I see that honesty pays". He may not be consciously aware that he reverences the moral law—or at least that part of it which concerns buying and selling—but the reverence is really there, though it may be inarticulate. He would not do the "dishonest" thing, even though he were certain to make a profit by it. At least he would not do it, unless his position were a desperate one, or the profit contemplated extraordinary ; and to say that in these cases he might fail is only to say what is true of all of us, that he is not immune from temptation. Yet he really all the while prefers being honest to being dishonest quite apart from any calculation of gain and loss. His way of life may present few opportunities for striking and sensational actions ; he may have nothing more picturesque to do in the

world than to give good measure and good quality and to ask no more than their reasonable price; in that case his days will be spent wholly, or almost wholly, merely in "doing right". But to say that this doing right "has no value", with the implication that the occasional acts of "heroism" for which a life of vending cloth or bacon gives no opening have "value", is to forget the moral of Kant's impressive remarks that *all* of us serve in the army of duty not as gentlemen-volunteers, but as "regulars". He that is faithful in little, we have been told, may expect to hear the commendation "Well done, good servant". (Of course if what is meant is that *value* is properly a non-ethical term, and can only be applied to that which has its economic price, I should agree that it is wholly irrelevant in ethics to talk about the value of right action. But I should then say the same about anything which can be called *good* action in a moral sense of the word *good*, and should agree with Kant that action which is morally right and good has something more than value, it has absolute *worth*. If *value* does not mean distinctively *moral* value, neither rightness nor goodness *as such* has value; if it does mean *moral* value, both have it.)

I cannot but think that the most formidable *prima facie* objection to the view which I have been trying to suggest is one which has not so far been mentioned, though it is at the root of Kant's unfavourable criticism of "Perfectionist" theories in ethics. Kant's main point against the "Perfectionist", it will be remembered, is that his method of reasoning involves a vicious circle. I am supposed at once to judge that a certain action is right *because* it is what the perfectly good man would do in the given situation, and also to be sure that the perfectly good man would do this act and no other *because* it is the right one to do. The rightness of the act has to figure both as the ground for my conviction that it is what would be done by a perfectly good man and also as an inference from my independent knowledge of what "perfection" is. But clearly the proposition "this is right" cannot be thus both the ground of the second statement and an inference from it; it must be either the one or the other. And which it must be is decided, according to Kant, by a very simple consideration. I do not know, except in the vaguest way, what it would be like to be a perfect man, but I do very definitely and certainly know—in ordinary cases at least—what it is right for me to do here and now. "We know not yet what we shall be", but I know without any shadow of doubt that it would be wrong in me to refuse to pay a debt I have incurred, to break a promise which I have made and

am in no way prevented from fulfilling, to swear in a law-court to a statement which I do not know to be true. It would seem, then, that our only way of forming even the vaguest notions of perfect goodness is to start from the independent knowledge of what we ought to do or ought not to do here and now. Knowledge of right and wrong must therefore be independent of knowledge of good, as Kant maintains in the second *Critique* that it is. (Perhaps he had forgotten that the *Fundamental Principles* had adopted the reverse order and deduced the whole theory of the rule of right and wrong from an initial proposition about the always and unconditionally good.)

Now it is plain that Kant is at least right about the matter of fact to which he is appealing. I do not, in fact, need to have first formed an articulate idea of perfect goodness before I can be sure what it is right or wrong for me to do. If I did, I should be constantly in doubt about the plainest duties of everyday life. Consider, for example, the obligation of veracity. We must, of course, be careful about the precise way in which we express that obligation. It is certainly not a moral duty to make a statement simply and solely on the ground that we believe, or even know, it to be true. Common good feeling requires me *not* to say much that I may perfectly well know to be true, but to keep it to myself. It would be morally wrong, for example, to give publicity to statements, however true, about the misdeeds and moral failings of other men, if the truth of the statements were the only reason for publishing them. Unless it is in some way *pro bono publico* that the truth should be known, I ought, if possible, to keep it locked up in my own breast. In the majority of cases, I am probably not justified in revealing such matters spontaneously, when no question has been put to me about them, and even when I am directly questioned, very often I have not only a right but a duty to decline to answer. It only becomes my duty to answer such inquiries when I am satisfied that the parties who make them have a right to do so, and a right to be given *by me* the information for which they ask. Even Kant himself, with all his rigorism, would not have denied any of these statements. All that he denies is that I have ever the right to make a statement which I believe to be false and mean to be misleading. The majority of moralists, indeed, would not go quite so far. Most of them are prepared to agree with Newman that there are exceptional cases in which "intentional misleading" is morally justified, though they are far from agreed as to the precise nature of these exceptional circumstances. All, however, are at least agreed

that where there are no such exceptional circumstances, it is definitely wrong to say what I believe to be false with the intention of misleading.

It follows that in actual life I constantly know with absolute certainty that the statement I am now going to make ought to be made as true as I can make it, due regard being, of course, paid to the context which is taken to determine what degree of accuracy is relevant. (I mean, for example, that when I am asked by a person who meets me in the road to "give him the time", I shall not be lying if I say "half-past four" though my watch marks 4.25, whereas it would be definitely wrong to say "four o'clock". I may presume that the questioner will be satisfied with the nearest "round number".<sup>1</sup>) But it would be impossible, if I did not already know that I ought to be thus careful about accuracy, to infer the duty from some antecedent ideal of "perfection" or "self-realisation".

The difficulty, however, is, when we come to consider it, less formidable than it looks. Such as it is, we meet it outside the particular domain of Ethics. It is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to give any satisfactory definition of the beautiful, or to say, in any intelligible way, what the artist's ideal of beauty is. Yet the artist can, in the particular case, be perfectly certain that a certain word, or rhythm, or shade of colour, or musical phrasing produces the effect of beauty in the context in which he employs it, and that any substitute for it would ruin his effect. It may be quite impossible to make any general statement, except one of the vaguest kind, about the nature of beauty in a rhythmical cadence. Yet when Milton closed *Paradise Lost* with the words *Through Eden took their solitarie way*, he must have known that he had found exactly the perfect "dying fall" his poem required, and that any substitute for his closing word (such as, e.g., *path*, or *road*) would have spoiled the effect and been wrong in that place. He must have been guided in his language by an ideal of beauty of form which was none the less real and operative that it defied formulation and would have been empty apart from its embodiment in the concrete instance. So it is again with our guiding ideal of truth. Our inability to give any definite envisagement to our ideal of truth when we try to contemplate it as a Platonic *χωριστόν εἶδος* in no way interferes with our certainty that we are in the presence of a truth when we come upon one. It is but lost labour to repeat the story that truth means systematic coherence, and

<sup>1</sup> Because I know that this is usually so ; if the questioner felt it necessary to be informed "to the minute", he should have made this clear to me.



that since we can never be sure that any proposition does "cohere" perfectly with every other that might truthfully be made, we are never certain that any is really and fully true. Even if we do not see how to meet the "idealist" argument, we are none the less confident that there are truths which are entirely true, and that we know some of them when we come across them. It is as embodied in this or that certainly true statement that truth can be said to be *norma sui et falsi*.<sup>1</sup>

As a consequence, the apparent priority of the notion of the obligatory to that of the good has its counterpart outside ethics. As my duties come to me *prima facie* simply as courses of action which are right, apart from any consideration of a good to be furthered by the performance of them, so the perfect phrase comes to the poet, in the first instance, as the "inevitable" word, the thing he *must* say, and the true conclusion to the scientific or historical thinker as the result to which the evidence "inevitably" conducts him. *Why* this word and no other must be written, or this conclusion and no other drawn, is a question just as much or as little unanswerable as the question why this act and no other is the one which must be done. In all these cases there is a necessity, æsthetic, logical, moral, according as we are dealing with a problem of art, of thought, or of conduct, and the necessity in them all is just "the necessity of the case". We may say of the artist's sense of being bound to express himself as he does, or the thinker's sense of being forced to the conclusion to which he has come, as Kant says of the good man's sense of being obliged to act as he does, that they are the way in which that which is "objectively" æsthetically, logically, or morally uniquely in place manifests itself to

<sup>1</sup> What I have said in the last paragraph may perhaps recall to the reader Kant's treatment of beauty in his third *Critique*. It might be suggested that the Kantian formula *Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck* might be made to cover the case of morally right action. But that formula, even in the case of beauty, will only work satisfactorily when we are thinking of "beauty in nature", which we recognise but do not make. The rhythmic beauty of a typical passage of Miltonic verse is *zweckmässig*, but not *ohne Zweck*; the effect is one which Milton deliberately willed and conceivably only produced by repeated and painful effort (as Tennyson is reported to have said of a particular line of his own which had been praised by reviewers as obviously dictated by an immediate "inspiration" that he had smoked a dozen pipes before he could get it right). The proverbial *curiosa felicitas* of Horace, again, means precisely a *Zweckmässigkeit* which looks at first sight to be *ohne Zweck* but has really been achieved by careful and elaborate effort. And I do not believe that fine moral action, any more than the highest beauty in art is really "struck out" at a beat.



a being hampered by "subjective" limitations. As a being with a perfectly reasonable will would not apprehend his doing of the act the situation calls for as a "duty", so a thinker of unlimited insight would not regard any truth as a result to which he was forced, nor an artist with an unfailing apprehension of the beautiful any phrase or cadence as that which he was bound to employ. There would be simply the perception of the act as good, of the thought as true, of the artistic effect as beautiful. Meanwhile in us who are so perpetually prone to do what is evil, to think what is false, to admire what is flashy or perverse, the sense of constraint attending alike our recognition of the morally, the intellectually, and the æsthetically right is the witness of the claims on us of ideals of goodness, truth, beauty, which are not the less real and operative that none of them can be formulated as "clear and distinct ideas". Prof. Guzzo has observed that in ethics we need to distinguish between *i doveri*, the particular right actions which are incumbent on us in our successive situations in life, and *Il Dovere*, the principle in virtue of which each and all of these right actions are incumbent on us; that, as he holds, and it seems to me rightly, is no other than the Platonic "good", a *χωριστὸν εἶδος* transcendent of each and all of its infinitely numerous embodiments in successive temporal occasions. And the same thing is surely no less true of the distinction between *the* truth and truths, or between Beauty and the "many" beauties of the universe. Truth, or *the* Truth, so it seems to me, is neither identical with a manifold, or class, or collection of "truths", nor yet is it a mere "common character" of the separate items of the collection; so far Plato was quite right. Where it is harder to follow him is in his conviction that the *χωριστὸν εἶδος* is accessible, in its transcendency, to our intellect, or to any intellect but that of a Creator of all things. For us, it remains true that we "know in part and we prophesy in part", and that, I take it, is why it has been possible to imagine that duty and good can be disjoined.

## II.—PLATO'S 'PARMENIDES' (II.).

BY GILBERT RYLE.

I HAVE said that the Parmenidean dialectic contains four main stages or operations which I have labelled A1, A2, N1 and N2. Each of these contains two movements. Let us call these M1 and M2, so that we can refer to a given movement as A1 (M2) or N2 (M1), ('M' for movement).

The references to them are as follows :

A1 (M1)	137 c 4
A1 (M2)	142 b 1

A2 (M1)	157 b 6
A2 (M2)	159 b 2

N1 (M1)	160 b 5
N1 (M2)	163 b 7

N2 (M1)	164 b 5
N2 (M2)	165 e 2

The general relation between the two movements within one operation is this, that while M1 (say) proves that the subject under investigation, namely Unity (or, in the other cases, what is other than Unity), possesses both of two antithetical predicates, the other movement M2 proves that that same subject possesses neither of two antithetical predicates. Or rather, in each movement the label of which is M1, say, it is proved that there are numerous pairs of antithetical predicates both of the members of all which pairs characterise the subject, while M2 establishes that the subject is characterised by neither of the members of these several pairs of antithetical predicates. And in general the predicate-couples considered in M1 are more or less the same as the predicate-couples in the corresponding M2.

Actually in A2, N1 and N2, the first of the two movements in each case proves that the subject possesses both of the members

of the pairs of antithetical predicates, while the second movement proves that it possesses neither; but in A1 the order is the other way round, M1 proving that it has neither and M2 proving that it has both.

#### A1 (M1).

The first movement of the first operation, namely A1 (M1), is (according to my interpretation) as follows:—

If Unity exists, it cannot be manifold and therefore must be unitary or single. It cannot therefore be a whole of parts. It will not therefore have outer or inner parts, and so it will have no figure. It will have no location and no surroundings and so no change of position or stationariness of position. Change and fixity of relations are forbidden to it. It cannot be numerically different from anything or identical with anything: It cannot be identical with anything else or different from itself, for obvious reasons; and it cannot be different from anything else, because being different is different from being single, so that if it is single it cannot be that *and* be different from anything. Equally it cannot be identical with anything, even itself. For unity is one thing and identity is another. [This seems a dubious step. Certainly unity is not the same as either identity or difference. But it does not seem to follow that it cannot *enjoy* identity or difference, save on the assumption that unity is single *and* has no other properties than singleness. However, this point is now affirmed.] If Unity has any other attributes than that of being unitary, then it is *ipso facto* shown to be several things, which severalness is inconsistent with its unitariness. Unity cannot be *both* unitary *and* anything else at all, even identical with itself. Since similarity and unlikeness are identity and difference of attributes, Unity cannot enjoy either similarity or unlikeness, and so neither equality nor inequality of dimensions. So it cannot have equality or inequality of age with anything, and so cannot have an age at all, and is therefore not in time.

Its existence therefore is existence at no date, and this is non-existence at every date. It cannot, therefore, exist, and if it does not exist it cannot carry its alleged special property of being single, since there would be nothing in existence for the property to characterise. So Unity neither exists nor is it single. No name can be the name of it, no description the description of it, and there can be no knowledge, opinion or perception of it. It cannot be talked or thought about (since there isn't any 'it'), which is absurd.

*Comment.* This, like all the other operations, smells highly artificial. There must be something wrong with the several deductions. We are inclined to say that the starting-point was illegitimate, and to write off 'Unity exists' and 'Unity is unitary' as bogus sentences—the latter for making an universal one of its own instances, the former for tacking the verb 'to exist' on to what is supposed to be a logically proper name. We may also suspect that the argument presupposes that singleness is a quality, when it is nothing of the sort. Doubtless we are correct on all these scores—but how can the illegitimacy of such procedures be established? Not by *prima facie* unplausibility, for the Theory of Forms did seem plausible and did entail (1) that every universal is single; (2) that every abstract noun is not only possibly but necessarily the subject of a true affirmative existence-sentence; and (3) that being single is a case of having an attribute.

The illegitimacy of the starting-point is established by the impossibility of the consequences that must follow if the original propositions are taken to be both legitimate and true. We must not be superior and appeal to sophisticated distinctions between formal and non-formal concepts or to professionalised classifications into 'categories' or 'types' of the various sorts of logical terms; for the necessity of such distinctions and classifications had first to be shown. Plato is showing it, though it may well be that he could not formulate what it was that he was showing. Of necessity he lacked the language of categories and types. That there are different forms of judgement and what their differences are could hardly be familiar at a time when the very notion of 'judgement' had yet to receive its introductory examination, *e.g.* in the *Sophist*. And little progress could be made in the former enquiry until principles of *inference* became the subject-matter of specialised research.

We can say, glibly enough, that qualities do not have qualities and also that existence and unity are not qualities. For we have been taught these lessons. But what first made it clear to whom that these lessons were true, unless some such ratiocinations as these?

To say that a term is of such and such a type or category is to say something about its 'logical behaviour', namely, about the entailments and compatibilities of the propositions into which it enters. We can only show that terms are not of one type by exhibiting their logical misbehaviour when treated alike. And this is what Plato is here doing.

To complain that the several conclusions are absurd is to miss

the whole point. Plato means to prove that the premisses must be illegitimate because the conclusions are absurd. That is the sole and entire object of *reductio ad absurdum* arguments, which is what all these arguments are.

### A1 (M2).

This, the second movement of the first operation, is the longest of them all. And it is insufferably tedious. Its object is to prove that Unity has both of the members of all the predicate-couples, the lack of both of the members of which had been established in A1 (M1).

If Unity exists, it must partake in or be an instance of existence. So being unitary is one thing and being an existent is another. So the Unity to which existence belongs will be a compound of Unity and Existence, a compound having those two parts or members. The whole containing these parts will itself be unitary and existent, and so also each of its members will be both unitary and existent and thus will be another compound of these two elements over again, and this will continue forever. So if Unity has existence, it must be an infinite manifold.

Next 'Unity' and 'Existence', not being synonymous, must stand for different things. So both will be instances of difference or otherness, which is consequently a third term over and above those original two. We can now speak of one couple consisting of Unity and Existence, another couple consisting of Unity and Otherness, and a third of Existence and Otherness.

And the constituents of a couple are units both of which must be unitary in order to be instances of unit. A couple plus the third unit will make three objects, and as couples are instances of even-ness, and threes of odd-ness, the Forms of Even-ness and Odd-ness are also now on our hands. And as multiplying consists in, *e.g.*, taking couples three at a time, or threes twice at a time, we can get any number in this way. All arithmetical concepts are automatically generated; from the existence of unity the existence of every number follows, *i.e.*, an infinite number of objects must exist. Every number yields an infinity of fractions, so Unity is fractionised by its interlocking with Existence into as many members as there could be arithmetical fractions, *i.e.*, an infinite number.

Being a whole of parts it must contain its parts. There must be a distinction between what is and what is not contained by it. So it must have limits and consequently be finite, for all that there is an infinite number of parts which it contains.

If it has limits or boundaries it must have a beginning and an end as well as a middle : and it must have a configuration or shape. [Parmenides here unwarrantably jumps to the conclusion that it must have a *spatial* configuration.] Being a whole of parts, Unity cannot be a part of any of its parts, nor can it be just one of its own parts. It cannot therefore be one of the things that it itself contains. To be anywhere it must be in something other than itself ; yet since everything countable is among its parts, it must be contained in itself. This is supposed, I think invalidly, to imply that it must, *qua* self-containing, be immobile, and, *qua* contained by something else, be mobile.

Next, Unity, not standing to itself as part to whole or as whole to part, must be identical with itself, fully and not partially, and it must also be fully and not partially other than whatever is not Unity. But the next stage seems very paradoxical. For it is to be argued that Unity is *not* different from what is other than it and also is *not* identical with itself.

For a container is not where its contents are, since they are inside it, which it cannot be. Now Unity has just been shown to be both content and container, so it must be elsewhere than itself and so not be identical with itself.

The opposite point, that Unity is identical with what is not Unity, is shown in this way. Otherness cannot characterise anything, for everything is 'itself and not another thing'. So neither Unity nor what is not Unity can possess otherness. And as what is not Unity cannot be either a part of Unity or an unitary whole of which Unity is a part, it is only left for Unity and what is not Unity to be identical. [This argument pretends, for the moment, that 'otherness' is the name of a quality. Of course it isn't a quality—but why not ?]

Next, since Unity is other than what is not Unity, and *vice versa*, both Unity and what is not Unity must exemplify otherness. But in their both being instances of the same attribute, namely that of otherness, they must be similar in that respect. For that is what similarity is, the possession by two things of the same character. Now identity is the opposite of otherness. But it has been shown, in an earlier argument, that Unity must be identical with what is not Unity [146-7] ; consequently, as the possession of identity is the non-possession of otherness, there must be this respect of dissimilarity between Unity and what is not Unity. For by this argument a suggested shared property is not shared. It follows that Unity is both similar and dissimilar both to what is not Unity and to Unity itself.

I skip the detail of the next few stages of the argument. It is argued that Unity must be both in and out of contact with itself and with the 'field';<sup>1</sup> that it must be both equal and unequal to itself and the 'field', that it must be greater and smaller than itself and the 'field' and also older and younger than itself and the 'field', and also be neither of these.

Then, to controvert the end conclusion of A1 (M1) it is shown that Unity does exist at every time and is there to be named and described, known and thought about.

Finally, since the only way in which a subject can be conceived both to have and to lack a given property is that it *alters*, having the property at one date and lacking it at another, it is argued that Unity changes, develops, decays, and moves as well as being immutable and static, and that the time of its changings and movings must be a time which takes no time—at which time it is in neither of the conditions from or to which its transition is. (This looks like a variant of a Zenonian paradox about motion.)

*Comment.* Naturally we feel that most of the foregoing assertions, with the arguments leading to and from them, are absurd. Concepts are being played with fast and loose. Those of one type, with one sort of logical rôle, are being made to understudy or deputise for others of quite different sorts. Different concepts should not be treated as if the rules of their co-functioning were all similar. Precisely—but only absurdities reveal the different rules, and the *reductio ad absurdum* argument marshals the absurdities.

#### A2 (M1).

Parmenides now enquires: From the assumption that Unity exists, what consequences follow about τὰ ἅλλα? He will argue that this subject too must possess opposite predicates. What exactly does τὰ ἅλλα denote? We have no reason to restrict it, for example, to the objects of sense or opinion; nor yet to the Forms other than Unity. It must be taken to cover all terms whatsoever, of whatever sorts, which are other than Unity. So Circularity as well as Alcibiades, the Equator as well as my present pang of pain, will be members of this *omnium gatherum*. Let us just call it, in racing parlance, 'the field'.

The field is other than Unity, yet it embodies it. For it has members, being a plurality, and so must be *one* aggregate or whole of those members. Moreover, each of those parts or

<sup>1</sup> Meaning by this the totality of all that is distinguishable from Unity.

members must be one part or member. A whole is a plurality of units, so it is a unit and each of them is a unit.

But though or because they exemplify it, it is not and none of them is Unity. A thing is not that of which it is an instance. So since the field is not Unity it must be a plurality or manifold. And the argument, which I skip, is developed that such a plurality must be both a finite and an infinite plurality, so each of its members will be so too.

Being both limited and unlimited, the field and its several members are similar to one another, since they all co-exemplify limitedness and unlimitedness; yet since these are opposite predicates, what exemplifies one must be unlike what exemplifies the other, as what is black is unlike what is white. Similarly it could be shown, though it is not shown, that the field and its several members must enjoy both identity and otherness and both change and changelessness, etc.

#### A2 (M2).

Unity and the field are an exhaustive disjunction; there can be nothing which does not belong to the one camp or to the other. So there can be no superior camp, to which both these camps are subordinate as members. Hence Unity will have no truck with the field, either so as to constitute it *one* whole of parts, or as an assemblage of *unitary* parts. So the field cannot be a plurality, nor will any number be applicable to it, or to any part or feature of it. So the field cannot possess either similarity or dissimilarity or both at once. For both together would be a pair and each by itself would be single, and these are applications of number. For the same reason the field cannot be identical or different, stationary or mobile, coming into or going out of existence, greater or smaller or equal.

The conclusion of all the movements of both operations A1 and A2 is thus summed up. If Unity exists it both has every predicate and lacks every predicate, including that of unity. And the same holds good for the field too.

#### N1 (M1).

We now turn to the consequences of the hypothesis that Unity does not exist. The proposition that Unity does not exist clearly differs in having a different subject from the propositions that largeness or that smallness does not exist. So we know what 'Unity' denotes and that it denotes something other than what these other nouns denote, whether our judgement is that there does or that there does not exist such a thing. So Unity



is something which we apprehend, and it possesses and is known to possess the attribute of being other than the terms which we have distinguished from it. Consequently Unity, for all that it does not exist, is an instance of various things. The word 'it' applies to it. Being distinguished, it has dissimilarities from what it is distinguished from, and as it is not so distinguishable from itself, it must have the opposite of dissimilarity, namely, similarity to itself. [We may grumble at this step. The inference 'I am not unlike myself, therefore I must be like myself' contains a fallacy. But what sort of fallacy? The inference is valid if I am compared with my father, so why does it not hold good in this case? If we say 'because the terms to the relations of likeness and unlikeness must be numerically different', then we are asserting a very special sort of 'must'. Namely we are saying that 'I' and 'like (or unlike)' are terms which are of such formal constitutions that absurdity results from their juxtaposition in this way. And that is a discovery about the formal properties of certain sorts of terms. It shows that similarity is not a quality. But the distinction of quality-concepts and relation-concepts is a distinction between types of concepts.]

Being unlike the field, it cannot be equal to it or its members; so it must be unequal to them. But inequality is in respect of largeness and smallness (since for two things to be unequal in size one must be relatively large and the other relatively small). So Unity possesses largeness and smallness [the argument would only prove that it must possess at least one of the two]; but as being big is the opposite of being small, Unity must, by way of compromise, have what is betwixt and between the two, *i.e.*, equality with itself. [This is fallacious—but why?] Unity therefore is an instance of bigness, smallness and equality.

But if it has all these predicates, Unity must, though non-existent, still enjoy being in existence in some fashion. For if the above descriptions were true, they described it as being what it really is. Unity must be there for us to be able to say or think that it does not exist. But also it must not be there, for its non-existence to be truly predicated of it. But hovering in this way between existence and non-existence is change, and change or transition is motion [this is illegitimate—but to see why it is illegitimate is to see something important about the concepts of existence, non-existence and change.]

Yet since it does not exist it cannot be anywhere or move anywhere anywhither. And the other sort of transition, from state to state, is also ruled out; for if unity changed in this way it would cease to be Unity and become something else.

But to be exempt from movement and change is to be stationary and immutable. So Unity both is and is not mobile, and both is and is not mutable. And it also follows both that it is and that it is not subject to generation and annihilation.

*Comment.* The interesting parts of this movement are the stages where we find the famous argument that that of which it is true that it does not exist must be *there*, in some sense, to accept this ascription of non-existence and also to be distinguishable from other terms, existent or non-existent. We are enlightened enough to say (with Kant) that 'exists' is not a predicate or (with latter-day logicians) that the nominatives to verbs of existence do not function as demonstratives or logically proper names; but the penalties of not saying so are here exhibited. Doubtless the rules governing the logical behaviour of verbs of existence are still obscure to Plato; but that there are such rules, and that they are different from those governing ordinary predicates, is here being realised by him. For absurdities result from treating them alike. Plato seems to be ahead of Meinong here.

#### N1 (M2).

If Unity does not exist, it is lacking in all modes, departments or sorts of existence. It can enjoy neither coming-to-be nor annihilation; it cannot be subject to mutation or motion, nor, being nowhere, can it be stationary anywhere.

Indeed, it can have no attributes or properties, neither largeness, smallness, nor equality, neither similarity nor difference. It cannot even be correlated with a field, for its having such a correlate would be a relational property of it. It has no attributes, parts, relations, dates, and it is not there to be known, thought or talked about, perceived or named. There is no 'it' at all.

*Comment.* It seems to follow from this that all negative existence propositions must be nonsense if they are true, since there is nothing left to support the negative predicate. So the name of the subject of predication is the name of nothing. From this it is a short step, which Plato does not take (any more than Meinong did), to seeing that the nominatives to verbs of existence are *not* the names of anything, and 'exists' does not signify a quality, relation, dimension or state, etc.

#### N2 (M1).

If Unity does not exist, what predicates attach consequentially to the field? Plainly the field must by definition be other, yet it cannot be other than Unity, since this, by hypothesis,

does not exist for the field to be demarcated against it. The field must be other in the sense that its members are other than one another.

Yet, since Unity does not exist, the members of the field cannot be unitary or be units; so the field can only be a manifold of manifolds without end. Only of such manifolds can we say that they are other than each other—since there is nothing else to say it of. Each manifold of manifolds will seem to be single, though not really being so. And numbers will seem to be applicable to them, though the seeming will be illusory. Derivatively the concepts of odd and even, greater, smaller and equal, limit and unlimitedness will appear to have application, together with those of unity and plurality, similarity and dissimilarity, etc., etc. Yet if unity does not exist, none of these concepts can really have application to the field.

## N2 (M2).

If Unity does not exist, the field cannot be single, nor can it be a plurality, else it would be *one* plurality and its members would be units. Nor could the field seem to be either single or a plurality. For since there is no Unity, there is nothing of the sort for the field to exemplify or participate in in any respect whatsoever. So the field cannot be thought, even, to be single or plural or to be an instance of anything else, such as similarity or dissimilarity, identity or otherness, contact or separation, or anything else at all. The field could not therefore be thought to exist. So if Unity does not exist, nothing exists. So, whether Unity exists or not, Unity and the field both have and lack every predicate and its opposite. 'Very true' is the last word of the dialogue.

What is the outcome of all this tiresome chain of operations? First, *ad hominem* it seems to have been proved, in the case of at least one extremely eminent Form, what Socrates was reluctant to believe could be proved, that a Form does undergo hosts of incompatible predicates, and that these disagreeable consequences flow not only from the palatable hypothesis that that Form exists but also from the unpalatable hypothesis that it does not exist.

But what does Plato think to be the important lesson of the whole dialogue? Here we can only make more or less plausible conjectures.

1. Plato might think that the whole argument proves that no universal can be the subject of an attributive or relational

proposition; and he may have confused with this the quite different point that no universal can be the subject of an affirmative or negative existence-proposition. (For he may have thought wrongly, as Descartes and Meinong did, that 'exists' is a predicate of the same category, *i.e.*, with the same sort of logical behaviour, as 'is square' or 'is green'.) Universals are not substances, or abstract nouns are not proper names, and sentences in which we talk as if they were are logically vicious.

This conclusion is true, and relevant to the question of the truth of the Theory of Forms. So it may be what Plato had in his mind.

2. But Plato may be apprising himself and us of a seemingly more parochial discovery, namely that some concepts do not behave in the same way as some others.

He may, for example, be making the discovery that 'exists' and 'does not exist' do not have the same sort of logical behaviour as 'breathes' or 'resembles' or 'is square'. If we consider the concepts which occur in our ordinary descriptions and classifications of things, they seem to fit reasonably well into scales of genera and species. And we can imagine a table depicting all the ladders or pyramids of generic and specific concepts, such that any descriptive or classificatory concept would have its place fixed for it somewhere in one and not more than one such ladder or pyramid. But there are some concepts which can be peculiar to no one ladder or pyramid but must somehow pervade them all. Such are the concepts answering to expressions like 'not', 'exists', 'same', 'other', 'is an instance of', 'is a species of', 'single', 'plural' and many others. Some concepts are 'syncategorematic'.

At first sight we may be tempted to take such concepts, which are obviously of very general application, to be merely highly generic concepts, perhaps actually *Summa Genera*. But if we do so take them, our enterprise collapses, for just these concepts are again required when we attempt to describe the affiliations or non-affiliations between *Summa Genera* themselves, and also between the sub-divisions, not of one but of all the sort-hierarchies.

Formal concepts, as we may now call them, differ from generic ones not in being higher than they in the way in which they are higher than specific concepts, but in some other way. They differ from generic concepts not, for example, as 'Even Number' differs from '2', but as '+' and ' $\sqrt{\quad}$ ' differ from either.

Or again, to pick up again the two analogies which Plato uses in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, formal concepts differ from

generic and specific concepts not as one letter of the alphabet differs from another or as one bunch of letters differs from another bunch of letters, but as the mode in which letters are arranged into a syllable or word differs from the letters which are so arranged: or else as the way in which nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc., are combined to form a significant sentence is different from those elements or even from the way in which one such element, like a noun, differs from another, like a preposition. What a grammatical construction is to the words of a sentence embodying that construction, that a formal concept is to the terms (particulars and ordinary universals) which enter into the proposition or judgement.

Now when we treat a formal concept as if it were a non-formal or proper concept, we are committing a breach of 'logical syntax'. But what shows us that we are doing this? The deductive derivation of absurdities and contradictions shows it, and nothing else can. Russell's proof that, in his code-symbolism,  $\phi$  cannot be a value of  $x$  in the propositional function  $\phi x$  is only another exercise in the same genre as Plato's proof that 'Unity' cannot go into the gap in the sentence-frame '... exists' or '... does not exist'.<sup>1</sup>

I feel fairly sure that this is something like the point which Plato was trying to reveal in this dialogue. I feel this partly because the imputed doctrine is true and important and partly because, so construed, the dialogue then links on directly to the later parts of the *Theaetetus* and to almost the whole of the *Sophist*. Whereas the first interpretation which I suggested has no echoes of importance in either dialogue.

Moreover, we know that Aristotle was alive to the fact that there was a special crux about Unity and Existence; and also that these concepts with some others (e.g., Good) did not come under any one of the Categories but exhibited themselves in all of the Categories: nor were they concepts of the genus-species sort.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noticing that the concept of being-an-instance-of, about which the discussion turned in the first part of the dialogue, is in fact a form-concept, and not a proper concept; the contradictions and circles which embarrassed Socrates did arise from his attempt to treat it as if it was from the same basket with ordinary relations. However, Plato does not point this out. We can conjecture that the second part of the dialogue does contain (between the lines) the answer to the problem of the first part; but we cannot say that Plato was aware of it.

<sup>2</sup> And cf. *De Interpr.*, 16b, where Aristotle explicitly says that 'is' and 'is not' only function significantly in the assertion of some synthesis, and cannot be thought except together with what is combined in such a synthesis.

And (in *Met.* 1003b and 1053b) he uses for both 'existence' and 'singleness' the argument which Hume and Kant used for 'existence', to show that they do not signify attributes; namely that the descriptions of a man, an existent man and a single man are not descriptions of different sorts of men.

And lastly I am tempted to prefer this interpretation to the other on the score that it does more credit to Plato's powers of discerning the important in logical questions. There is, indeed, an agreeable sweepingness in that suggested message of the dialogue according to which Plato was proving the general point that universals are not subjects of qualities or relations. But its sweepingness would only be *sanitary*, for it would only be establishing the negative point that there was something wrong with the foundations of the theory of Forms.

It would have small instructive effect on thinkers who had never adopted the belief that abstract nouns are the names of substances.

It would leave open and, worse, it would leave almost unformulated the profounder question, What is wrong with those foundations? *This* question requires the discovery of the difference between formal and non-formal concepts—and this discovery is required for all sorts of logical problems, and not only this special historical one of the nature of the fallacy underlying the special doctrine of Substantial Forms.

One objection to the foregoing interpretation of the dialogue is sure to be made. It is incredible, it will be said, that the central doctrine of Platonism, namely, that Circularity, Unity, Difference, etc., exist, should be shown by Plato himself to be logically vicious, even though he mitigates the cruelty of his exposure of his earlier children by showing that there would be a precisely parallel viciousness in the doctrine that they do *not* exist. On minor points, doubtless, Plato's second thoughts might be expected to be improvements on his first thoughts, but that he should overtly demonstrate the untenability of the very principles of the system from which his whole influence upon subsequent thinking derives is too shocking a supposition.

But such an objection does less than justice to a great philosopher. Kant is felicitated for being capable of being awoken from dogmatic slumbers; Aristotle is permitted to be fonder of truth than of Platonism; those of Russell's contributions to logical theory are considered important which belong to the periods after his affiliation to Kant, Bradley, and Bosanquet. Why must Plato alone be forbidden the illuminations of self-criticism?

Moreover, it has long been recognised that in the whole period which includes the writing of the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Philebus*, Plato's thinking is not entirely, if at all, governed by the premisses of the Theory of Forms.

He attends to the theory on occasions, but he does so in a dispassionate and critical way. In the *Sophist* [246] the exponents of the theory of Forms are treated in the same way as are the materialists; neither can answer the Eleatic Stranger's puzzles about existence and non-existence. Similarly in the *Philebus* [15]. Moreover, if it is true that the theory of Substantial Forms embodied radical fallacies, to praise Plato as a great philosopher, as we do, would be consistent with crediting him both with the acumen to recognise and the candour to expose them.

But more important than these considerations is this fact. Whatever its sublimity and inspiration-value, the Theory of Forms had been from the start, *inter alia*, a doctrine intended to resolve certain puzzles of a purely logical nature. How can several things be called by one name or be of one sort or character? And how is it that only those systems of propositions express certain knowledge which contain neither the names nor the descriptions of actual instances of sorts or characters—namely mathematics and philosophy?

The Theory of Forms was intended to answer both these questions. It fails to be a satisfactory theory, for the reason, mainly, that exactly analogous questions arise about Substantial Forms to those questions about the instances of Forms which the theory had been intended to resolve. And in so far it was the wrong sort of answer.

But something remains. It remains true that every judgement or proposition embodies at least one non-singular term or element. It remains true that the propositions of mathematics are universal propositions. And it remains true that in some sense, some or all philosophical questions are of the pattern 'What is it for something to be so-and-so'? (where 'being-so-and-so' is an universal).

The criticisms of the doctrine of Substantial Forms given in the dialogue have no tendency to upset these positions even if they do not directly yield an answer to the problems which they raise. But the road is cleared for an answer to them, a road which was blocked by the fascinating but erroneous theory which they dispose of. Nor could the new advances have been begun save by someone who had himself gone through the stage of being at least very familiar with the theory of Substantial Forms.



In particular, I shall suggest, the road is now cleared for the advance which was partially made in the *Sophist*, where for the first time the possibility and the need of a theory of categories or types is realised.<sup>1</sup> The distinction between generic concepts and formal concepts is here seen or half-seen, and logical enquiries are at last capable of being begun.

In fine, on my theory, the *Parmenides* is a discussion of a problem of logic—as part of the *Theaetetus* and most of the *Sophist* were discussions of problems in logic. Not that Plato says 'let us turn back from Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Physics and consider some questions belonging to the province of Logic', for these titles did not exist.

But his questions and his arguments in this dialogue should be classified by us as belonging to the same sphere to which belong, for example, Aristotle's theory of Categories, Kant's separation of formal from non-formal concepts, Russell's theory of types, and Wittgenstein's and Carnap's theories of logical syntax.

Whether, if I am right, the dialogue is interesting is a question of taste. The central problem seems to me of radical importance and therefore interesting, potentially, to any philosopher who cares to get down to the roots. But the detail of the argument is arid and formalistic and so sustained that everyone must find it tedious—in the same way as the methodical dissection of Vicious Circle Fallacies is tedious if it is thorough.

I do not think that the dialogue could or should be interesting to a student who is primarily anxious to know Plato's later views about the human soul, or God, or immortality, or physics, or Parmenidean Monism. For, as I read it, the dialogue contains no references to such topics and no premisses from which conclusions about these topics can be deduced.

The dialogue is an exercise in the grammar and not in the prose or the poetry of philosophy.

To corroborate the foregoing theory about the programme of the *Parmenides*, I append some remarks about the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, in which, I think, the same or kindred lines of thought are to be traced. These dialogues were certainly composed close to the date of the *Parmenides*. The *Sophist*, which is a sort of sequel to the *Theaetetus*, was certainly written after the *Parmenides*, to which indeed it makes one or two undoubted allusions and of which, in an important stretch, it partly echoes and partly presupposes a part of the dialectical

<sup>1</sup> I use the word 'category' in a less misleadingly precise way than Aristotle.

operations. The *Theaetetus* was almost certainly in part, and perhaps as a whole, composed after the *Parmenides*, and it contains what is probably a reference to it.

*The Theaetetus.*

With the main problem of this dialogue I have here no special concern. It is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge. It begins with a sustained exposition and criticism of the theory that to know something is to have sense-acquaintance with it or memory of sense-acquaintance with it. It is soon shown that neither this theory nor a more generalised analogue to it can account for our knowledge about the future, or of the truth of theories about what is right or expedient, especially of the truth or falsehood of this theory of knowledge itself, or even of mathematical truths. And it is briefly indicated that even within the field of the objects of sense-acquaintance it will not do. For to know that sense-given objects exist or do not exist, are similar or different, single or plural is to do or experience something more than merely having sense-acquaintance. So a new hypothesis is considered, the gap between which and the previous view is of the greatest importance not only for the theory of knowledge, but also for our special problem. For it is now suggested that to know is to judge, or is a species of judging. And this means—to bring together threads from earlier and later parts of the dialogue—that knowledge requires for its expression not just a name but a sentence or statement. And what a sentence or statement expresses always contains a plurality, at least a duality of distinguishable elements or factors. Knowledge, as well as true and false belief and opinion, cannot be expressed just by a proper name or demonstrative for some simple object, but only by a complex of words which together constitute a sentence.

At this point Socrates does something which at first sight seems to be deserting the direct path in order to follow up a side-track. For he suddenly opens up a prolonged enquiry into the nature of false beliefs or mistakes, and is of necessity at once led to debate how we can either think or state that which is not. How can I either think or describe something which is not there to be the object of a thought or description? But I think that this is in fact no digression at all. For, first, it is true that I can only be described as knowing the same sort of things as I could be described as mistaken about. To know is, at the least, to be under no mistake. And, second, any description of any actual or possible mistake automatically reveals

the complexity both of what is falsely judged and, correspondingly, of what would be truly judged. For to mistake is to take something for something instead of for something else.

So a 'simple' could never be the object of a mistake. I could mistakenly think that  $7 + 5 = 11$ , and unmistakably judge or know that  $7 + 5 = 12$ . But 7 could not be the total object of a mistake, and so, by implication, not the total object of a piece of true belief or knowledge either. And this is what was at bottom wrong with the equation of knowledge with sense-acquaintance. This noise or that stench is not the sort of thing that could be described as what I mistakenly believe, and therefore it is not the sort of thing which could be described as what I correctly believe or know. There must be a complex of distinguishable elements as well in what I know as in what I mistakenly or correctly believe. What I know are facts, and facts always have some complexity. So 'simples' could not be facts, though they would be elements in facts. Only a proper name could directly stand for a simple, and only a sentence could state a fact.

Now, without raising for the moment the question what are the simples or elements of which what I know or believe are complexes, or even whether there are any such elements, we can see that a complex of elements must be one of two things. Either it is just a lot or assemblage of elements or it is some sort of union of or fabric embodying them. *Either* the required complex of elements A, B and C just is A and B and C, so that to know the complex would just be to know A and to know B, and to know C, which would merely be to go back on the result already arrived at and to suppose that what can be named but not stated could be what I know. *Or* the required complex is some sort of an organised whole, of which the principle of organisation is distinguishable from the elements which it combines. And in this case the principle of organisation is something unitary and not to be resolved into a plurality of elements; that is, it is a new 'simple', somehow superadded to the original elements which it organises into the single complex. But if we may not say that simples are what we know, we may not say it either of this new combining simple.

This point is brought out by means of the analogy of letters in syllables. A syllable is a complex of letters, which themselves are not complexes. Now *either* a syllable is nothing but the lot of letters in it, in which case to know it is just to know each of them, an illegitimate hypothesis if what I know must always be a complex. *Or* a syllable is some ordered arrangement of

letters. But in this case the order of arrangement is not a lot of letters but something unitary and irresoluble. And then it is an extra simple element (though not, of course, one of the same type as a letter). Finally it is argued, on the tacit assumption that by a 'complex' can only be meant either a conjunction of similar elements ('letters') or a conjunction of some elements of one sort ('letters') plus at least one element of a different sort ('order of arrangement'), that in fact such conjunctions or assemblages are not more knowable but less easily knowable than what they are conjunctions of.

If knowing was inventorying collections, certainly simple elements could not be known. But in fact, whatever knowing is, collections are not more accessible to knowledge than their members are. Moreover, inventories are just as well capable of being the objects of true or false beliefs as of knowledge. So the differentia of knowledge is not to be found in this direction.

Now this discussion reveals at least two extremely important points.

1. It is true that if the universe contains simples, such that for each there could be, in principle, a proper name, the utterance just of this proper name could not be the expression of true or false belief or of knowledge (in the sense of 'knowledge that . . .'). What I believe or know requires a whole sentence for its expression, and what a sentence states is *in some sense* a complex. It is always possible to find for any sentence another sentence the signification of which is *partly* similar and *partly* dissimilar to that of the given sentence, *i.e.*, what a sentence says contains parts or factors distinguishable from each other and capable of some independent variations by substitution.

Now, though Plato does not make this application, Substantial Forms were supposed to be just such simple namables. And if we ask ourselves: What would it be like to be knowing Equality or knowing Justice or knowing Existence?, and, still more, if we ask: What would it be like to be mistaken about Equality or Justice or Existence?, we find ourselves bothered and bothered for the very reason that Plato here gives, namely that we know that when we describe ourselves as 'believing or knowing so and so', a proper name cannot go into the place of the accusative to those verbs.

Oddly, Prof. Cornford, who approves of the refutation of the view that knowing is having sense-acquaintance, since knowing is, or is a species of, judging, still believes that Plato's real theory of knowledge, unexpressed in this dialogue, was that Substantial Forms are what knowledge is of. Yet this would involve that

'Equality' and 'Circularity' do express knowledge, for all that it would be nonsense to assert that any such abstract noun could express either a mistaken or a true belief.

Socrates draws attention to an important affiliated point when he asks how we can mistake one thing for another either when we know both (supposing still that we may speak of knowing 'things'), or when we know neither, or when we know one and not the other. And he asks: Who has ever mistaken the number 11 for the number 12 or *vice versa*, for all that plenty of people have taken  $7 + 5$  to equal 11? No one has ever told himself that an ox must be a horse or that two must be one, that beauty is ugliness or justice is injustice. By analogy we might ask (though Socrates does not): Who ever told himself the infallible tidings that 11 is not 12 or that 11 is 11, that justice is not injustice or that ugliness is ugliness?

It is tempting to suggest that the moral of this puzzle and of later developments of it is something like this, that while a mistaken or a true judgement must contain some plurality of elements, this requirement as it stands is too hospitable. Not any combination of any sorts of elements constitutes a possible mistake, or in consequence, a possible truth. ' $7 + 5 = 11$ ' is a possible mistake, but ' $12$  is  $11$ ' is not. 'Theaetetus is Theodorus' is not a possible mistake, but 'Theaetetus is the son of Theodorus' is. The elements of what I know or believe will not all be of the same type. But Plato does not here allude to any such lesson.

2. But anyhow it is unquestionable that Plato is in this dialogue alive to the following matters. What I know or truly believe or falsely believe is some sort of a complex of elements, and one the verbal statement of which requires not a name only, nor even a conjunction of names, but a complex expression of which the special form of unity is that of a sentence. What constitutes a complex, like a syllable, a unity is some feature of it other than any one or the mere lot of its elements, such as letters.

That is, Plato is now considering the places and rôles of 'terms' in truths and falsehoods, with his eye on the underlying question of what are the principles of organisation which govern the combination of such 'terms'. He does not say, nor are we warranted in inferring from the contents of this dialogue that he saw, that there are some concepts, namely form-concepts, which cannot do duty for proper concepts or ordinary 'terms', much less that he saw that 'exists', 'not', 'one', 'several' and others do express such form-concepts. But it is clear that

he is consciously developing a method of inspecting the formal properties of such complexes of elements as constitute truths and falsehoods. He knows that names are not true or false, that sentences are not names, that sentences are not just assemblages of names or composite names resolvable without residue into several component names; and he knows that nothing less than sentences will express what we know or truly or falsely believe. A mere inventory of namable simples would not only not be all that we know, or wish to know, it would not even be any part of what we know or wish to know.

In any truth or falsehood there must be some multiplicity of distinguishable factors, and of these at least some perform a different sort of function from some others—the order of arrangement of letters in a syllable does not play the same sort of rôle and so is not the same type of factor as the individual letters. Of course, Plato has not got a substitution-method, or, what this involves, a code-symbolism with which to indicate those similarities and differences of factor-types which sanction or veto particular substitutions. But that there is a co-functioning of distinguishable factors in truths and falsehoods and that their functions are not all similar is, I suggest, a thing which Plato is here clearly realising.

### *The Sophist.*

This dialogue begins with an attempt to arrive at a clear definition of what constitutes a Sophist. Its method is that of dichotomous division. Some highly generic concept, which is assumed without proof to be the correct one, is divided into two species, one of these is then similarly divided into two sub-species, and so on until a point is reached where the concept under enquiry is seen to be such and such a sub-sub-species of the original genus. Many commentators regard this method of Dichotomous Division as a grand discovery of Plato, and some even identify it with the Method of Dialectic for which Plato makes his famous claims. It is clear to me that the Method of Dialectic as this is described in outline in the *Republic* and in detail in the *Parmenides* and the later parts of the *Sophist*, and is actually exercised in the second part of the *Parmenides*, has almost nothing to do with the Method of Division. The Method of Dialectic has links with Zeno's antinomian operations, or it may just be an expansion of them; but this process of Dichotomous Division is an operation of quite a different sort. In particular, it is not a process of *demonstration*, as Aristotle points out.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In *Prior Analytics*, 46a, *Posterior Analytics*, 91b and 96b.

Whether Plato did or did not believe that the Method of Division was a powerful philosophic instrument, we can be quite clear that it is not so. No philosopher, including Plato, has ever tried to employ it for the resolution of any serious philosophical problem, and if they had done so they would not have succeeded. For first of all it can only be applied to concepts of the genus-species or determinable-determinate sort, and it is not concepts of this sort that in general, if ever, engender philosophical problems. And, next, most generic concepts do not subdivide into just two polarly opposed species; usually there are numerous species of a genus or sub-species of a species.<sup>1</sup> And the question whether a sort divides into two or seventeen sub-sorts is, in general, a purely empirical question. So nearly any case of a philosopher's operation by Division could be upset by the subsequent empirical discovery of sorts lying on neither side of the philosopher's boundary lines. And, finally, there is room for almost any amount of arbitrariness in the selection from the ladders of sorts *en route* for the definition of a given concept. Except in artificial hierarchies, such as library catalogues and regimental ranks, there are few, if any, rigid scales of kinds. So there are many tolerable and no perfect ways of defining most of the sort-concepts that we employ.

Had Plato wished to exhibit these and kindred blemishes in the programme of definition by Dichotomous Division, he could have chosen no more effective procedure than that of exhibiting several definitions of one and the same concept, all achieved by descending different scales of kinds. And this is what in fact he does. He gives six or seven different definitions of 'sophist', all arrived at by different paths. However, he does not say that he is revealing defects in the method, and the subsequent dialogue, the *Politicus*, is another exercise in it; so some of his commentators may be right in believing that Plato thought well of its potentialities.

However, there is a pair of concepts which are forced upon our notice in the course of the operations which turn out to require a very different sort of elucidation, namely those of non-existence and existence. For a Sophist is a pretender who either thinks or says that what is not so is so. The puzzle which arose in the *Theaetetus* arises again here. How can what does not exist be named, described or thought of? And if it cannot, how can we or Sophists talk or think of it, falsely, as existing?

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aristotle's criticism of the programme of dichotomous division, *De Part. An.*, 642.



So the question is squarely put: What does it mean to assert or deny existence of something?

What do Pluralists or Monists mean when they assert that there exist a lot of things or that there exists only one thing? What do materialists or idealists mean when they assert or deny that bodies or that Forms are real?

Now, it is of the first importance for our main question to notice certain points. (1) With reference to Parmenidean Monism it is shown that the concepts of Unity and Existence interlock in an important way, without being identical. And part of the argumentation of the *Parmenides* is echoed here upon just this matter. (2) No attempt is made to elucidate the concepts of existence and non-existence by the Method of Division. The heroic attempt of Meinong to show that they are co-ordinate species of a generic concept is not anticipated by Plato. And we can see—so perhaps Plato saw—that the Method would not work just because these concepts are *not* sort-concepts, but that there is an important difference between sort-concepts and these two which is the source of the inapplicability of the Method of Division to them. (3) There are some other concepts, identity, otherness, change and changelessness which have to be operated upon alongside of existence and non-existence. (4) The procedure of investigating the interrelations of these concepts is called Dialectic—which, I think, is only remotely connected with the operation of tracing out sort-hierarchies which is called Division.

Now in attempting to elucidate the concepts of existence and non-existence, Plato makes use of two analogies, one of which he had used in the *Theaetetus*. Namely, he compares the ways in which some concepts will combine in only certain ways with certain others (a) to the ways in which letters will only admit of certain sorts of alliances so as to form syllables, and later (b) to the ways in which words will admit only of certain sorts of alliances so as to form sentences.

For a syllable to be constituted vowels must be there as well as consonants, and for a sentence to be constituted a noun must be conjoined with a verb and not a noun with a noun or a verb with a verb. If we like to build metaphors from these analogies we can say that some, but not all, concepts must be 'vowel'-concepts, or that some, but not all, concepts must be 'syntax'-concepts as opposed to 'vocabulary'-concepts. And existence and non-existence are of these new types.

It is further indicated [253, 259, 260b] that these two concepts of existence and non-existence, together with certain others

which are associated with them, namely change and changelessness, otherness and identity, are in an important way pervasive—they crop up, that is, in all the Division-scales in which we locate other concepts, in the same sort of way, I take it, as 'non-existence' cropped up in one of the definitions of 'sophist'. We are reminded of Aristotle's assertion that Existence and Unity and Goodness belong to no one of the Categories but pervade them all, though his Categories are not, of course, *Summa Genera*.

There appears then to be quite good internal evidence in the *Sophist* for the view that Plato was now discerning an important difference between types of concepts or universals, and in particular that concepts of sorts, which can be scaled with or without precision in hierarchies of genera, species and sub-species, obey very different rules from some others, like existence and non-existence. And the concepts of this latter class perform what I may call a logical rôle which is analogous to the rôle of vowels in syllables or that of syntax-rules in sentences. They function not like the bricks but like the arrangement of the bricks in a building.

Now the interesting thing is that it is true that existence and non-existence are what we should call 'formal concepts', and further that if modern logicians were asked to describe the way in which formal concepts differ from proper or material or content-concepts, their method of exhibiting the rôle of formal concepts would be similar to that adopted here by Plato. But we need not go further than to say that Plato was becoming aware of some important differences of type between concepts. There is no evidence of his anticipating Aristotle's enquiry into the principles of inference, which enquiry it is which first renders the antithesis of formal and other concepts the dominant consideration. There is, consequently, in Plato, no essay at abstracting the formal from the contentual features of propositions, and so no code-symbolisation for the formal in abstraction from the material features of propositions.

There is, of course, always a considerable hazard in attempting to elucidate a doctrine of an earlier philosopher in the light of subsequent and especially of contemporary doctrines. It is always tempting and often easy to read palatable lessons between the lines of some respected but inexplicit Scripture. But the opposite policy of trying to chart the drift of some adolescent theory without reference to the progress of any more adult theories is subject not to the risk but to the certainty of failure.

We cannot even state what was a philosopher's puzzle, much less what was the direction or efficacy of his attempt to solve it, unless subsequent reflections have thrown a clearer light upon the matter than he was able to do. Whether a commentator has found such a light or only a will-of-the-wisp is always debatable and often very well worth debating.

Thus I may be wrong in believing that there are affinities between Plato's enquiries in these dialogues and Hume's and Kant's account of assertions of existence, Kant's account of forms of judgement and categories, Russell's doctrine of propositional functions and theory of types, and, perhaps, more than any other, nearly the whole of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. I may be wrong in construing these dialogues as, so to speak, forecasting most of the logical embarrassments into which the infinitely courageous and pertinacious Meinong was to fall. But at least my error, if it is one, does not imply that Plato's puzzles were so factitious or ephemeral that no other serious philosopher has ever experienced any perplexity about them.

### III.—TWO NOTES ON SYLLOGISM.

BY J. D. MABBOTT.

I HAVE found in recent books on Logic<sup>1</sup> two statements about syllogisms which seem generally accepted, but which I find myself compelled to reject. These statements are (I) that a syllogism with an enumerative universal judgment as a major premiss commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*, (II) that a syllogism is an inference involving subject-predicate relations throughout and that the subject-predicate relation is therefore transitive. I propose to try to prove the contradictory of both these positions.

I. A SYLLOGISM WITH AN ENUMERATIVE UNIVERSAL MAJOR PREMISS DOES NOT COMMIT *PETITIO PRINCIPII*.

We must first consider what an enumerative universal judgment is, and secondly what *petitio principii* is, before we can solve our problem.

1. *The Enumerative Universal Judgment.*—(a) Its Meaning. These are judgments such as "All books on the top shelf are German", "All Heads of Cambridge Colleges are over fifty years of age". In these cases there is a finite group of say  $n$  members, of each of which it is asserted that it has a certain character. Now what is in fact meant by such a judgment? It is sometimes suggested that this enumerative judgment contains or includes  $n$  singular judgments (Kant's *Kritik* is German, Meinong's *Annahmen* is German . . . etc.). It is said to be "a summing up"<sup>2</sup> of singular judgments or "equivalent to an aggregate"<sup>3</sup> of them. But surely its meaning does not include these singular judgments, nor are they to be discovered there by analysis. I may understand what is meant by "All the books on the top shelf are German" and believe it true

<sup>1</sup> I propose to refer to these books as follows (numerals indicating pages): E—R. M. Eaton, *General Logic* (New York, 1931); J—H. W. B. Joseph, *Introduction to Logic* (second edition, Oxford, 1916); J II—W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, Part II (Cambridge, 1922); K—J. N. Keynes, *Formal Logic* (fourth edition, London, 1906).

<sup>2</sup> K. 426.

<sup>3</sup> E. 148.

without having any idea whether Kant's *Kritik* is there or not. It is therefore wrong to speak of the enumerative judgment as a "mere summary" or "memorandum" of a number of singular judgments. "Jones and Evans are President and Secretary of the College Rugby Club respectively" is a mere summary of singular judgments, because I could not understand or believe it without *ipso facto* understanding or believing that Jones is President. Similarly "Jones and Evans are officials" is a mere summary. But "All the Welshmen in the club are officials" is not a mere summary, since I could understand or believe that without understanding or believing that Jones is an official.

(b) Its Verification.

Joseph is here more accurate than the other authorities. He does not say that an enumerative universal is equivalent to a number of singulars but that it is "based on" them.<sup>1</sup> But even so there are two points to be noted. It would be curious if the form of a judgment should betray the type of evidence on which it rests, and in fact an enumerative universal judgment may be otherwise established. Bosanquet (to whom I owe most of this treatment of universal judgments) says that we must not "carry a genetic distinction like this into the interpretation of judgments whose actual content is the same" for "a judgment which *might* be obtained by enumeration constantly is obtained in some other way".<sup>2</sup> Secondly, the suggestion that an enumerative judgment concerning a collection of  $n$  subjects is "based on"  $n$  singular judgments is inaccurate. "All the books on this shelf are German," if it is based on enumeration at all, is based on  $2n + 1$  judgments. First there must be  $n$  singular judgments (Kant's *Kritik* is German, Meinong is German, . . .), then a further  $n$  singular judgments (Kant's *Kritik* is on this shelf, Meinong is on this shelf, . . .), and also a judgment which is not singular at all, "These are all the books on the shelf" or "No book on the shelf has been omitted from the above enumerations". The enumerative universal then is (i) not necessarily verified by complete enumeration, and (ii) not completely verified by  $n$  singular judgments. However, the point which must be stressed in view of what follows is the distinction between "contained in" and "based on". Nowhere perhaps is it more clearly false that "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification".

<sup>1</sup> J. 305.

<sup>2</sup> *Logic*, second edition, I, 154. See further below on this.

2. *Petitio Principii*.—This is the fallacy of “begging the question”, of “assuming what is to be proved in order to prove it”. The fallacy might be said to occur in cases of three different types:—

(i) Where one premiss contains or includes the conclusion in its meaning;

(ii) Where the conclusion is necessary for the establishment of one premiss;

(iii) Where both premisses would not be true unless the conclusion were true.

The last of these three is an irrelevant sense, for all valid inference would be *petitio principii* if this were what was meant by it. It is to be observed first that if logic is treated (as it is by Russell and his followers) as the science of “implication” then in no sense of *petitio principii* is it a logical fallacy. For even if the conclusion is explicitly contained in one premiss there is a case of implication, for  $p$  and  $q$  implies  $p$  where  $p$  and  $q$  are any propositions. Eaton suggests that the distinction here required is one between “valid” inference and “fruitful” inference, to which I should add a third type, “heuristic”. A “valid” inference will be one which satisfies the condition that its premisses cannot be true and its conclusion false. A “fruitful” inference will be a valid inference in which the conclusion is not contained in any one premiss. A “heuristic” inference will be a fruitful inference in which the premisses may be established by evidence which does not include the conclusion, an inference which may therefore lead the person inferring to information not possessed before. As we have seen, a *petitio principii* is a valid inference, whatever “*petitio principii*” may mean, and it is for this reason that the authorities call the fallacy one of proof not of inference.<sup>1</sup> But does this mean that *petitio principii* is a fallacy because inferences which commit it are not fruitful or because they are not heuristic? The authorities seem to me not at all clear on this. Keynes<sup>2</sup> gives three examples of the fallacy. (i) There are the cases of analytic tautology. “All Euclidean triangles are plane figures. This is a Euclidean triangle, therefore it is a plane figure.” Here the *minor* premiss includes the conclusion in its meaning. No one could know or believe “This is a Euclidean triangle” without knowing or believing “This is a plane figure”. This inference is therefore valid but neither fruitful nor heuristic. I agree here with Keynes. (ii) The second case of *petitio* quoted by

<sup>1</sup> K. 425, J. 310, E. 144.

<sup>2</sup> K. 426.

Keynes is that of a syllogism using as its major premiss a proposition established by evidence which includes the proposition to be demonstrated. "All S are P, all M are S; therefore all M are P. But all M are P and all S are M; therefore all S are P." This whole argument is valid but not fruitful. But it is to be observed that the argument is not a syllogism but a sorites or series of syllogisms, and only a sorites can commit the fallacy in this form. This case is therefore irrelevant to the question of the validity or fruitfulness of the syllogism.

3. *The Enumerative Universal Judgment and Petitio Principii*.—In both of Keynes' cases above the inference is certainly valid but not fruitful. His third example is that which raises my query. He says that the fallacy is also committed by syllogisms where the major premiss is an enumerative universal "summing up a number of particular instances each of which has been separately considered".<sup>1</sup> Joseph agrees with this. "We saw that the crucial question" (sc. whose solution will decide whether the syllogism commits *petitio principii*) "here concerned the nature of the major premiss; is it universal or merely enumerative? is it based on an enumeration of particulars or on the connexion of universals? If it is enumerative and rests on a previous review of all the particulars included in the middle term the charge of *petitio* is sustained."<sup>2</sup> Eaton agrees also. The problem depends on how the conclusion is "wrapped up in the premisses". "It is possible to state pseudo-general propositions which are equivalent to aggregates of singular propositions." He gives "All the books in this room are on philosophy" as an example, and adds that these limited generalisations are "the only kind that can possibly beg the question when they are used in deduction".<sup>3</sup>

We have already seen that Eaton and Keynes leave us in doubt whether they think the meaning of the enumerative universal includes the singulars within it. "Summing up" and "equivalent" suggest that they do. We have already rejected this. "All the books in this room are on philosophy" does not include "*Leviathan* is on philosophy". The syllogism with an enumerative universal major premiss is therefore not only valid, as are Keynes' other two examples of *petitio*, but also fruitful, while his other two are not. If *petitio* is defined as (i) above, these syllogisms do not commit it.

Joseph, however, as we saw, is clearer. He says that the enumerative universal "could not be established without

<sup>1</sup> K. 426.<sup>2</sup> J. 304.<sup>3</sup> E. 148-149.



establishing the singulars", not that the singulars are contained or included in it. He therefore can maintain that such syllogisms are both valid and fruitful, but that they are not heuristic, that they cannot lead to knowledge not possessed before.

Now this charge might be met by saying that logic has no concern with how the premisses of an inference are established, nor with whether they are true or known to be true. I state "All the heads of Cambridge Colleges are over 51" and I ask "Do you understand that? If so, do you follow the reasoning: All the heads of Cambridge Colleges are over 51; Spens is head of a Cambridge College, therefore he is over 51, or do you claim that there is a fallacy here?" If my interlocutor says "Do you know that all heads are over 51? how did you establish it? Is it true?" I reply, "I did not establish it, and I do not know whether it is true. But anyhow the inference is sound." To ask how premisses are established before deciding whether fallacies are committed is in effect to deny to logic all inference from false or dubious premisses. This is the answer a rigorous logician might make, and in effect Eaton makes it. "Progress by inference from the known to the unknown may be more important for knowledge than passage from the known to the known; but psychological novelty must be distinguished from validity and question-begging. The charge that some syllogisms and, in general, some deductions do not lead to novel conclusions is thus no serious argument against deductive inference."<sup>1</sup> But holding this view Eaton has no case at all against the syllogism with the enumerative major premiss. It is neither invalid nor question-begging. A lack of "psychological novelty" in the conclusion is the only possible charge against it and this Eaton holds to be logically uninteresting and unimportant.

I should myself disagree with this degree of logical rigour. I think there is one way in which it is fair for a logician to ask how a premiss is established. That is the question: Does the form of any premiss involve facts about the fruitful inferences of which it must be the conclusion? Joseph's view is clearly that the form of the enumerative universal judgment does involve such facts. "If in the proposition *All B is A*, I mean not that *B as such* is *A*, but that *All the B's* are *A*, I must certainly have examined *C* (if that is one of them) before making the assertion; and therefore the major premiss, *All B is A*, rests (*inter alia*) on the present conclusion, *C is A*."<sup>2</sup> Johnson is

<sup>1</sup> E. 147.<sup>2</sup> J. 302.

equally clear. He formulates the distinction, which, in Eaton, appears as that between logical and psychological considerations, as one between constitutive and epistemic.<sup>1</sup> He agrees that "the charge of circularity or *petitio principii* is epistemic"<sup>2</sup> and therefore concerns the question "What must have been asserted for this (enumerative) proposition to be asserted?" The charge against the syllogism with the enumerative major premiss is therefore that in order to assert its major premiss I must have previously asserted its conclusion, and therefore that such a syllogism cannot lead to knowledge not possessed before. Even this charge I deny.

If we consider the syllogisms in which it is generally agreed that *petitio* is not committed we shall find our clue to the error in the charge formulated above. They will be cases in which "the grounds for accepting the truth of the premisses are quite independent of any explicit knowledge of the truth of the conclusion".<sup>3</sup> Major premisses which satisfy this condition are, according to Keynes, who is followed by Joseph, of three types: (i) statements of intrinsic or intensional connexion of characteristics such as those of mathematics or "anything coloured is extended", (ii) general statements accepted on authority, such as those of law, e.g., "All treason is a capital offence", or (iii) the conclusions of scientific inductions, such as "all putrefaction is caused by organisms". Now in order to reject Joseph's statement that "If I mean *All the B's are A*, I must certainly have examined C (if that is one) before making the assertion" it is necessary only to point out that statements of the form "All the B's are A", involving no intrinsic connexion between B and A as such, may fall into Keynes' second class above, and be accepted on authority. Their form can give no clue to their source. If two people are working together on a statistical enquiry, both may completely forget which of them did some particular piece of enumeration, yet both may later use the result of that enumeration equally fruitfully. I have recently worked out some statistics concerning the work of Oxford men in the Civil Service examinations. I worked on confidential data and noted among other conclusions that "All the Oxford mathematical candidates in 1938 got low marks on the compulsory papers". Now suppose the mathematics tutor of Cardinal College argues "All Oxford mathematical candidates in 1938 got low marks on their compulsory papers (authority: Mabbott) and my pupil Smith was sitting in 1938, therefore he

<sup>1</sup> J. II, 8.<sup>2</sup> J. II, xix.<sup>3</sup> K. 427.

got low marks on these papers", how can it be maintained that the tutor has committed *petitio principii*? When we say "a heuristic inference must lead to a conclusion not known before" the word "known" is elliptical, and surely for there to be a fallacy it must mean "known to the person inferring", and we have shown the conclusion need not be known *by him*. The ambiguity comes out even more clearly in Johnson's formulation of the epistemic conditions for valid inference, those conditions which according to him are broken in *petitio principii*. The relevant condition is first stated thus: When I am to infer  $p$  from  $q$  "the asserting of  $p$  must be possible without reference to the asserting of  $q$ ".<sup>1</sup> The words "without reference to" are of course very vague, and the condition is restated by Johnson on the following page, "the asserting of the proposition  $p$  should not have implied the asserting of the proposition  $q$ ". But here again it is obscure by whom the assertions are supposed to be made, yet the validity of my inferring must surely be independent of the facts about what others have asserted.

There is a further ambiguity in the assertion that a heuristic inference must lead to a conclusion not known before, and it lies in the word "before". It might be said that, whereas the tutor of Cardinal College can use the enumerative major premiss in a heuristic syllogism, I myself could not, since I worked out the statistics and therefore know that Smith got low marks prior to knowing that all the Oxford mathematicians did so. Suppose however a man calls on me and says "What marks did I get on my Civil Service essay?" I should reply "I do not know". If he added "I am Smith of Cardinal College," I should again reply "I don't know", because I have long forgotten all the detailed names and figures. But if he adds "I read mathematics" I can say at once, "Then you got low marks", for I have not forgotten that all the Oxford mathematicians did so. This is the ambiguity in the word "before". If it means "at any time before, however remote", it makes the original charge true but surely irrelevant. For any fallacy to occur in an inference the word "before" ought surely to mean "at earlier stages of that inference". I am claiming therefore that a syllogism with an enumerative major premiss can lead to a conclusion (a) not included in any premiss, (b) not known by the person making the inference prior to its apprehension as necessitated by the premisses. I can admit that the conclusion will not be new knowledge if "new" means "never before known by anybody in the whole world".

<sup>1</sup> J. II, 8.

It may be objected to the whole of the above argument that it is vitiated by a loose usage of the word "known". I may have forced the admission that the tutor of Cardinal College could reach a conclusion new to him if he accepted the enumerative major premiss on my authority. But anything so accepted cannot strictly be "known", nor therefore can any conclusion derived from it. And similarly in the case where I had forgotten the evidence but retained the conclusion it would be held that I did not *know* the universal judgment to be true. Only the person who has done the enumeration and retained in his mind the particulars can be said to *know* the enumerative universal and his use of it would involve *petitio principii*, since the conclusion is one of the singulars which must be retained throughout if the universal is to be known.

I should maintain against this type of argument that the question whether premisses are "known" or not in this strict sense is always irrelevant to the logic of inference, and if "proof" requires that premisses and conclusion should be known to be true then I should like to see any syllogism which is a proof. And as for my particular type of premiss I should have thought it obvious that even I at the time of enumerating do not *know* the enumerative universal. For its truth would depend on (a) my having remembered accurately the successive singular judgments, or recorded them accurately and read my record accurately, and (b) on my having omitted no Oxford mathematician, and (c) on my having read the mark sheet accurately in each particular case. So I should deny that I have ever known that all the Oxford mathematicians got low marks in their compulsory papers. I should even add that I should sometimes accept authority as a more probable source of truth in an enumerative universal than actual enumeration by myself. If, for example, I had a communication from the Civil Service which ran "With reference to your statement about Oxford mathematicians, said statement is false" I should accept their authority against any enumeration of my own, however carefully performed. For the Commissioners have facilities which I have not for avoiding all the three sources of error noted above. (a) They have statistical experts whose trained memory and recording methods are no doubt greatly superior to mine. (b) They have the full records of each candidate, whereas I had to search through Calendars and Class Lists for my singular judgments and could easily have missed a name or have assumed that J. Smith, the Civil Service mathematical candidate, was J. Smith the Cardinal College mathematical scholar, when they

were two different people. (c) They have the actual papers, whereas I had a complex mark sheet in which "column error" is always possible.

I conclude therefore that there is no sense of *petitio principii* relevant to logic, in which a syllogism with an enumerative universal major premiss must commit this fallacy.

## II. THE SUBJECT-PREDICATE RELATION IS NOT TRANSITIVE.

It has been generally recognised that the syllogism is not the only valid form of demonstrative inference. Inferences such as "A is equal to B, B is equal to C, therefore A is equal to C" are not, as they stand, syllogistic, nor is their "reduction" to syllogistic form by importing an axiom as a major premiss a legitimate way of exhibiting the inference concerned. It has also been recognised that there are certain relations such that, if R is the relation, ARB and BRC together imply ARC. These relations have been called "transitive". Here the validity of a form of inference is connected with the type of relation asserted in its constituent judgments. It was thereupon assumed that the limitation of the field of application of the syllogistic form was due to the special character of the subject-matter to which it applied and that the subject-matter was demarcated by the appearance of a special type of relation in the constituent judgments. This is held to be the subject-predicate relation. Now if it is true that premisses and conclusion all assert subject-predicate relations, then the subject-predicate relation is transitive. This is implied by Joseph's description of syllogism: "A syllogism is an argument in which, from the given relation of two terms, *in the way of subject and predicate*, to the same third term, there follows necessarily a relation, *in the way of subject and predicate*, between those two terms themselves".<sup>1</sup> Eaton asserts the transitivity explicitly. "Syllogisms are valid because the relation of predication is transitive."<sup>2</sup> This is the second point I wish to attack.

Now on the "extensional" theory of syllogism, *i.e.*, the view that a syllogism is an inference concerning class-inclusions, the position is correct, for the relation of class-inclusion is certainly transitive. For a relation to be transitive, however, it is essential that its terms should have the same general character. Equality relates quantities, sequence relates events, inclusion relates classes, but what does the subject-predicate relation relate? The only answer is subjects to predicates. But are subjects and predicates entities of the same type? Clearly not. Then the

<sup>1</sup> J. 249. Italics original.

<sup>2</sup> E. 222.

relation cannot be transitive. For example, in a syllogism in Barbara: "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal"—if each judgment asserts a subject-predicate relation the middle term will be both a subject and a predicate. This is impossible if subject and predicate are entities of different types. If the minor premiss "Socrates is a man" is really asserting a subject-predicate relation, then "humanity" is the predicate. But if so, the major premiss must be asserting a relation between "humanity" and "mortality" and *this* relation cannot be a subject-predicate relation. "Mortal" is not a predicate of the predicate "humanity". Joseph, I think, may intend to counter this argument by saying that it depends on confusing "predicate" with "attribute". "Predicate" is the wider term, and even when an attribute is a predicate it is so only when it is predicated. For instance, "we should not ordinarily call it an attribute of Mr. Pickwick to have been once impounded" and "Blue is an attribute of the star-gentian really and always: a predicate only when one *judges* that the star-gentian is blue".<sup>1</sup> "Subject-predicate" is therefore a logical relation, "subject-attribute" a real relation.

Now there are difficulties which I shall touch on below about the "subject-predicate relation" and about the entities it relates, but it is fair to recognise here that Joseph's work is an introduction to Formal Logic and without much "taking for granted" on these fundamental difficulties the student could never be introduced to the subject of syllogism. But my point is this. Even if these difficulties are waived and if we accept "terms" as the ultimate atoms for logic and "the subject-predicate relation" as a peculiar type of relation between them, there still arises the internal inconsistency of having to treat subject terms as predicates and *vice versa*. For, even if "predicate" is a wider term than "attribute" and includes "north of London" or "having once been impounded", a term which is a predicate in one judgment cannot be a subject in another. "North of London" and "having been impounded" cannot themselves have predicates. There are places in Joseph where this is implicitly admitted. "The middle term is a character not a class"—character being here used as the term wider than attribute needed to include "north of London", etc. The major premiss then asserts a connexion of characters; "the syllogism works through the connexion of concepts or universals".<sup>2</sup> Even where the major premiss looks like a subject-predicate statement, *e.g.*, "Sponges are vegetables", we must

<sup>1</sup> J. 252.<sup>2</sup> J. 306.

remind ourselves of the discussion of subject and predicate earlier in the book,<sup>1</sup> in which a distinction is drawn between the "concrete subject" of a judgment and the "subject-concept" which may be only "a detail in the being of the subject". In such a case the predicate is a predicate not of the "subject-concept" but of the "concrete subject". For instance, in "The emperor is dead", "emperor" is a "subject-concept" and the relation between it and "dead" is not a subject-predicate relation. So also in "Sponges are vegetables" the character "vegetable" is not a predicate of the character "sponge". Joseph objects to the maxim "*nota notae est nota rei ipsius*" as a statement of the axiom of syllogistic argument on the ground that it suggests that "one attribute is conceived to qualify another in the same way as an attribute qualifies a concrete subject".<sup>2</sup> My point is that there is *no* "way in which one attribute qualifies another attribute". Yet only if there is such a way, and if it is the same as the other way referred to, can the syllogism be regarded as asserting a series of subject-predicate relations and that relation as therefore transitive.

The difficulties of the subject-predicate relation can be noted only briefly here, as they take us into the foundations of logic and as recent logical theory seems rather to have shelved than to have solved them. They are, however, relevant to the subject of the present notes because any doubt about the subject-predicate relation should involve doubts about the treatment of syllogism as a department of formal logic demarcated by the dominance of that relation. Whitehead expresses these doubts as vigorously as anyone. "Predication is a muddled notion confusing many different relations under a common form of speech."<sup>3</sup> He obviously regards the distinction between subject and predicate as purely one of grammar or language. Now Eaton seems to me to combine Joseph's view that "the subject-predicate relation" is a definite type of logical relation with Whitehead's view that it is a name for a muddle. Compare "Predication is a rough-and-ready idea that covers a multitude of defects in the classical logic",<sup>4</sup> with "Syllogisms are valid because the relation of predication is transitive".<sup>5</sup> The error of the classical logic is also said to arise as follows: "The subject-predicate logic is not full-grown. Choosing the least complex of all possible forms of proposition—one that ascribes an attribute to a subject—it attempts to pour all other propositional

<sup>1</sup> J. 23.<sup>2</sup> J. 308.<sup>3</sup> *The Concept of Nature*, p. 19.<sup>4</sup> E. 66.<sup>5</sup> E. 222.



forms into the simple mould and thence to construct all types of demonstration. A fragment of logic is mistaken for the whole."<sup>1</sup> Now this seems to me to imply that, when the subject-predicate form is cleared of confusion, it applies strictly only to subject-attribute material, and that when we construct inferences concerning subjects and attributes the syllogistic moulds are accurate formulations of these inferences; and syllogism would then be a part of formal logic, that part dealing with premisses which ascribe an attribute to a subject. The assertion that syllogisms are valid because predication is transitive should then be more accurately stated so as to run "Syllogisms are valid because the subject-attribute relation is transitive". But we have seen that the subject-attribute relation is certainly not transitive.

The other and more formidable difficulty is the problem of "terms". If we accept Joseph's view that the subject-predicate relation is a logical relation but the subject-attribute relation is a real relation, we must go on to ask what the entities are which are related by logical relations. What are "terms" in logic? They are not *words* but objects of thought,<sup>2</sup> and the passage quoted above from J. 252 suggests that "objects of thought" are realities. When I judge falsely, then, that star-gentians are pink, all the real star-gentians have both the attribute blue and the predicate pink, and thought has then the power of relating realities otherwise than as they are really related. I am sure there is no easy solution to this problem and the attempts to meet it by identifying logic with metaphysics on the one hand or grammar on the other seem to me simply to shelve the difficulty. But this difficulty should make us even more suspicious of "the subject-predicate relation" considered as a special type of relation distinct from grammatical relations of substantive and adjective (or verb) on the one hand and real relations such as subject and attribute on the other.

To sum up the argument of this second note I have maintained (i) that I find no such clarity about the notion of "the subject-predicate relation" as would enable syllogism to be distinguished from other forms of inference by its aid, (ii) that even if there is such a type of relation, it cannot be said to be transitive.

<sup>1</sup> E. 66.<sup>2</sup> J. 18-19.

#### IV.—KANT AND GREEK ETHICS (I.).

BY KLAUS REICH.

(Translated by W. H. WALSH.)

##### INTRODUCTORY.

It is a commonplace among historians that Greek philosophy, in its genuine form, lay more or less outside the horizon of the philosophers and "humanists" of eighteenth-century Germany. In support of this judgment the cases of Kant and Goethe, in particular, are pointed to, and it is asked what contact they had with the true thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Greek Stoics and Plotinus; whether that thought had any influence on them and whether they ever succeeded in understanding their own relationship to it. And the answer we are given is that the only contacts between eighteenth-century Germany and the Greeks were of a very slight nature, and that the operation of a vast mass of superficial prejudices produced by a scholastic tradition rendered even these unfruitful. Yet how different (we are told) were the relations of these thinkers to the Romans: think of the part played by a Lucretius or a Seneca in their daily lives. But surely it is a fact that the philosopher at least ought to study the founders of his science, not simply for amusement's sake but to understand his own problems. So that finally the question is put whether philosophy in the eighteenth century must not have suffered considerable damage from the neglect of such study.

The answer to such a question is that the judgment of an eighteenth-century philosopher about the matter must have been very different from ours. The object of studying the history of philosophy is to become familiar with a philosophical tradition, so that we do not tackle the problems peculiar to our subject with minds which are crude and inexperienced. Now in twentieth-century Germany we have no natural philosophical tradition, and there is therefore nothing absurd in our falling back on historical sources and studying the thinkers from whom mankind first learnt. But in the eighteenth century German

philosophy was better off than it is now. It was better off because it was already in possession of the thing which we have to look for in the remote past of the Mediterranean world if we wish to free ourselves from the blindness and crudity of mind which are our natural lot: it had a philosophical tradition, presented, if not in a noble form, at least in one which was respectable and soundly conceived. Periwig and plait did not prevent the schoolmaster of that time from turning his pupil into a competent workman. How much of the true content of philosophy could be learnt from a combination of Wolff and Baumgarten with Lucretius and Seneca can be seen in the earlier works of Kant. If we now had a philosophical tradition in Germany, the *Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund*, the *chef d'œuvre* of Kant's dogmatic period, would enjoy the reputation it deserves, alike for its thoroughness and for the elegance of its style. A man who was educated in the Leibnizian school and had learnt from the Romans could dispense with the Greeks more easily than we can, seeing that we read neither the one nor the other. I say that he *could* dispense with them; but it is my belief that if such a person were to come into contact with the founders of philosophy, the result, even if the contact were fugitive and took place through an intermediary, would be more striking than it would in other circumstances. Bring a mind practised and disciplined in philosophy, which has developed a critical spirit, up against Plato or Panaetius, and they will inspire it in a way in which they could not affect a modern whose approach to them was literary and historical. Our standing *vis-à-vis* Plato, in short, is that of outsiders; Kant could view them with the knowledge of an expert. We may be admirers of the Greeks; Kant, we should remember, was a master of philosophy. Because of this his philosophical judgment would be different from ours; and he would not need to possess the same materials before being able to frame a sound judgment. The bankrupt and the owner of a flourishing business do not obtain capital on the same terms: in this sphere as in so many others nothing guarantees profit so much as the attainment of profit in the past.

It is for these reasons that I consider that, if the question of the effect of Greek ethical thought on Kant is raised again, there is a good chance of coming to different results from those which have hitherto been commonly accepted. There is one condition, to be sure, which we have to make in undertaking such an enquiry, and that is that we take Kant's moral philosophy more seriously than is usual in present-day Germany, where the influence of Hegel and Nietzsche is paramount. By this I mean

that our aim must not be merely historical: we do not seek simply to throw light on Kant's relations with certain particular Greek thinkers. Our true purpose must rather be to attain to knowledge and understanding of the practical philosophy of Kant himself.

#### PART I.—KANT AND PLATO.

In a letter to Lambert, dated 31st December, 1765 (by which time the *Traume eines Geistersehers* was already finished), Kant drew attention to a work he was proposing to write on the method of metaphysics, and went on to say that it was his wish that its publication should be preceded by that of "some smaller compositions", the "material" for which "lay ready" before him. The object of these compositions was to see that there should be no lack of examples to which reference could be made in illustrating the doctrines of the main work, and the first of them were to deal, respectively, with the metaphysical foundations (*Anfangsgründe*) of natural science and the metaphysical foundations of ethics. According to the *Advertisement* to Kant's lectures for 1765 the second treatise, so far as its object was the investigation of the first principles of all morality, was to be written under the ægis of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume. We can find the explanation of Kant's taking up this position if we look at the prize essay, *Über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral* (1762-64). There we read that from the two formal principles of morality—do the best (*Vollkommenste*) of which you are capable, refrain from doing that which hinders your realising the maximum amount of good possible through you—"no determinate obligation follows". "Not until our own days", the passage goes on, "have men begun to realise that while knowledge is the faculty which represents truth, it is through feeling that the good is apprehended, and that the two faculties must not be confused together." Because the concept of good arises in this way, "unprovable material premises" cannot be dispensed with in practical cognition, "postulates which form the foundation of our other practical propositions. By introducing the term 'moral sense' Hutcheson and others have supplied a starting-point for some interesting disquisitions" (IV. § 2). Similarly in the *Traume* Kant toys with the idea of basing moral philosophy on a metaphysic of moral feeling (I. Teil, II. Hauptst.). As late as 6th February, 1767, Hamann informed Herder that Kant was concerned with an undertaking of this kind.

Yet in 1770, as is shown by the dissertation *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* and by Kant's letter to Lambert of 2nd September of that year, the project had been abandoned. *Philosophia moralis*, we now learn, so far as it provides the first principles of moral judgment, belongs to *philosophia pura*, i.e., to a branch of philosophy free of the admixture of all empirical elements, a science in fact of the pure understanding or of pure reason, the conclusions of which rest on concepts given by the intellect itself and which affords knowledge *per ideas puras*. To draw the distinction between practical and theoretical philosophy Kant no longer relies on the concept of man as in his nature a sensitive being; instead he refers exclusively to the contrast between that which is and that which in conformity with freedom ought to be. No longer have we to consider what is in order to determine what ought to be: what ought to be in conformity with freedom stands on its own in opposition to what is. "Epicurus, who reduced the criteria of moral judgment to the feeling of pleasure and pain, is therefore condemned with full justice, along with certain modern philosophers, such as Shaftesbury and his school, who to some extent have been distant followers of his" (*Diss.*, § 9).

Here we have a violent break with the position Kant adopted in moral philosophy in the years from 1762 to 1767, the position now stigmatised as "Epicureanism". What was the cause of this break?

In 1770 Kant gave open intimation that he proposed to ground moral philosophy on a new basis, treating it as a purely rational science. Because of his pre-occupation with works on theoretical philosophy this intention was not carried out till 1784; the treatise in which the theory is first worked out is the *Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals*,<sup>1</sup> written in that year and published in 1785. It is true that in the third section of this book, the "Transition from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of pure practical reason", there is a series of arguments (concerned with fixing the limitations of practical reason) which presupposes the *Critical* point of view which Kant first attained to in 1772. But the first two sections (the "Transition from common to philosophical rational knowledge of morality" and the "Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysic of morals") are of a purely *analytical* nature; in the words Kant uses at the end of the second section, they simply contain "a development of the universally received notion of morality". There is

<sup>1</sup> Referred to as *Grundlegung* in the rest of this paper.

therefore nothing in principle against the supposition that the main idea put forward in the *Grundlegung* is identical with that of which Kant had been vaguely conscious in 1770 as the basic notion of his ethical philosophy. Let us accept this supposition for the moment: can we derive from it any clue to the reason for Kant's volte-face in moral theory?

Over and over again in the first two sections of the *Grundlegung* we come across expressions of the polemic (with which we are familiar from § 9 of the *Dissertation*) against the practice of constructing an ethical system on the basis of sensibility or feeling, *i.e.*, on the basis of empirical knowledge of "the nature of man". What ground is here offered as necessitating our rejection of a doctrine of this type and acceptance of a new point of view? The explanation of this subject begins at the end of the first section (the third paragraph from the end) and is continued in the opening pages of the second section. The whole passage forms a unity which is scarcely broken by the intervening chapter division.

The passage is preceded by a discussion of the concept of duty, leading to the principle of ethical knowledge, the moral law. Kant goes on: "Here it would be easy to show how common sense, in virtue of its possession of this compass, can in all cases which arise find its way about with perfect ease and decide what is good and what bad, what conforms to duty and what is opposed to it. There is not the slightest need to teach common sense anything new to make this clear; we have only, like *Socrates*, to draw its attention to its own principle. And so we could demonstrate that there is no need of science and philosophy for a man to know what he must do to be honest and good, or even wise and virtuous." But, we are told later, "in his wants and inclinations . . . man feels in himself a force in opposition to all the dictates of duty . . . and from this there arises a propensity to argue sophistically against these strict laws of duty . . . and to bring them into closer accordance with our wishes and desires." Hence (passing to the second section), "an impartial observer can sometimes be doubtful whether anywhere in the world we can really meet with true virtue. *In this case* the only thing which can save us from deserting duty altogether . . . is the clear conviction that we are not concerned with the question whether this or that happens, but must realise that reason in itself and in entire independence of all appearances ordains what ought to happen, prescribes actions of which the world may not hitherto have afforded any *example* . . .; and such actions can none the less be

demanded of every man, since these duties are, as duties, involved prior to all experience in the *Idea* of a reason which determines the will on *a priori* grounds. . . . Nor could anything be more ill-advised than to suggest that morality be derived from *examples*. For every example must itself first be judged according to moral *principles* to find out whether it can serve as an *original* example, that is, as a *model*. . . . Even the Holy One of the Gospels must be compared with the *ideal* of moral perfection before he is recognised as such . . . he must be compared with the *prototype* of goodness . . . with the *Idea* of moral perfection which reason frames *a priori* . . . with the true *original* which lies in reason. If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what must rest solely upon pure reason and be altogether independent of experience, I think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is a good thing to exhibit these concepts generally (*in abstracto*) as they are established *a priori* along with the principles which belong to them; that is, if our knowledge is to be separated from the vulgar and be called philosophic. But in our age the raising of such a question may well be necessary."

Notice the words "in our age": with what other times is Kant contrasting his own? I submit that it is with those when men let themselves learn from Socrates. My contention is that we cannot deny that the idea to which Kant appeals here as a basis for his rationalist ethics in contrast with the moral philosophy of "our age" is identical with that to which he has recourse in § 9 of the *Dissertation* to ground the same theory against Shaftesbury and his followers. In both cases his object is achieved by use of the antithesis of example and *Idea*, copy and original. And just as in the *Grundlegung* he mentioned the name of Socrates, so in the *Dissertation* he had referred to Plato. In the latter work we read: "The general principles of the pure understanding issue in some pattern, conceivable only by the pure intellect, which is the common measure of the reality of all other things." This supreme pattern is called *perfectio noumenon*, and we are told that *perfectio moralis* belongs to it. And a little later Kant says: "In every kind of object whose quantity is variable the maximum is the common measure and the principle in the light of which they are known. The maximum of perfection, which is called by Plato an *Idea* (as for example, his 'Idea' of the republic), is nowadays termed an ideal. It is the standard of everything contained under the general notion of perfection of any sort, in so far as we think that the lower degrees can only be fixed by limiting the maximum."



It is apparent that the same series of concepts was employed by Kant in 1785 to establish the necessity of a rationalist theory of ethics as had been used by him in 1770. They were concepts of which a more detailed discussion was to be given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the sections entitled "Ideas in general", "The Ideal in general" and "The transcendental Ideal". The first of these contains a comprehensive survey of the Platonic philosophy. Kant mentions the examples of duty, the state, an organism and the world, and by means of these illustrates precisely the same concepts as we have seen him use in § 9 of the *Dissertation* and in the passage quoted from the *Grundlegung*. Immediately afterwards comes the following judgment on the system as a whole: "If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting on the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, i.e., according to Ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation. It is however in regard to the *principles of morality*, legislation and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible only by Ideas—incomplete as their empirical expression must always remain—that Plato's teaching exhibits its *quite peculiar merit*. When it fails to obtain recognition, this is due to its having been judged in accordance with precisely those empirical rules, the invalidity of which, regarded as principles, it has itself demonstrated."<sup>1</sup>

After these quotations it is, I believe, a natural and legitimate question to ask whether the cause of Kant's breaking away from the position he had held in moral philosophy in 1765 and to which he still adhered in 1767, although three years later he was to denounce it as "Epicureanism", may not perhaps have been *Platonism*. It is plain enough that someone or other possesses a "quite peculiar merit" in regard to Kant's insight into the nature of morality. If we are trying to discover who rendered Kant this service, should we not look for him in the person of the philosopher to whom, in the passage just quoted, is assigned the merit of having performed the very same service to philosophy in general?

The idea that Kant's standpoint in the *Dissertation* was influenced by renewed contact with the philosophy of Plato is not in itself new. Only previous attempts to demonstrate it have always aimed at showing that it was the speculative theory of the *Dissertation* which was directly determined by Kant's taking

<sup>1</sup> [B 375, translated by Kemp Smith. The italics, both here and in the quotations from Kant on pp. 342 and 343, are not Kant's but the author's.] Translator's note.

account of Plato's views ; no one has thought of looking for the primary object of Plato's influence in Kant's ethics. To prove our thesis we must first of all discover some point of contact between Kant's ethics and Plato's. We can do this if we remember that in 1767 the attention of the philosophical world had been drawn to the bible of Platonism, the *Phaedo*, through the publication in that year of Moses Mendelssohn's book *Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele*. We know that Kant considered that the appearance of his own work the *Traume eines Geistersehers* had stimulated Mendelssohn in bringing out his book ;<sup>1</sup> and it appears that in opening the *Phädon* he must have had the impression that, after the *Traume*, Mendelssohn had felt compelled to bring Plato into the lists to counterbalance his own scepticism and "misology".

It may be thought that the reference here to Plato is unjustified, but I use the name advisedly. My reason is that the *Phädon* is not just a work of Mendelssohn's. Its author himself calls it in his preface "something intermediate between a translation" (sc. of Plato's *Phaedo*) "and an original composition" ; and he further tells us that he has "made use of the form, arrangement and eloquent language of the Greek author" and "only attempted to present the metaphysical proofs in a fashion which suits the taste of modern times". Moreover Mendelssohn remarks that, with regard to the second of these points, that of the manner of reproducing the "metaphysical proofs", he has been able, in the first of the three dialogues into which the work is divided, to "keep somewhat closer to the original". "It appeared", he says, "that there were several lines of proof in this part of the work which needed only a slight change in the manner of writing and a different mode of development from their first premises to gain that power of conviction, which a modern reader misses in the dialogues of Plato." In the second and third parts of the book, by way of contrast, Mendelssohn found himself compelled to desert his master. In the second dialogue he followed Plotinus ; in the third he "had to have full recourse to the moderns and allow my Socrates to speak very much like a seventeenth- or eighteenth-century philosopher."

What is the true relation between Mendelssohn's "something intermediate between a translation and an original

<sup>1</sup> On 8th April, 1766, he wrote to Mendelssohn : "It is the cause of no small pleasure to me to see that my essay, small and slight as it is, is to have the good fortune to draw from you a thorough consideration of the matter". The matter in question was "to seek data for the problem of the presence of the soul in the world, both in material natures and in natures of its own kind".

composition" and Plato's *Phaedo*? According to the usual reckoning (based on Stephanus' edition) there are sixty-one pages in the latter. Mendelssohn gives a continuous sentence for sentence translation of more than a third of this (in fact, of twenty-two pages), interpolated only very occasionally by short explanatory comments; the translation, incidentally, is mainly made from the Latin version. This translated portion comprises the beginning (57A-70C = chs. i-xiv), the end (114E-118 = chs. lxiii-lxvii) and in between two transitional passages (84C-85D = ch. xxxv and 88C-91C = chs. xxxviii-xl). Between these two transitional passages come the famous objections raised by Simmias and Cebes against Socrates' proof of immortality of the soul, and these are, in accordance with the general principle of the work, freely reproduced. Mendelssohn's first dialogue, in which he gives his real proof of the soul's immortality, covers the section in the original from the beginning (57A) to ch. xxxv (84C-85D), which itself is rendered word for word. From the middle of this dialogue onwards (*i.e.*, from 70C = ch. xv ff.) Mendelssohn no longer follows the *Phaedo* in detail, but his argument is exactly like Plato's in so far as he makes his proof proceed purely ontologically from the concept of natural change. He leaves out the adjoining passage claiming that the proof is confirmed by the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. The second and third of Mendelssohn's dialogues, corresponding to 91C ff. (= ch. xli ff.) in the *Phaedo*, are devoted to the same problems, and are the same in form and arrangement, as the original. They contain a refutation of the objections of Simmias and Cebes: the rejection of materialism (2nd dialogue = *Phaedo* xli-xliii); and the statement of the doctrine of teleology (3rd dialogue = *Phaedo* xlv-lvi). Mendelssohn omits the myth of the judgment of the dead (chs. lvii-lxiii), and ends his work with a literal translation of the conclusion of the *Phaedo*.

A consideration of these facts shows that we have an incomparably better right to say that in reading Mendelssohn's *Phädon* we are reading the *Phaedo* of Plato than to claim, as we are perhaps accustomed to do, that Panaetius' *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* can be read through the medium of Cicero's *de officiis*. And if we say that, as embodied in the *de officiis*, the moral philosophy of the middle Stoa was able to pursue a triumphant course through the centuries, surely we can ask, with at least as much justice, whether the doctrines of Plato's *Phaedo*, as represented in Mendelssohn's dialogues, may not have overcome Kant's ethical scepticism in the years immediately preceding 1770.

What must Kant have learnt from Plato for the latter to

have brought about the violent change which his ethical views certainly underwent between the beginning of 1767 and 1770 ? He must have learnt that every system which based morality on the senses or on feeling was necessarily inadequate ; that the distinction between the morally good and the morally bad had to be grounded on pure reason ; that duty must be thought of as the concern of reason alone, and that morality had to be based on Ideas and only on Ideas. There can be little doubt that the necessity of embracing these doctrines could not have been urged upon Kant in a stronger form than that which it takes in Plato's *Phaedo*.

Thus, at the end of Socrates' great speech in the *Phaedo* in defence of his contention that "every true philosopher must be glad to follow in the steps of one who is dying" (61D), Kant read<sup>1</sup> of the opposition of a life of wisdom and virtue to one in which pleasures and pains were played off one against another (68B-69E = ch. xiii). At the very beginning of the narrative Plato had made Socrates remark, when released from his chains, on "the strange character of that which men call pleasurable" and on how it was always bound up with its opposite (60B, c) : a remark obviously intended to indicate the trend the discussion was to take. True virtue—true courage or self-control, for instance—belongs only to the wise. "The courage or self-control of the rest of mankind will appear to you *absurd* when you consider them more closely." After this come the following remarks : "We may say that all brave men, except those who are wise, are fearless merely through fear. But is not a fearlessness which depends on fear highly absurd ?" "And the case is the same with those who claim the virtue of self-control. It is out of lack of moderation that their lives are decent and abstemious. You would have thought such a state of affairs an impossibility." The conclusion of the subsequent discussion is that this business of exchanging one pleasure for another, as if they were so many coins, "is not the way to true virtue. The only true coin, for which one must give up everything, is wisdom (*φρόνησις*). With such a coin to one's credit one can procure all the other virtues : courage, self-control and justice. . . . But without wisdom all that can be achieved is an exchange of passions for a painful shadow of virtue, which itself is in bondage to vice."

When Kant read these words we can imagine that he must have reflected on the fact that in holding, as he did in the years 1762 to 1767, that feeling or sense was the source of our knowledge of

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the good, he had laid himself open to the same condemnation from Plato as is here accorded to the life of the multitude. He might even have thought that—as some scholars have suggested—Plato was making a direct attack on the ethical theory of Aristippus of Cyrene, the forerunner of Epicurus; a theory the likeness of which to Kant's own could not have escaped him. Aristippus is mentioned—or, as the scholiasts say, censured—at the opening of the *Phaedo* as not having been present at the conversation with Socrates, and it was he who made “that strange thing which men call pleasurable” the basis of virtue. It should be noticed that Kant was here confronted not merely with a description of the behaviour of the multitude, but further with a demonstration of its irrationality. The rule of practice of the ordinary man was to be courageous through fear, abstemious through lack of moderation: that such a rule was impossible and absurd was evident. True virtue could only be based upon “wisdom”: upon a wisdom, in fact, which was altogether independent—as Kant would say, “pure”—of considerations of pleasure and pain, inclinations and feeling, and which was certainly not a tool serving merely to facilitate the interchange of pleasures.

This point made, Kant came in the passage at 89c to 91a (= chs. xxxix-xl) to Plato's warning against hatred of reason or misology and sophistical scepticism.<sup>1</sup> Such a warning was well grounded. For “assuming that truth is not only stable and unchanging in itself, but further is not altogether incomprehensible to mankind, if anyone, on failing to attain it, allows himself to be deceived and blames not his own person and his own incapacity (*i.e.*, his own denial of the objective powers of reason), but prefers out of repugnance to charge it on reason, spending the rest of his life in hatred and abomination of rational arguments: should we not say that the misfortune of such a person is pitiful? . . . We must therefore first and foremost attempt to convince ourselves that it is not truth itself which is uncertain and variable; rather it is human reason which is often too weak to grasp truth and make it its own. Because of this we must double our efforts and our determination and

<sup>1</sup> I am inclined to think, on the evidence of Kant's letter to Mendelssohn of 8th April, 1766 (quoted above), either that Mendelssohn himself had Kant in mind in translating this “warning”, or that Kant must have thought, on reading it, that he had had. Kant might certainly have noticed that the passage was one which belonged to the “form” in which Plato's thoughts were presented, and was therefore, in accordance with Mendelssohn's general principles, literally translated.



continually essay new attacks on our problems. This is the duty of all of us, my friends."

It is an easy step from this appeal to the objective powers of reason to its application to the sensualist ethics of the Cyrenaic school, the theory of that Aristippus whom we suppose to have been referred to in Socrates' speech and whom Aristotle was to include in the ranks of the sophists.<sup>1</sup> It is "the duty of all of us" to put our trust in the objective powers of reason because it is only that "wisdom" which results from the activity of a reason "pure" of any consideration of sensibility which can produce true virtue. A virtue based on sensibility is wholly illusory and self-contradictory (*cf.* ch. xiii). The misologist and sceptic is thus identical with the follower of Epicurus. The true servant of virtue must be a "friend of reason"; he must be a "rationalist". It is my submission that this train of reasoning leads directly to § 9 of the *Dissertation*, where Plato's wisdom is contrasted with Epicurus' art of calculating pleasures. "Philosophia igitur moralis, quatenus principia diiudicandi prima suppeditat, non cognoscitur nisi per intellectum purum et pertinet ipsa ad philosophiam puram, quique ipsius criteria ad sensum voluptatis aut taedii protraxit, summo iure reprehenditur Epicurus, una cum neotericis quibusdam ipsum e longinquo quadamtenus secutis ut Shaftesbury et asseclae."

It is in the same section that we meet with the positive expression of a subject we have already discussed. This is the theory of Ideas, in which the "philosopher's spiritual flight" found its specifically Platonic form, and to have formulated which constituted Plato's "quite peculiar merit." It was in the "due exposition" of this theory that "the true value of philosophy" consisted; it was on it as basis that "the majestic edifices of the moral world" were built. "Principia generalia intellectus puri exeunt in exemplar aliquod nonnisi intellectui puro concipiendum", Kant says in the *Dissertation*, "et omnium aliorum quoad realitates mensuram communem, quod est *perfectio noumenon*. In sensu theoretico est *Ens summum, Deus*, in sensu practico *perfectio moralis*. . . . In quolibet autem genere eorum, quorum quantitas est variabilis, *maximum* est mensura communis et principium cognoscendi. *Maximum perfectionis* vocatur nunc temporis ideale, Platoni idea (quemadmodum ipsius idea rei publicae)." Now Kant had found the fundamentals of his statement of the Platonic theory of Ideas in Socrates' speech in defence of his proposition that "every true philosopher must be glad to follow in the steps of one who is dying", the conclusion of which was the proof that virtue can only exist along

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, B 2, 996a, 32.

with "wisdom", being produced by a reason pure of all consideration of sensibility. Mendelssohn's translation of *Phaedo* 65A-66A (ch. x) is the relevant passage. The question is: "how must the soul set about . . . penetrating into the essence of things?" And the answer is that it is only when "we no longer feel our own existence, when neither sight nor hearing, neither pleasant nor unpleasant thoughts, remind us of ourselves", only when "the soul withdraws its attention from the body and forsakes its company as much as it can" and is "gathered into itself", that it can "contemplate reality". The point is made clear in the conversation which follows. "Is absolute perfection a mere concept or does it signify a real entity existing apart from us?" "Yes indeed, it signifies a real entity, which exists without limit apart from us and to which reality must especially appertain." "And absolute good and absolute wisdom—are they also something real?" "Yes, they are inseparable characteristics of the most perfect being, without which it cannot exist." "But who has taught us to know this being? We have not seen it with our bodily eyes, have we?" "Certainly not." "And we have never heard or felt it either; none of our external senses has conveyed to us a conception of wisdom, goodness, perfection, beauty, the faculty of thinking, etc.; and yet we know that these things exist apart from us and are real in the highest degree." Here we discover the *maximum perfectionis*, which is on the one hand *ens summum* or *deus*, on the other *perfectio moralis*; that which—especially in its aspect as *perfectio moralis*—can alone be and is the object of a pure rational cognition which is free of all relation to sense. It is the representation of this maximum which first provides us with a conception of moral perfection; it is at once the principle in the light of which the good is known and itself the highest actual good.<sup>1</sup>

Now it is certainly not my wish to maintain that it was from Plato's *Phaedo* that Kant originally derived the conceptions which I have here put forward as fundamental in the Platonic theory of Ideas. The contrary can be seen from the most casual look into Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*. I will state, however, what I do believe, and believe firmly. It is a fact (i) that after the *Dissertation* Kant never makes use of the concepts we have discussed without referring, as he had never done before, to Plato as the philosopher responsible for their origin; and (ii) that

<sup>1</sup> In Mendelssohn's free reproduction of the ethical discussion of 81A-84B (= chs. xxix fin.-xxxiv) the contrast between the "prototype" and "image" of wisdom, perfection and beauty gains emphasis from the special place in the work at which it is introduced: it occurs at the end of the first dialogue.

he sees Plato's "quite peculiar merit" in his use of these concepts and in the proof that they must be used *particularly so far as the principles of morality are concerned* (he says this in the chapter on the Ideas in the *Critique*, corresponding to § 9 of the *Dissertation*). Now I maintain that both of these facts are due to Kant's having read Mendelssohn's reproduction of the *Phaedo*. I am further of the opinion that I have shown the reason for Kant's conversion to rationalism in moral philosophy, a conversion effected, as we have seen, between February, 1767, and the writing of the *Dissertation*. That again was caused by reflection on the demonstration mentioned above, and that was brought to Kant's notice by the appearance of Mendelssohn's book in 1767. From now on Kant saw that *perfectio moralis* cannot reside in "the nature of man" but belongs to the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* of the Ideas, *i.e.*, to *perfectio noumenon*: the insight into these truths was made possible for him by Plato. Hence the 'quite peculiar merit' of the service which Plato had rendered to philosophy in general can in fact be credited to him also in his relation to Kant.<sup>1</sup>

Once this has been established we see that Kant's whole position in the *Dissertation* over the question of the sensible and intelligible worlds was conditioned by two factors: first, by his realisation, in 1769, that space and time were ideal, not real; and secondly, by his having before him a well-grounded model of a purely rationalist ethical theory in the shape of what we may describe as the Platonic doctrine of morals. It was on the pattern of this that Kant sketched a purely rationalist metaphysics. His ranking of the notion of the morally good as a supersensible Idea led him to ascribe objective validity to concepts of pure reason, objective validity, that is to say, "from a practical point of view"; and it was his moral philosophy which misled him in 1770 into assuming the same validity for rational concepts in the theoretical sphere, *i.e.*, in the field of speculative knowledge of God and nature. He failed to realise that in this latter field he had a special duty to show that the assumption was reasonable. As I say, it was his *ethics* which betrayed Kant at this date into a sin of omission. Certainly his mathematical views could not have been responsible for the mistake: indeed,

<sup>1</sup> Those who think well of the history of German culture may be pleased to remember that the populariser of the *Phaedo* belongs to the New Humanistic circle which included Winckelmann and Lessing and which was just being formed in Germany at this date. That Kant, like Winckelmann, Hamann and Herder, valued Mendelssohn's *Phädon* highly is shown by the circumstance that it is in favour of this work alone that he broke his rule not to criticise books in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: B 413-415.

after attaining to the Critical point of view, he held that it was mathematics which had misled Plato into extending his theory of Ideas to the sphere of nature.<sup>1</sup> An error of this kind, however, was only possible because Plato "thought all *a priori* cognition was intellectual cognition", a proposition which his principle of the ideality of space and time had already enabled Kant to recognise as false.

Kant's Critical philosophy, as developed from 1772 onwards, held firmly to the theory that concepts of reason have objective validity from a practical point of view. As for the question of the legitimacy of a similar assumption in the theoretical sphere, it was the realisation that there was a problem here and the attempt to solve it which gave rise to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Let us follow Kant a little way towards the solution of his difficulties. It is notorious that he declared that he owed his insight into the necessity of raising the problem of knowledge afresh to his perception of the antinomial character of the concept of the world regarded as a given whole.<sup>2</sup> It is also notorious that he avowed that it was due to Hume's reminding him that the general law of causality was unproved and unprovable on the basis of mere concepts of things in general.<sup>3</sup> To bring these two statements into accordance with one another we must say that the decisive stimulus in the formulation of the problem came from consideration of the causal antinomy, that between natural necessity and the possibility of an absolute beginning of causality, or in other words of transcendental freedom. This antinomy has wider implications: it raises the question of the relationship between the world of nature and ethical freedom or again, in its subjective expression, that between moral philosophy and theoretical knowledge.<sup>4</sup> As early as 9th May, 1768, Kant informed Herder that in all the changes of standpoint he was adopting, in which he looked at his problems "from all kinds of points of view", he always had the "whole structure" before his eyes, his "hope being that in the end he would find

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introd. III; *Critique of Judgment*, § 62; *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, 3rd ms, 2nd section; *Von einem neuerdings Erhobenen Tone in der Philosophie*, ad init.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Garve, 21st September, 1798. In the *Dissertation* Kant had not yet realised that such an antithetic existed. It is true that he there recognised a "dialectic" of the principles of knowledge, but this dialectic concerned simply the confusion between the sensible and intelligible worlds, each of which was taken to be a knowable object.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena*, Introd.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. a paper written when Kant was preparing the *Fortschritte* (Reicke, *Loose Blätter*, D 14) dating from 1793, in which Kant says: "The origin of Critical philosophy lies in moral theory in its reference to the problem of responsibility for actions".

points of view from which he could delineate it truthfully." The same thought lies behind his letter to Marcus Herz of 7th June, 1771: "You are familiar with the enormous difference which is made, not merely to the whole of philosophy, but further to *all the most important ends that men pursue*, by distinguishing between what rests on merely subjective principles of human faculties, whether they are principles of sensibility [*Diss.* §§ 24-29] or principles of understanding [*Diss.* § 30], and what is based directly on objects." "All the most important ends men pursue" are, we should note, thought in the concept of the *summum bonum*, and their first condition is freedom. The passage goes on: "Provided that one is not carried away by the mania for system-building one finds that investigations instituted about the same fundamental principle in its most far-reaching application confirm one another. It is in this belief that I am occupying myself at present with drawing up in some detail a work to be entitled 'The bounds of sensibility and reason', which will *both* contain an account of the relations of the fundamental concepts and laws applicable to the sensible world, *and also* give a sketch of what constitutes the nature of æsthetics, metaphysics and *ethics*."

We are now in a position to trace this complete coherence of outlook in the *Dissertation* itself. The new problem of the determination of the validity of those intellectual principles which concern "relations of qualities" fits on to the last section (30). These are the so-called dynamical principles of the first *Critique*, and are exemplified by the principle of the permanence of substance and the general law of causality. The last-named and the principle of the conservation of matter are already referred to in § 30 of the *Dissertation*. And in the same context the rule *omnia in universo fieri secundum ordinem naturae* is mentioned as a principle which *Epicurus* (whose moral philosophy we have learnt is censured with full justice) accepted as universally valid; and we are told that while on the one hand it is "almost" indispensable in scientific enquiry, it is on the other an unproved assumption.<sup>1</sup> It thus looks very much as if Kant had already

<sup>1</sup> In this passage the nature of the 'spark' Hume was to supply is already indicated, but not in an explicit fashion. To make the spark catch fire further insight was required. Kant had to see that if the general law of causality is taken as valid *sine ulla restrictione* of the sensible world regarded as a given whole it leads *ad absurdum*. It is in this circumstance that we find the clearest demonstration that it was the connecting of the problem Hume discovered about causality with the realisation of the antinomial character of the concept of the sensible world, which led to the *Critique*.

suspected that the *opposition of Epicureanism to Platonism*, which through the medium of the *Phaedo* had effected his significant shifting of position in ethics in the years 1767-68, had a real counterpart in the theoretical sphere. At all events it is noteworthy that the antithetic into which reason falls when it tries to conceive the world as a whole is recognised in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as "the contrast between Epicureanism and Platonism"; and it was the consciousness of the existence of this antithetic which "impelled" Kant "to the composition of the *Critique*". The relevant passage is the third section of the "Antinomy of Pure Reason" (B 490-504), and the reference to the historical contrast comes immediately after the problem of the antinomies has been set out. Thus before he proceeds to the far-reaching and delicate investigations which are to lead to the solution of this dialectic, Kant gives a detailed appreciation of the opposition of Epicureanism to Platonism so far as it affects "our greatest expectations, and the prospect of our attaining those ultimate ends in which all the strivings of our reason must finally be united."

We now know how Kant became convinced of the almost religious significance of this historical contrast: it was through his meeting the *liber divinus* of Plato, which is called *Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡθικός*.

(To be concluded.)

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## V.—DISCUSSION.

### ON RUSSELL'S PARADOX.

RUSSELL'S paradox rests on the figure " $\phi\phi$ ", in which " $\phi$ " is to be a variable function and the juxtaposition of the two " $\phi$ "s is to express the relation "predicate of". By means of the definition " $H\phi. = Df. \sim \phi\phi$ ", which is generally held to be admissible, we get, by an inference which generally is also not objected to, the contradiction " $HH. \equiv . \sim HH$ ". We shall try to show that, even if in conflict with the theory of types there were propositions " $ff$ ",<sup>1</sup> nevertheless there would be no propositional function  $\hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$  or  $H\hat{\phi}$ , the correlation between propositional functions  $f\hat{\phi}$  and propositions " $ff$ " rather being effected by a certain semantical concept, which does not give rise to paradoxes.

If it is desired to express the proposition that the propositional function  $f\hat{\phi}$  occurs<sup>2</sup> in a certain proposition, it is usual to represent this proposition by " $Ff$ " or " $Gf$ " or the like. Here " $Ff$ " is an abbreviation of a certain expression, and this expression contains the variable " $\phi$ " and turns into expressions abbreviated by " $Ff$ ", " $Fg$ ", . . . , if for " $\phi$ " certain functional expressions are substituted, which are abbreviated by " $f$ ", " $g$ ", . . . . The letter " $F$ " therefore provides an abbreviated representation of a certain *propositional form*, and only by such a common form can the opinion be justified that " $Ff$ " asserts *the same property* about  $f\hat{\phi}$  which is asserted by " $Fg$ " about  $g\hat{\phi}$ .<sup>3</sup> From this point of view also words

<sup>1</sup> An instance of this kind of proposition appears to be the formula " $(\exists f): (\exists \phi). F\phi$ ", which may be interpreted as asserting that the concept "not empty" (*i.e.* the propositional function  $(\exists \phi). \hat{F}\phi$ ) is not empty. Cf. Hilbert-Ackermann, 1st edition p. 93 or 2nd edition p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> That a propositional function occurs in a proposition is not to mean that the function is spoken of in the proposition and that consequently a designation or denotation of the function is contained in the proposition. The intended meaning rather is that the function *itself* enters into the proposition.

<sup>3</sup> The difference in form between the expressions abbreviated by " $f$ " and " $g$ " apparently implies difference in form between the expressions abbreviated by " $Ff$ " and " $Fg$ ". Therefore, as will become clearer in the following paragraphs, it should perhaps even be doubted whether there are any propositional functions  $F\hat{\phi}$  at all belonging to the "object language". Perhaps these functions are always semantical belonging to the "metalanguage". In this case there would not exist predicates of predicates within the "object language". At any rate, in the case of the function  $\hat{\phi}f$  its semantical nature is obvious (see below).



like "green", "red", etc., which are generally held to express or rather to designate simple qualities, would ultimately be abbreviations for propositional forms.

In order to designate propositional forms, we are using here, following "Principia Mathematica", expressions " $F\hat{\phi}$ ", " $f\hat{\phi}$ ", etc., with circumflexed variables. Yet it should be observed that similar expressions are also used for the designation of other kinds of propositional functions, namely mere many-one correlations by which propositions or only truthvalues are correlated with certain objects, without considering a determinate propositional form by which the correlation concerned is brought about. Now surely every correlation must be effected by some propositional form or other, because otherwise we should not be able to speak about the correlation. But it may be that there are only semantical propositional forms which enable us to define the correlation.<sup>1</sup> We shall try to show that just this is the case with the expression " $\hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$ ".

Coming now to the decisive point of our considerations, we state that, according to what has been explained above, the first " $f$ " in a proposition " $ff$ " represents the propositional form of that proposition, designated above by " $F\hat{\phi}$ ". If therefore both " $f$ "s are replaced by variables (especially both by the same variable " $\phi$ ") then also the propositional form of " $ff$ " has become variable and there remains nothing constant at all, and consequently also no propositional function  $\hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$ . The fallacy responsible for Russell's paradox is hereby shown to coincide with the belief that "where there is a value there is also a function". Russell's own way of solving his paradox consists in the view that there are no such values, i.e. no propositions " $ff$ ". This may certainly be true in spite of the formula " $(\mathcal{J}F):(\mathcal{J}\phi).F\phi$ " mentioned in footnote 1. But it cannot be denied that a really satisfactory argument for Russell's view is wanting, no less than for the whole simple (not ramified) theory of types.

Another function existing only on paper is the function  $\hat{\mathcal{J}}f$ , mentioned in footnote 3, p. 355. For here also a propositional form is obviously wanting in spite of the constant " $f$ ". One might think that in all these cases the propositional form is the  $\epsilon$ -relation, but this would lead to the well-known infinite regress. Instead of " $f\hat{g}$ " we should have to write more exactly " $\epsilon(g, f)$ ", and instead of this again " $\epsilon_1(\epsilon, g, f)$ ", and so on *ad infinitum*. In this way every proposition, simple as it may be, would contain infinitely many redundant constants. The probability of this view is at any rate not increased by the fact that it would prevent the above solution of Russell's paradox. Therefore we do not believe that the relations  $\epsilon, \epsilon_1, \dots$  belong to the "object-language" but hold them to be semantical

<sup>1</sup> The correlation in question here is not that which correlates  $b$  to  $a$  if  $f(a, b)$  but that which correlates " $f(a)$ " to  $a$  or " $f(a, b)$ " to  $a, b$ , and so on.

relations, belonging respectively to the "metalanguage", "meta-metalanguage", and so on. Besides, it seems difficult to sustain the view that, for instance, a proposition " $fa \vee ga$ " is in every case of the form " $\epsilon(a, h)$ ",  $h\hat{x}$  being a predicate of  $a$ . This supplies another argument in favour of the semantical nature of the  $\epsilon$ -relation.

In order to get still more evidence about the non-existence of an expression which, by substituting in it the expressions abbreviated by " $f$ " and " $g$ " respectively, turns into the expressions abbreviated by " $ff$ " and " $gg$ " respectively, it will be useful to consider any two determinate functions  $f\hat{\psi}$ ,  $g\hat{\psi}$ , for example the two functions defined by

$$\begin{aligned} f\psi &= Df \cdot (\exists X) \cdot \psi X, \\ g\psi &= Df \cdot (X) \cdot \psi X \vee \sim \psi X. \end{aligned}$$

When, by means of these definitions, the abbreviations " $f$ " and " $g$ " are eliminated in the expressions abbreviated by " $ff$ " and " $gg$ ", then the apparent conformity of the propositions " $ff$ " and " $gg$ " disappears.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, how could these two propositions have the same form, since  $f\hat{\psi}$  is the form of the first and  $g\hat{\psi}$  that of the latter, and these two propositional forms are, by assumption, different? Hence, if there are propositions " $ff$ ", the view that " $ff$ " ascribes the same predicate to  $f\hat{\psi}$  which is ascribed to  $g\hat{\psi}$  by " $gg$ " is delusive, and, as may be repeated here, is the very fallacy leading to Russell's paradox.

Although we have seen that, within the "object language", there is no predicate or propositional form predicated in " $ff$ " as well as in " $gg$ ",<sup>2</sup> we by no means deny that there may be a corresponding semantical predicate. For it can hardly be doubted that a meaning is attached to the figure " $\hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$ ", and we may further assume that it is the syntactical concept of substitution, more exactly of "self-substitution" (*i.e.* of the substitution of a propositional form in itself), which is relevant here. If we define

$$R(x, y) = Df. \text{ (the proposition } y \text{ results by self-substitution of the propositional form } x),$$

$$W(y) = Df. \text{ (the proposition } y \text{ is true),}$$

$$A(x) = Df. (\exists y) \cdot R(x, y) \cdot W(y),$$

$$H(x) = Df. \sim A(x),$$

<sup>1</sup> The above mentioned non-existence of functions  $\hat{\phi}f$  implies the impossibility of transforming " $ff$ " into " $gg$ " by a genuine substitution, for there is no underlying propositional form in which the replacement of the expression abbreviated by " $f$ " by the expression abbreviated by " $g$ " could be executed.

<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, if  $a, b$  are individuals, " $f(a, b)$ " attributes the same predicate " $f(\hat{x}, \hat{x})$ " to  $a$  which is attributed by " $f(b, b)$ " to  $b$ , although, following the usual view, the two propositions " $f(a, a)$ " and " $f(b, b)$ " are ascribing to  $a$  and  $b$  respectively, the different predicates  $f(a, \hat{x})$  and  $f(b, \hat{x})$  respectively.

then the semantical predicates  $A(\hat{z})$  and  $H(\hat{z})$  respectively correspond approximately to the meaning of " $\hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$ " and of " $\sim \hat{\phi}\hat{\phi}$ ".<sup>1</sup>  $A(\hat{z})$  and  $H(\hat{z})$  are predicates of propositional forms or predicates of predicates, but not in the usual sense. For if the propositional form  $F\hat{\phi}$  is a predicate of predicates in the usual sense, then the propositions " $Ff$ ", " $Fg$ ", . . . result by substituting in  $F\hat{\phi}$  the propositional forms  $f\hat{\psi}$ ,  $g\hat{\psi}$ , . . . On the other hand, what have to be substituted in  $A(\hat{z})$  are not propositional forms but designations or denotations of propositional forms. Therefore, in view of the nature of the arguments we shall call  $A(\hat{z})$  a "denotative predicate", whereas the usual predicates of predicates will be called "connotative predicates".<sup>2</sup> Now, if " $A(x)$ " is a proposition, then " $x$ " is the designation of a propositional form which in turn, if " $A(x)$ " is to be true, must be a connotative predicate. For only connotative predicates yield propositions by self-substitution. Hence, if  $x$  is a denotative predicate, then  $\sim (\mathcal{A}y) \cdot R(x, y)$ , and consequently  $\sim (\mathcal{A}y) \cdot R(x, y) \cdot W(y)$ , i.e.  $H(x)$ . Therefore especially  $H(A(\hat{z}))$  and  $H(H(\hat{z}))$ . Here it must be observed that " $H(H(\hat{z}))$ " does not result from  $H(\hat{z})$  by self-substitution but is the result of the substitution of a denotation of  $H(\hat{z})$ , namely of " $H(\hat{z})$ ", in  $H(\hat{z})$ .

If our considerations are free from essential errors, then Russell's paradox has been cleared up on the assumption that there are propositions " $ff$ ", i.e. propositions resulting by self-substitution of predicates. Of course, it is possible to modify the definition of  $R(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ , and therewith also that of  $H(\hat{z})$ , for instance by the following stipulation:

$R(x, y) = Df$ . (the proposition  $y$  results by the substitution of a designation of the propositional form  $x$  in  $x$ ).

Then we get the contradiction " $H(H(\hat{z})) \equiv \sim H(H(\hat{z}))$ ". This semantico-empirical paradox can easily be solved by the ramified theory of types without using the simple theory of types. We have only to fix the "order" of the propositional variable  $y$  in " $H(H(\hat{z}))$ ", i.e. in " $\sim (\mathcal{A}y) \cdot R(H(\hat{z}), y) \cdot W(y)$ ". If this order be  $n$  then " $H(H(\hat{z}))$ " becomes a true proposition of an order  $\geq (n+1)$ . The assumption of the simple theory of types is not involved thereby, and would no more be involved if orders of propositional functions were concerned.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The question if also respectively only " $(\mathcal{A}y) \cdot R(x, y) \cdot y$ " may be used as definiens of " $A(x)$ " will not be discussed here.

<sup>2</sup> To say that a proposition " $D(x)$ " asserts something about  $x$  is only correct, if  $D(\hat{z})$  is a denotative predicate.

<sup>3</sup> It may be judged from the above that, in our opinion, there are arguments in favour of the "ramification principle" independent of the simple theory of types. But it would lead us too far to go into this question here.

F. GRAF HOENSBROECH.

## VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Die Formenwelt des Tastsinnes.* Vol. I. *Grundlegung der Haptik und der Blindenpsychologie.* Vol. II. *Formästhetik und Plastik der Blinden.* By G. RÉVÉSZ. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1938. Vol. I. Pp. xii + 291. Vol. II. x + 293. Gld. 9.80.

"If we take away everything we owe to our sense of sight—colour, light, the diversity of shape, perspective organisation, atmosphere and the distant view—the presentation of Nature that remains shrinks to a miserable skeleton. What is left of the loveliness of a flower when nothing but its scent and texture can be perceived?"

With these words on the last page of the first volume of this book Prof. Révész prepares us for Volume II, in which he asks whether the blind can have any sense of beauty, and in which he gives an answer which we can easily foretell. The position indicated by the quotation is familiar, it is the common-sense point of view—the blind are *deprived* of the very sense through which Beauty is perceived.

It is, however, not merely frivolous to toy with the idea of a blind metaphysician who might take a very different line. Might he not pride himself on having a truer sense of the world as it really is than could be obtained by such as us, who are doomed to confuse primary and secondary qualities, who are carried away by subjective modifications, who live in a world of imagination, and who make matters worse by being pretentious about it? It is in the spirit of such a philosopher that we should approach the problems of touch, and I shall suggest that we shall go seriously wrong if we take any other line when we come to the topic of tactile aesthetics with which Vol. II is concerned.

About one thing we must be clear from the start, and that is that our blind metaphysician would not be able to make us 'see' his point, because the world of those who shut their eyes, or who have been blinded, is quite different from the world of those who have never seen at all; the world of the person who has seen is, as Prof. Révész puts it, *optifiziert*.

In the description of this 'optification' we meet with serious difficulties of language, and not here alone. In the first place we must distinguish between three notions. There is the notion of pure 'touch', and there are 'kinaesthetic experiences', and we can have the one without the other; but when we speak of 'the world of touch', or 'tactile aesthetics', we are referring to the data

provided by an intimate combination of them both and for this sense Prof. Révész uses the adjective 'haptic'.

With regard to 'optification' there is a difficulty of description. We can say what it is not more easily than what it is. We have to insist that visual imagery need by no means be present, and that the perceptual experience we get when we grope about in the dark or blind-fold cannot be analysed into a visual element and a 'haptic' element, in the way that we can analyse the 'haptic' experience into motor and touch components. All we can say is that the spatial structure, the shapes of things and their arrangements are apprehended as it were on a visual map. This is quite clearly the case when we stumble about in known surroundings, and I believe it to be the case to a lesser degree when we are in a quite unknown place in the dark. We enlarge on our haptic data at once; they are received by a seeing mind; we touch surfaces of things optically known to us, and when we pass from one thing to another we leave them visuo-spatially related behind us. The born-blind cannot have the same mapping-out and interpreting organisation, and therefore their world must be quite different from anything we can imagine, except in so far as we reduce our blind-fold world to a minimum.

However, much can be done to throw light on certain theoretical possibilities in the world of the blind by studying the capabilities of the blind-fold, and in any case it is of the utmost importance that attention should be paid to perceptual fields other than the visual, which has so over-dominated our thought.

In Vol. I Prof. Révész analyses the haptic world, and his conclusions are of the greatest interest.

He begins by a long discussion on the *a-priority* of space. He is interested to show that haptic space is identical with optic space, but that the content of haptic space is in some sense independent of the content of optic space: the blind-born have spatial perceptions, and the blind-fold have direct tactual access to space even though their perceptions are modified by organisation and interpretation on visual lines. This is surely sound enough. The expressions 'touch space' and 'visual space' may be useful but they are not to be taken seriously as indicating two different spaces; they are merely ways of referring to visual and tactual (or haptic) configurations of Space. But what are we to say of our general perception of Space? It is not a simple matter.

From the non-visual point of view Prof. Révész distinguishes three space-experiences: (1) the space round one's own body (*Eigenkörperraum*) and the experience of phenomenally empty space; (2) kinaesthetic space; and (3) haptic space.

There will probably be no difficulty with (3)—"an experience which manifests itself when our grasping and touching organs come into contact with Space as furnished with objects" (p. 99).

Kinaesthetic space (2), too, is acceptable. We should all, I think, admit that when we are moving our arms about "empty space is

made more concrete and more experienceable, though it is impossible to describe this 'concreteness' adequately" (p. 96). "The body", says Prof. Révész, "loses *seine räumliche Unbestimmtheit, Unausgedehntheit, Unumgrenztheit, seine 'ichartige Raumpunkthaftigkeit'* (Ahlmann) and achieves a body-in-space content" (p. 97). For what follows the expression quoted from Ahlmann is significant.

It is the empty space of (1) that makes us pause. If we are quite still, blind-fold or in a completely dark room, is it true that "the body seems to be an unstructured, non-spatial something," that, "so far as an encompassing space is concerned, there is nothing there at all"? (p. 85). On page 59 he puts this to the test. If you are completely at rest, with your eyes closed, and then submit yourself to an olfactory stimulus, "although the smell sensations do not exactly fuse with the internal bodily condition, nevertheless there is no sharp distinction between them, guaranteed to prevent all possibility of mistakes being made, and therefore there is no distinction between the perceiving subject and the outer world which surrounds him. The outer world as such has not yet come into being."

The difference of opinion lies here: Does space-perception come in only when we apprehend space as round our bodies, or apprehend our bodies as in a space which surrounds them, or is space already a constituent of the total experience in the primary 'over-there-ness' of every presentation? It might be put: Is space what surrounds our bodies, and in which our bodies are spread (to take account of bodily localisation) or is space a mode of all presentations whatever, 'ego-ambience' rather than 'body-ambience'?

I am inclined to take the second view. It seems to me that space transcends sense, and that if we accept this we are freed from all manner of difficulties, such as the perception of space behind our backs. In this case Prof. Révész contrasts his view with that of Heidegger, who traces spatial experience back to the experience of *In-der-Welt-Sein*, which seems to me a more plausible account of the matter. If, for instance, you are going to put our awareness of the space behind our backs down to 'knowledge', then you are bound to admit, as Prof. Révész does, that it often gives us an 'illusion of sensory awareness'. If you say that our perceptual experience involves from the start an *ambience*, a 'space-all-round', as its setting, then you do not have to call an experience which seems to me a chronic condition of awareness—that there is a 'behind me'—an 'illusion' derived from knowledge.

However, Prof. Révész prefers the former of the above alternatives—that a non-spatial experience precedes the development of spatial awareness. It is somewhat surprising that he should hold this view when one reads his important article published in the 131st volume of the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* (1934). In this article he gives an account of some experiments he did on illusions in the spatial field. It appears that touch—both active

and passive—is subject to the same illusions as sight. There is a conspicuous instance in the illusion of the two segments. If you take two equal segments (strips, not lines) and place one above the other so that their curves run in the same direction, you get the impression of two unequal segments, and it has been shown elsewhere that even hens are victims of this mistake. If you make the segments so that they can be ‘felt’, then the same illusion is apparent to touch, active and passive, as well as to sight. In order to account for this, and other similar facts, Prof. Révész suggests that there must be some ‘unitary, general and fundamental function’, i.e. a ‘space-function’, which operates with sight as well as touch. But surely such a ‘space-function’ must transcend the body, and operate as a framework for all perceptual experience whatever?

In any case it is admitted that the same space—whatever the true history of our acquaintance with it may be—serves for all senses, and the next task is to find out how it is populated.

In the first place we perceive with our moving fingers more than we perceive with the passive touch. Katz, in his admirable *Aufbau der Tastwelt*, has shown how all the variety of texture with which our fingers are acquainted depends on change of stimulation from moment to moment; bare touch is homogeneous and varies only in quantity, while serial touch provides us with the difference between velvet and marble.

This, however, is not enough information. How do we fill our ‘world of touch’ with the *things* which those various materials compose? Prof. Révész discriminates a variety of ‘principles’. (1) By means of the ‘stereoplastic principle’ we first get a general idea of the three-dimensionality of the thing by feeling all round it so far as we can; (2) we then proceed to employ movement over the surface, along the boundaries, into the crevices, sometimes with one hand on the thing and the other moving, and sometimes both hands moving together—the ‘principle of successive exploration’ and the ‘kinematic principle’; while (3) for greater detail we measure off lengths against our outstretched fingers for comparison—the ‘metrical principle’.

And what do we get out of all this activity? It will depend on our attitude. We usually are interested in identification, or, rather, classification (the ‘intentional’ attitude), and here Prof. Révész makes a very interesting point. “The haptic perceptual process is in general cognitive, and for this purpose the individual peculiarity of the thing is irrelevant” (p. 127). We know the ‘what’ rather than the ‘which’, as he puts it; the individuality of the thing, which is so important to the eye, slips through the fingers—*this* cup is a cup, *this* chair is a chair. The importance of this for aesthetics is obvious.

And then, again, we can only get a schematic idea because of our method of *successive* exploration. We do not, of course, analyse the shape and then synthesise—we have been brought up to know



that the two go hand in hand—but for all that, the grand difference between hand and eye is that even with small objects held in the hand we cannot have a whole of any complexity before us all at once in the way that we can through the eye.

This means that objects which make an appeal to the eye, because of the simultaneous view of their parts and their relation to one another, can make no such appeal to the touch, any more than the eye would be satisfied by a successive presentation of the bits into which a 'beautiful' picture had been cut. This is, of course, going too far, because we *do* get some sort of structural idea of a shaped whole by means of our fingers; but the points which are important for the visual experience, and which depend for their effect on simultaneous presentation, will be missed in our tactile experience, even though that experience is suffused with 'optification'.

But besides this identifying and classifying attitude there is another—the 'receptive' attitude "in which the perceiving subject gives himself up passively or contemplatively to the impression of the object" (p. 175). The impressions which we get in this way are impressions of wholes—'haptomorphic wholes'. What are these wholes? If there is any real difference between the 'receptive' and the 'intentional' attitudes, these pure hacto-morphic wholes are contemplated, or can be contemplated, in their own right, while the wholes presented to the 'intentional' attitude are merely signs of things. Prof. Révész's treatment of the matter is not always quite clear, because whenever the haptic wholes are mentioned it is in connection with the synthesising power which we must have to cognise *things* by touch at all. That we may regard as established: to apprehend things there must be some belonging-togetherness of the serial touches; but the æsthetic question is concerned with the receptive wholes rather than the cognitive ones.

The whole problem is made more obscure by the double attitude possible in receptivity, to which Prof. Révész does not allude. It is a common-place in text-books that the tactual sense is peculiar because we can make a distinction between the feeling we get at the tips of our fingers and the surface we are 'feeling', and we can concentrate on either of these aspects. Now if we put aside the touch-datum which is simply used as a sign of a thing—a chair or a table—as being purely 'intentional', we still have *two* more possibilities: (1) we might contemplate a whole made of touches and movements, much as we might contemplate a series of movements which we make with our arm, or (2) we might contemplate a shape touched and moved over, but objectively considered, much as we may suppose a learner of Braille to contemplate his dot-forms in the early stages of his learning. "These forms", says Prof. Révész of Braille type, "are of a specifically haptic kind" (p. 140).

When we come to the subject that really interests Prof. Révész—tactual æsthetics—we should expect to find these two kinds of haptic forms distinguished, and the question asked: Is there any

evidence that the blind-born or the blind-fold or the blinded can get any æsthetic pleasure, either from forms made up of touch and motion subjectively regarded, or from forms touched and moved over objectively regarded? In other words, could we so stimulate the hands or body of a blind man that the orderly series of stimuli would provide him with æsthetic enjoyment, or could he, by moving his hands and providing himself with touches, weave a haptic symphony?

As Prof. Révész remarks, our minds fly at once to music. There we have delicious series, but there is a difference between the haptic series which we get when we have an object to 'feel' and the auditory series we get when we listen to a sonata: in the latter case the orderly series is provided for us, in the former our hands wander at random, and we provide ourselves with an unordered series which can have no æsthetic value. This may be so with the objects which the blind have to explore with their fingers, but the point is: Can we devise a temptation to explore such that the series imposed on the exploring fingers would be orderly and beautiful?

Such a problem never occurs to Prof. Révész, and I feel it to be because he has not taken up the position of our blind philosopher, who takes touch seriously and treats vision with contempt. This impression is born out in Vol. II, the title of which is: *Formästhetik und Plastik der Blinden*.

How does Prof. Révész find out whether the blind have tactile æsthetic experiences? Does he treat haptics seriously in their own right, from their double point of view—subjective and objective? No, he presents blind-fold and blind subjects with busts and statues that he thinks beautiful when he looks at them, and finds that his subjects make the grossest errors of cognition, to say nothing of their errors in taste. The bust of Homer is mistaken for Jesus Christ, a beautiful lady of Florence is taken for the Devil, and the wildest judgments of æsthetic value are made all round. 'And why not?' we may ask. Surely it is quite fantastic to suppose that a source of stimulation which may provide æsthetically valuable perceptions to the eye should provide æsthetically valuable perceptions to the touch. The mistake is due to our taking sight too seriously. Prof. Révész seems to think that Beauty resides in some physical objects and that we can perceive Her by eye but that we cannot touch Her with our fingers. He is caught by the domination of his own visual experience, and cannot detach himself from it.

If I am right, if it is really absurd to test the æsthetic sense of the blind on objects whose beauty is only revealed to the sight, then the theoretical part of Vol. II is almost completely irrelevant to the problem at issue. I say *almost* advisedly, because there is a passage of great interest concerning the plastic activities of the blind when they are left to themselves and do not have to copy models.

Two investigators, Münz and Löwenfeld, wanted to see what would happen if blind children (7 of their subjects were born blind) were invited to mould in plasticine *das was sie gerade innerlich beschäftigte und erfüllte* (p. 98). This rather tall order was executed with interesting results. The creations are, of course, hideous to look at, but where they represent human beings they do convey, by exaggeration, the emotion they are intended to embody. It is ridiculous to complain of their ugliness when looked at—the world of vision does not enter into the picture at all—but one significant fact emerges, and that is that they are not recognisable to the touch even of their makers.

Prof. Révész directs our attention to an apt parallel. "Just as the dance ends for the dancer when he ceases to move, so does the contact with his product vanish for the man born blind when he has done with his modelling" (p. 103).

This raises the most interesting questions, and ones which would interest our imaginary metaphysician, if he were able to dance. Do dancers have an æsthetic experience when they are executing their dances? If so it would be irrelevant to the issue if we said that the marks they left on the floor looked untidy. If the blind can express their emotions by manipulating a piece of plasticine, can that manipulation be accompanied by an æsthetic experience? If so it is irrelevant to point out that the result of their manipulations is deplorable. And then we have still the general question on our hands, to which Prof. Révész offers no answer: Are any haptic wholes beautiful? If we want to find out we must ask our fingers and not our eyes.

It must be admitted that if there *were* beautiful haptic forms of either kind, it is on the cards that we should have heard of it before this. The form of a marble egg may be lovely to hold, but tactile beauty seems wedded to simplicity, and not very enlivening at that. If there were really much æsthetic experience to be gleaned from the haptic sense we should expect to see more ecstatically fidgetting blind artists than we do.

After this unhappy condemnation of the blind for not being able to appreciate 'beautiful' statues, Prof. Révész devotes the rest, and greater part, of the second volume to an account of the work of famous blinded sculptors. There is the Tyrolean Kleinhans who lived at the end of the eighteenth century and left a myth behind him, there is Vidal who modelled animals, there is Schmitt, and finally there is Masuelli. These artists are considered in detail, and four more are given summary treatment. It is a piece of research into the curiosities of Art which should be interesting to the historian.

This does not mean that there is nothing here for the psychologist. There is a great deal. Prof. Révész shows how uninspired the work of blinded artists becomes when they rely on a set of practised models, which they repeat over and over again, and how hopeless it is for

them to attempt portraiture because they are incapable of getting a simultaneous perception of all the parts they are trying to reproduce; they have to proceed piece-wise, measuring every little line and bend as it comes, and even then there is much that must escape their fingers because they cannot explore every nook and cranny. These are serious disabilities, but in the cases of Masuelli and Schmitt it seems that the artistic imagination can provide their seeing fingers with tasks which lead to not inconsiderable results. The artist must respect his limitations; there are details he cannot cope with, but he can school himself to avoid such pitfalls and clothe his fantasy in formulations which his hands can execute.

Prof. Révész has done the teachers of the blind a great service in calling their attention to these two cases of blinded sculptors, because the lessons he has taught us from their methods can be generalised. The encouragement of free imagination, within the limits of execution, might provide those who have lost their sight with a valuable source of happiness. For this reason alone it is to be hoped that this work will come into the hands of all who are interested in the teaching of the blind.

W. J. H. SPOTT.

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*Descartes' Discourse on Method.* By LEON ROTH. Oxford: At the University Press, 1937. Pp. viii, 142. 6s.

THIS well-ordered and agreeably written book is a contribution of first importance on its much canvassed subject. Prof. Roth has no new facts to adduce, and says so; what is novel in his book is to be found in certain emphases which he thinks have been ignored or refused due weight in previous expositions. The greater part of my notice is devoted to indicating what is distinctive in Dr. Roth's emphasis; towards the end I suggest a reason for thinking it premature to decide whether it is rightly or wrongly placed. The history of Cartesian scholarship reveals that more than one interpretation of Cartesianism has held the field at different periods, and although Dr. Roth's presentation is historical in the sense that he ever seeks to elicit and adhere to what was Descartes's expressed *intention*, it may still be well to be slow in accepting a latest version as final because it is in that sense historical.

Taking the materials of the *Discourse* to represent essential Cartesianism, Dr. Roth examines in turn the variety of circumstances that contributed to the formation of its method, the use Descartes intended to make of it, the justification he thought he provided for it, its inherent weakness and the fortunes that befell it. The novel emphasis which Dr. Roth hopes may have a corrective effect first appears in his view of the relative order of

Descartes's several interests. The chief contention in this matter is that Descartes's dominant interest was in physics and his concern with philosophical and theological issues was quite secondary. The purpose of the method therefore was to promote the advancement not of metaphysics but of the sciences, and the *Principles*, which Descartes himself recognised as central, "has its analogue not in the *Méditations cartésiennes* of Husserl but in the *Mechanics* of Mach". But though he sought truth in the sciences, Dr. Roth does not regard Descartes as the typically disinterested man of science, since he conceived them all to have the quite practical aim of harnessing nature to human purposes. "The will o' the wisp of his life was the conquest of death not only for the soul but also for the body." In a word, like Bacon, Descartes intended to understand nature with a view to controlling it, and both designed their methods to lead to discoveries that would place the resources of nature within human grasp. Descartes's method failed, Dr. Roth agrees with Milhaud, in achieving this end, and satisfying reasons for his failure are assembled throughout the book.

In the second chapter, the literary history of the text of the *Discourse* is carefully expounded and closely documented. The relation of that text to Descartes's other writings in respect of the dates both of their composition and their publication are most usefully treated. Though, for Descartes himself, no more than a preface to the *Meteors* and the *Dioptric*, the *Discourse* is, in Dr. Roth's judgement, incomparably the most important part of the volume published in 1637. Being a preface, we commonly regard the *Discourse* as relating the proposals and aspirations which its author entertained about that date, but the most famous and significant of its contents, Dr. Roth maintains, really go back many years earlier: "The *Discourse* in its detail no more mirrors the Descartes of 1637 than does the first *Critique* in its detail the Kant of 1781." This exploration of the circumstances in which the *Discourse* was composed and printed, and of the facts of Descartes's inner development at the time, lead Dr. Roth to a result of some philosophical importance about the order in which Descartes took up his several investigations. The years 1619-33 are occupied with the Method, with exercises in it, and with metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. And that order of the subjects corresponds exactly with the sequence of the works which he published between 1637 and 1644 (*viz.*, the *Discourse*, the *Essays*, the *Méditations* and the *Principles*). Thus in both series metaphysics is intermediate between method and natural philosophy (*i.e.*, between the *Discourse* and the *Principles*). So Dr. Roth concludes, "the end of his thinking, both chronologically and logically, is the philosophy of nature." "Metaphysics is intermediary, essential no doubt, as any bridge must be, but not an end in itself." He further shows that this order and priority of subject is confirmed by Descartes's own story of his early years. The *Discourse* then is both a history and a criticism of Cartesianism as it

presented itself to its author : it sums up a life's achievement rather than laying down a programme. Although Descartes's first published work, it is in effect his last—the *Meditations* and the *Principles* being really prior to the *Discourse* as a whole.

Dr. Roth, turning next to the nature of the Method, brings into relief its more general character by contrasting it with Bacon's *Novum Organum*, which he holds to be of rather later composition. Finding Bacon more truly mechanistic and less prone to exaggerate our intellectual capacity, he suggests that there arises from this difference "a profound rift between their conceptions of the very nature of method". Bacon's 'art' is not, like Descartes's, a "final" means of approach to nature but something tentative—"it feels its way, modifies itself, it varies its path in the stages of its own self-development"—whereas Descartes's method presupposes "a more precise, although a more confined, world". Neither thinker, however, is interested in his method's own self-development: their concern is a practical, not a logical one. It is the more surprising, therefore, Descartes's motive being so thoroughly Baconian, that his Method (in its fuller form in the *Regulae*) should have become typical of philosophical rationalism. That it should have drawn, in some of its detail, from "the living dialectic of the scholastic tradition", naturally leads one to associate it with a view of knowledge which, if not essentially Platonic, is at all events theoretical rather than practical. But Dr. Roth makes it clear how, though their common purpose is practical and empirical, the method of Descartes is not empirical in the same respects as Bacon's, and he traces the rift between the two methods to Descartes's rejection of probable knowledge and Bacon's retention of it in his proposal to establish "progressive stages of certainty". For Dr. Roth, the special merit of Bacon lies in his lively appreciation of the value of the negative instance, and he finds no trace of such an appreciation in Descartes. Yet, when casting the balance between them, although the advantage seems at first to lie with Bacon, Dr. Roth decides "there is no doubt that the method of Descartes is incomparably the more significant". This greater significance derives from his conception of order, in which we have "a doctrine of 'Linear Inference' opposed specifically to the old logic of classification, and unilateralness is of its essence".

In the fifth chapter on the weakness of the Method, Dr. Roth returns to his central theme that Descartes's originality lies wholly in his logic, the theology and metaphysics of the *Meditations* being a relapse. He thinks a disservice has been done to the history of thought by fixing on this work as the one which embodies the essence of Cartesianism, since this practice has "concealed the real unity in the development of the modern mind". The customary assumption is that after announcing the Method in the *Discourse* and offering specimens of its application in the *Essays*, Descartes had gone as far as he could with logic and science, and so turned to

theology and metaphysics which were his real enthusiasm. This supposition is erroneous, says Dr. Roth. Because the *Meditations* were published after the *Discourse* we assume that the matters treated in the former are logically prior to those discussed in the latter. But the true date of the *Meditations* is 1628-29, not 1641, the date of their publication; from which it follows that the *Discourse* (composed in 1636) is far from being a preliminary manifesto about that which was later worked out in the *Meditations* and *Principles*: "it is the retrospect of a Descartes who has been through the stages of the *Meditations* and the *Principles* and now looks back on them". "The Descartes of the *Discourse* is in full possession of himself. He is not sketching a programme but summing up results." And the sixth chapter of the *Discourse*, far from being an otiose appendix to the whole, is in fact Descartes's *confessio fidei*, and indeed more—"it is the cry of a whole generation, the achievement of which, however vast, fell short of its dreams and ambitions", but an achievement which also inaugurated the next epoch of scientific and philosophical thought.

The Method is of a *a priori* tendency: "physical existence ceases to be relevant, what matters is conformity to mathematical type." But though the Method is of a *a priori* tendency, Descartes's practice is far from being wholly so. He recognised constantly the need of experimentation, and regretted that want of time and money prevented his having more frequent recourse to it. The inherent weakness of his method Descartes himself candidly declared. "Pledged to a method which prolonged experience has shown him cannot bring him to his expressed goal, Descartes is condemned to a confession of failure. The fruitfulness of the science of nature for Descartes' expressed aims depends upon a winnowing of the infinite deductive possibilities by the empirical fan of the actual. The method offers too much, and as the sole instrument of discovery, must be pronounced, even by its creator, a failure." So do we witness the "eclipse of the method" (ch. vii).

Here Dr. Roth suggests that Descartes was not always faithful to the method himself: at times, a different conception of the order of propositions is evidently envisaged. It is an order in which the thoughts in the chains of reasoning are *not* linked in a unilinear, but in a "global" fashion—not in one-sided dependence but in interdependence, 'principles' resting upon 'consequences' as much as 'consequences' upon 'principles'.—This criticism, I would suggest, may have been too hastily conceived. Because certain propositions are found to be co-implicative, it does not follow that the whole field of inference is "global", if that means or implies co-implicative: there is no *a priori* reason why the field should not be a spread of occasionally co-implicative *unilinear* links. This alternative does not seem to have occurred to Dr. Roth, and one could wish the issue had been defined more closely. There is little doubt, however, that he is right in concluding that Descartes's unilinear deduction is in



fact, "as it was fated to become, not a method of discovery but an order of exposition". There rests the paradox of the *Discourse*. The essays "in" the method, which Descartes offered to illustrate its fertility, are not really, but only assumed to be, products of that method. So "the failure of Cartesianism lay in its connecting the *Discourse* with the *Essays*, the linking of the method with its practical application in the field of discovery. The history of its triumph is the history of their dissociation." So did the value of Cartesianism appear in the second half of the seventeenth century to consist not in a specific system of physics or metaphysics but in "a general method of approach to all problems", and in its insistence upon order and precision.

To characterise the later vicissitudes of Cartesianism, Dr. Roth turns to Locke. Having shown summarily but sufficiently how Locke is a Cartesian, he illustrates how restricted and conventional was his Cartesianism. If Locke accepted its logic, he would have none of its science, and set about severing the mathematics and physics that Descartes had so assiduously and decisively joined. "Thus we are led again to the historical paradox of the *Discourse*: it comes into its own only with the rejection of what, in Descartes' eyes, was its justification . . . it is through the death of the *Essays* that the *Discourse* came to its immortality. Descartes' *Essays* left Locke cold, his *Meditations* actively hostile. What influenced Locke permanently was the *Discourse*", says Dr. Roth. (Was it not rather, one would ask, the *Regulæ*? Adam and Cohen produce evidence to show that it circulated in manuscript long before its posthumous publication.) The view of Locke as being in empirical reaction against Descartes is corrected by the fact that Locke's own distinction between knowledge and opinion made him a rationalist. His serious examination of Descartes began after 1671, and it was from this belated study that Locke learned his theory of knowledge. Thus "to Descartes, the basing of physics is the end to which logic is subservient: the *Discourse* is subordinate to the *Essays*. . . . To Locke, as to Aristotle, logic is the ordering of knowledge acquired elsewhere, and its end is not discovery but demonstration."

Reaching his final conclusion that the weakness of this great attempt to utilise the mathematical method is due to the limitations of the mathematical mind, Dr. Roth's thought naturally enough runs to Pascal. Where for Descartes the probable is not knowledge, for Pascal there is no knowledge but of the probable. The point is fittingly enforced by a brief comparison with Pascal's *De l'Esprit géométrique* (the customary neglect of which, I suggest, is at the least a *péché véniel* of British philosophers). Pascal's anti-cartesianism again declares the impossibility of applying linear inference to concretely determined matter of fact.

It has been made abundantly clear that Descartes did not accomplish what he attempted, and why he failed. But Dr. Roth holds that what he did accomplish was the more firmly established in

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consequence. He set up an ideal for science and inspired the marriage of physics and mathematics. Yet the achievements of modern mathematical physics, the issue of that marriage, "offers a problem, not a solution, to philosophy". And one warmly agrees with Dr. Roth when he says "the scientist of to-day, bent on subordinating philosophy to his needs and methods, would do well to meditate on the history of Cartesianism". Had Descartes carried out his programme and been luckier with his physical hypotheses, "he would have been at most an inferior Newton". Whereas, with the discredit of the physics, the method came into its own—"the stone rejected of science became the corner-stone of philosophy". And the formulæ of that method "suggest problems which go beyond themselves and rise above the petty business of controlling nature to our ends". Scientific knowledge, Dr. Roth reflects, soon grows out of date, but philosophical inquiry remains; we are still agitated by the problems which agitated a Plato or a Descartes, and "the *Discourse* remains as a record of the self-revelation of the human spirit in one of its many paths to truth".

So far I have limited myself to indicating the kind of evidence by which Dr. Roth persuasively supports his thesis. I would offer in conclusion a reflection which concerns more directly what appears to be an assumption of the whole book—an assumption which Dr. Roth presumably makes in company with other writers on Descartes. Throughout he would seem to take for granted that the exact content and meaning of the Cartesian or "mathematical" method is already a matter of general knowledge to those engaged in studying Descartes. But I would ask whether it is not in fact an almost unexplored territory, one about which, up to the present, commentators have offered little but generalities. Laberthonnière roundly declares "la technique de cette méthode n'a jamais été fait sérieusement". Ostensibly, of course, the method consists in the four precepts set down in the second chapter of the *Discourse*. And most probably, as Dr. Roth says, the fundamental doctrine of the *Discourse* and the *Regulae* is the same: "we should not speak of two stages of Descartes's doctrine of method, and still less of two different doctrines" (p. 64). Even so, the method is, and should be shown to be, something substantially more than those four precepts. Or should one rather say that those four precepts cover considerably more than he who reads only the *Discourse* would ever suspect? Nor is this 'more' to be gathered by helping out the *Discourse* by the *Regulae*, though that amplification of it should relieve the method of any charge of triviality. What in its amplitude and its exact detail the Cartesian method eternally is, remains to be discovered. It will be discovered neither by limiting ourselves to the precepts of procedure in the *Discourse*, nor by confining attention to the epistemological and ontological doctrines Descartes thought they presupposed and which he developed formally in the *Regulae*. If "the Cartesian method" is to be understood through and through (it might, of

course, prove to be not completely understandable), it will surely be understood only by tracing out and identifying its ultimate presuppositions in the widely diverse regions of fact—geometrical, physical, astronomical, psychological, etc.—in which we are to suppose the formal elements of the doctrine of the *Regulae* to be founded, and by which we are to presume they would be vindicated. Descartes never undertook this task. As Dr. Roth says, he was concerned with his method not as a methodologist but as a practising man of science. The *Essays* were offered as exercises “in” the method to vindicate its efficacy and fecundity, and not at all to vindicate its ontological presuppositions.

Dr. Roth might reply that it was not his intention to enter on such an exploration, but simply to attempt no more than he declared at the beginning of his book. But in its preface he admits that though historically the point at issue is the nature and fate of Cartesianism, “there is involved the whole problem of the value of the mathematical outlook and the general competence of the mathematical mind” (p. vi). Now if “the whole problem” of the so-called mathematical method is “involved”, and if Laberthonnière and those in agreement say truly that this method has never been seriously examined, then is it not premature to decide what is the precise emphasis the Cartesian method imposes? For—the narrower, ‘precept-sense’ of the method apart—surely the correct emphasis will be determined by the method in all its ultimate detail, and this emphasis might turn out to be very different from what can be inferred from considering its inventor’s intentions. That correct emphasis will surely be something impersonal in a sense in which those intentions were not, and being determined for the method’s inventor rather than by him, might correspond surprisingly ill with those intentions. If this is so, it would seem that we are first of all required to understand in quite concrete ways, by reference to Descartes’s special researches, what is denoted by ‘order’, by ‘natures’, simple, relative, absolute, by ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’, and such other doctrines as receive but abstract formulation in the *Regulae*. His contributions to geometry, physics and the rest require to be construed in terms of the method, with a view not to considering the information he provides on those subjects in and for itself, but to discovering what they can inform us about his *method*. For if Descartes supposed, as surely he did, that the efficacy of the precepts in the *Discourse* depend formally on the doctrines expounded in the *Regulae* for their *validity*, no less would he have had to maintain (had he devoted attention to methodology on its own account) that the doctrine of the *Regulae* in turn derives its *intelligibility* from the determinate character of those quite concrete facts of the physical world and of human minds which were the subject-matters of his distinct scientific researches. We cannot, in sum, be said to possess Descartes’s method, to have determined its precise character, and *a fortiori* to have appreciated its proper ‘emphasis’ within Car-

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tesianism generally, until we have read its detail out of those researches and their related bodies of fact that are found in the *Geometry*, the *Dioptric*, the *World*, etc. Our minds await that *approfondissement* of the method which can be imparted only by pressing under explicit contribution the specific results of Descartes's natural philosophy and metaphysics. In this I am far from suggesting that an understanding of the Cartesian method in the light of such re-reading would require us to reject, or even to modify, Dr. Roth's main contentions. But since we cannot now foresee whether a present emphasis would need correcting, the fixing of a new one would appear to be prematurely attempted.

S. V. KEELING.

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*A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'.* By A. C. EWING. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1938. Pp. viii + 278. 8s. 6d.

THE main purpose of Dr. Ewing's book is to meet the needs of the honours student. For the beginner in philosophy a full size commentary may be too detailed to make a satisfactory introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and on the other hand a general sketch of Kant's philosophy as a whole is not detailed enough. There is here a gap waiting to be filled, and for this task few can be so well qualified as Dr. Ewing. He also hopes, and with reason, that his book may be some contribution to Kantian scholarship.

There is always a risk that in setting before oneself two such different aims one may fail in both. The honours student, as Dr. Ewing himself insists, will find some passages of exegesis very difficult unless they are read in close conjunction with Kant's text. He will also find difficulties of another kind where exegesis gives place to independent criticism. But it is impossible to avoid difficulties even in a commentary of this limited range, and I have no doubt that Dr. Ewing has produced by far the best introduction to the *Critique*, certainly in English and perhaps in any language. I am also sure that his work will be read with interest and profit even by those who are most expert in the Critical Philosophy.

If I have any general criticism to make, it is that I should have preferred the book to be longer. The text consists of only 270 small pages. If Dr. Ewing had allowed himself just a little more latitude, the treatment of some important passages might have been more adequate and the book as a whole more easy to read. I miss, for example, a fuller discussion of the sections at the beginning of the *Dialectic*; and although the arguments of the *Third Antinomy* may be straightforward, the honours student would, I am sure, have benefited by a summary of them. But on this point there

may well be differences of opinion, and in compensation for such omissions we are given a valuable discussion of the moral theory which forms the background of the Dialectic.

In reviewing a work of this kind it is hardly possible to do more than call attention to a number of points chosen more or less arbitrarily. If I tend to stress points of disagreement rather than agreement, this is only because the former are more interesting, as well as less numerous, than the latter.

Some of Dr. Ewing's best work comes in the early part of the book. The problem of synthetic *a priori* judgements he regards as a question about inference. This he has already worked out in his *Idealism*. The suggestion is well worthy of consideration, though there is a risk of misunderstanding Kant's own problem if we translate it into quite different terms. The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements certainly need not be confined to the categorical judgement—Kant himself applies it to hypothetical judgements—but it always turns on what is or is not contained in a *concept* as opposed to an object. It is this view which makes it necessary to appeal to a 'third thing', if we are to justify any synthetic judgement.<sup>1</sup> This is not made too clear by Dr. Ewing, and I doubt whether Kant would have accepted the views attributed to him in regard to analytic judgements. Most modern writers who affirm that all mathematical propositions are analytic seem to me to use this word in a sense different from that of Kant.

The account given of the Æsthetic is particularly interesting and is marked both by sympathy and originality. On the subject of geometry I should have liked Dr. Ewing to go farther and consider whether Kant does not offer a true account of the geometry of Euclid. Indeed I should have liked him to examine Mr. Joseph's view, which I take to be that Kant is right in insisting on an element of intuition in all geometry. It seems to me no answer to say that 'mere intuition (observing) will not explain logical necessity'.<sup>2</sup> Surely the whole point is that there is such a thing as 'intuitive induction' (as it is called to-day), and that this is in urgent need of explanation.

Dr. Ewing makes a good point when he insists that Kant's assumption of the non-spatial character of reality—as opposed to the doctrine that we cannot know reality to be spatial—is justified by

<sup>1</sup> Incidentally I doubt Dr. Ewing's statement on p. 252 that 'ethics would be synthetic because it could be at least applied to and illustrated by something that we experience in time'. In the *Grundlegung* ethical propositions can be synthetic because freedom can and must be *presupposed* by any rational being. Such a conceptual presupposition could not give us a synthetic theoretical proposition—for this we should require an intuition of freedom, and we have no such intuition. But it can give us a synthetic practical proposition; for if a rational being must act on the presupposition of freedom, he is as much bound by the laws inseparable from freedom as if he could know that he was really free.

<sup>2</sup> p. 49.

the Antinomies. But when he adds<sup>1</sup> that the argument of the Antinomies is the main argument employed in the *Dissertation* of 1770, he is surely mistaken. Many commentators have indeed supposed that Kant was influenced by the Antinomies at this time; but it has always been a matter for surprise that there is little or no mention of them in the *Dissertation* itself.<sup>2</sup>

In expounding the Deduction of the Categories Dr. Ewing deals first with the Transcendental Deduction and then with the Metaphysical Deduction. For this there is considerable justification, since the Metaphysical Deduction as set forth by Kant anticipates in certain respects the fuller argument of the Transcendental Deduction. Nevertheless Kant himself attached the utmost importance to the Metaphysical Deduction, and he intended the Transcendental Deduction to be understood in the light of the Metaphysical Deduction.<sup>3</sup> This becomes very clear, as Dr. Ewing recognises, in the second edition of the *Critique*, and I cannot but think that the transposition of the two Deductions is unfortunate. Admirable as is the exposition in detail, it seems to me as a whole to give an impression of vagueness; and I think that this is due to expounding the Transcendental Deduction in isolation from its proper background. I know indeed too well from experience how difficult it is to keep the main position clear when one is dealing with the details; but it seems to me that Dr. Ewing's transposition gives the whole argument a kind of twist.

The difficulty is not merely one of order but of the importance of the Metaphysical Deduction in Kant's system.<sup>4</sup> Dr. Ewing is no doubt entitled to differ from Kant as to its importance, and in certain respects his criticisms seem to me sound. Nevertheless I connect his view on this matter with other passages which are not wholly satisfactory. It seems to me to lead to a kind of hesitation about the relations between understanding and imagination, and also about the schematism. It seems to make him attach too little importance to the *origin* of the categories<sup>5</sup> and also of the Ideas of reason,<sup>6</sup> though concern with such origins is implied in the very title '*The Critique of Pure Reason*', and is inseparable from any deduction or justification. Again it seems to me to be connected with true, but rather ambiguous, statements, as when he describes

<sup>1</sup> pp. 50-51.

<sup>2</sup> Compare de Vleeschauwer, *La Dédution Transcendentale*, I, 148-149, and Reich, *Kant and Greek Ethics*, p. 352, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the long note in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, *Vorrede* (iv 474 n. ff.), or indeed any passage where the Deduction is treated as a whole.

<sup>4</sup> I should like in this connexion to call attention to a very remarkable short work by Dr. Klaus Reich entitled *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel* (Schoetz, Berlin, 1932). It treats certain aspects of the Metaphysical Deduction with a clarity which I have found nowhere else.

<sup>5</sup> p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> p. 200.

a transcendental proof as one which asks what are the conditions without which experience would be impossible.<sup>1</sup> Without further explanation this might be interpreted as a circular argument, and there are slight traces of such an interpretation.<sup>2</sup> These traces become seriously misleading in the surprising statement that a synthetic (or progressive) argument 'starts from ordinary experience and from that deduces synthetic *a priori* conclusions'.<sup>3</sup> However much we may by an *analytic* (or regressive) argument separate out the conditions—whether of ordinary experience or of science, is, I think, indifferent—we must find in these conditions an independent and necessary starting-point, if we are to enter upon a genuinely progressive argument to the conditioned and not to fall into a vicious circle. This new starting-point can be established only by finding the origin of the ultimate condition in mind as such, whether we are dealing with the categories or with the Idea of freedom. It is in this that the importance of the Metaphysical Deduction consists.

My one complaint about the account of the Principles is that it is too brief. Particularly valuable, as we might expect, is the discussion of causality and especially of its application to the phenomenal self. There is also an admirable discussion of co-existence—although Dr. Ewing does not succeed in making clear to me the argument of the Third Analogy (which I have never succeeded in making clear to myself), and although I cannot understand why he should regard the category of interaction as an Idea of reason. The examinations of the Refutation of Idealism and of the thing-in-itself are models of their kind.

I will raise only two difficulties. Why does Dr. Ewing maintain that the Second Analogy is concerned only with causality as relating successive states of the same substance? <sup>4</sup> And why does he regard introspection, on Kant's view, as concerned only with representations of physical objects to the exclusion of acts of thought and will and apparently even emotions? <sup>5</sup> Both of these views seem to me erroneous.

As to the Dialectic, I found Dr. Ewing's whole discussion interesting and valuable both in itself and in relation to the moral background. He will, I hope, forgive me if considerations of space lead me to confine myself to one difficulty.

Dr. Ewing appears to think that by calling Ideas 'regulative' Kant meant that they were incapable of proof.<sup>6</sup> It is only later<sup>7</sup>—surely to the confusion of the honours student—that he introduces a more natural meaning for 'regulative', and then only 'in a stricter sense' which he regards as confined to a certain class of Ideas. Apart from this curious use of the word 'regulative' there

<sup>1</sup> p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 110-111. The whole account of affinity in this passage seems to me in need of some correction.

<sup>3</sup> p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> p. 85.

<sup>6</sup> p. 245.

<sup>7</sup> p. 255.



is an ambiguity in his usage of the word 'proof'. All Ideas of reason can be proved to be necessary concepts of reason; but this very proof shows that nothing can correspond to them in sensuous intuition. Consequently—in the absence of any non-sensuous intuition—their objective validity cannot be proved<sup>1</sup> (except in the special case of practical Ideas). The point is of minor importance, and Dr. Ewing may have in mind some specific statement of Kant which I have overlooked, but here again I have an uneasy feeling that there is a failure to appreciate sufficiently the importance of the origin of *a priori* concepts.

I hope I have made it clear that where I differ from Dr. Ewing—and such differences are inevitable—I am concerned only with secondary matters or with questions of emphasis. For his work as a whole I have nothing but admiration. Perhaps I may be allowed to add that it is naturally a very great pleasure to me to find that many of my own theories have carried conviction to a critic so independent and sane as Dr. Ewing. I can confidently recommend his book to readers of every type, and I am particularly happy to think that beginners in Kant will now be able to start their studies on the right lines.

<sup>1</sup> Incidentally when Kant says that they have no 'meaning'—a statement which troubles Dr. Ewing—he intends to say no more than that their objective validity cannot be established.

H. J. PATON.

## VII.—NEW BOOKS.

*The Problem of Inference.* By W. H. V. READE. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1938. Pp. 173. 7s. 6d.

THIS book deals with many of the problems of knowledge which particularly interest philosophers to-day. It could not easily be assigned to any definite school of thought. In fact, "after wrestling with all manner of books about logic for more than forty years", the author seems to have acquired a certain mistrust of the more celebrated of modern logicians. For example, in discussing "the leap of the mind from data to hypothesis", he makes no reference to C. S. Peirce's *Retroduction*; and in propounding a tautology-theory of necessary propositions, he does not mention Wittgenstein or Carnap. Nowhere in his book is there any explicit reference to any Cambridge logician more recent than Sir Francis Bacon; and for "the important modern school of mathematical logicians", Mr. Reade hardly conceals an uneasy disapproval. The chief source of his own opinions, he describes as "reflection on old-fashioned people like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and even Mill": their sayings and their omissions he has "usually found more illuminating than the utterances of later writers" (p. 129). There is, however, nothing old-fashioned about Mr. Reade's own conclusions.

His problem is the Dilemma in the *Meno*: how it is possible to pass from the known to the hitherto unknown—a problem at once psychological and logical. The book is divided into two parts: in the first five chapters is set forth the traditional account of inference. Mr. Reade elucidates the meanings of inference and implication, mediate and immediate, deduction and induction, form and matter, universal, singular, particular and individual. Special attention is given to Aristotle's key-terms: *ἀρχαί*, *ἔσχατον*, *ἀποδείξεις*, *συμβαίνει*, *ἐπιστήμη*, etc., and to Mill's criticism of the syllogism. Mr. Reade also discusses the psychological questions of 'insight' and of 'cogency'. All this, however, is subordinate to the main themes which are further elaborated in the second, and longer, part. I shall attempt a very brief summary.

(1) The author totally rejects the view that inference based upon necessary entailment can ever provide us with new knowledge about the world. Such deduction is possible only within some systematic formulation of knowledge *already acquired*. It is essentially *analytical*, and depends upon the 'sterile' Law of Contradiction, together with the *rules* of the language which we ourselves have framed in order to express our acquired knowledge. Mr. Reade draws a close analogy between such linguistic rules and the rules of chess and tennis (Chapter VII and pp. 22, 33, 60 and 162 ff.).

(2) This rejected view of inference led philosophers to regard a mathematical system as the most perfect example of knowledge, and to regard our 'knowledge' of ethics, politics, biology, as consisting of 'mere opinion' or of 'probable inferences'. Mr. Reade exposes and rejects

altogether the term 'probable inference', and demands a new view of learning based upon induction (pp. 80-85).

(3) The rationalistic, absolutist view of knowledge and of 'opinion' is traced to a fundamental misconception: the 'universal' which Aristotle created out of Plato's 'Forms', and which, in the last resort, lies under "the venerable shadow of Parmenides". This universal, wholly present in all its instances, the perfect 'term' for syllogistic arguments, proves to be altogether useless in the acquisition of new knowledge. For what we learn, when we *really* learn, is always that the conjunction of certain characters occurs with a certain frequency. The relation of this statistical property to any individual case is totally unlike the old relation of universal to particular. Mr. Reade therefore answers the question: *How are statistics possible?* by saying: "only by a complete revision of the traditional notion of the universal and of the traditional problem of inference, as based on the antithesis of universal and particular" (p. 76).

(4) It is part of Mr. Reade's objection that the old universal does not show any intrinsic connection of genus and species; that it has misled scientists and historians into constructing *a priori* origins to illustrate the generic in unmodified abstractness, purity and simplicity (p. 153 ff.).

(5) What is the new universal? It is "a unity that owes its own existence to the diversity of the elements which it unites" (p. 152). The universal "contains in its essential nature, and within its own identity, every kind of variation realized in its manifold forms . . . all alike are comprehended in its undivided unity" (p. 135). What is *given* "can never be more than one of the many forms in which the nature of the universal is expressed" (p. 158); but the given is always of universal import. "Here is a round box. Roundness, therefore, is an attribute belonging universally to 'box'. Here also is a square box. Squareness, then, belongs likewise, and no less universally, to 'box' . . . every universal is whatever it *can be*, and whatever it *can be it is*" (p. 131). The variety subsumed under any universal is, perhaps, inexhaustible (p. 108).

(6) Inference, therefore, begins with acquaintance (p. 167), and its method is inductive (p. 172): we *learn* by perceiving (however confusedly) that a certain variety of a determinable character is actual and possible, and by testing to discover with what frequency such a variety occurs. At every stage of inference there is need for direct intuition, which is "in its essence, simply the apprehension of necessity" (p. 167). Mr. Reade does not propose any change in scientific method (p. 172); but his new view of knowledge will do justice, for the first time, to those enquiries which deal with the 'higher' or 'organic' phenomena. For the mechanical sciences treat of objects whose variations are limited (or better, whose variations have almost no *importance for us*); the Aristotelian fictions of *invariable law* and unchanging particulars, are not hopelessly inappropriate here. But the multitude of (interesting) animal and vegetable forms is so great that, for Aristotle, 'knowledge', or 'demonstration', is not possible in these fields. The new view of the universal and of law is designed to rehabilitate these most important branches of empirical research.

It will be seen that Mr. Reade's main purpose is to provide a *language* suited to the description of 'knowledge' and 'inference' in the only senses he regards as genuine—that is, contingent knowledge, and inference in statistical form about the world of experience. 'Inference' which consists simply in *transition from one expression to another*, in accordance with linguistic rules, he rejects as not being a genuine passing from the

known to the unknown. It seems to me however that the relation between necessary deductions in *mathematics*, and necessary deductions in *physics and biology*, is not clearly stated. Mr. Reade recognises, of course, that in the second case the rules of language by which the transitions are made have some vital relation to empirical propositions. The rule is somehow founded upon knowledge already acquired: but how? In the case of mathematical rules, he suggests that the relation to empirical propositions is either much more remote or else altogether absent (p. 97). But in Chapter IX he seems to argue that our *de facto* inability to infer all mathematics from a set of axioms (which in fact entails it), has just the same foundation as our inability to deduce genuinely new facts in biology without experiment. This argument (if I have understood it rightly) ignores an essential difference: I should express this by saying that mathematical laws have no empirical foundation and are purely 'formal', while the laws of biology and physics have such a foundation. The psychology of discovery may be the same in both cases—as C. S. Peirce argued—but surely the processes of verification are entirely different.

The book is written in the form of an essay, without paragraph numbers or titles, or cross-references, analytical table or subject-index. Its format is every bit as gentlemanly as its form. Mr. Reade's style is the Oxford Decorated: the epigrammatic ornament does not always bear the closest inspection, but the following will serve as a fair example:

"When Greek philosophy set forth on its first adventurous flight over the cosmic waters, it could hardly find a resting-place for the sole of its foot. Some were content to acquiesce in the fleeting impressions of perpetual flux; others, with fine audacity, declared that motion was impossible and change a dream. Then came Plato, to invent the universal, inhabitant of eternity, one and unchangeable, impervious to the riot of sensible things. Knowledge and opinion fell asunder, the one to contemplate absolute being, the other to guide the uninitiated in their stumbling course through a world composed of τὰ μεταξύ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ."

KARL BRITTON.

*Hegel nel centenario della sua morte.* Pubblicazione a cura della Facoltà di Filosofia dell'Università del Sacro Cuore. Milan: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero". 1932. Pp. xv, 395. Lire 25.

*Malebranche nel terzo centenario della nascita.* Ditto. 1938. Pp. xiv, 380. Lire 30.

THE Catholic University of Milan is making itself an active centre for studies in the history of philosophy. Besides a number of monographs, several from the capable hands of Olgiati, it has issued from time to time large collective commemorative volumes on St. Thomas, Kant, Vico, Augustine, Spinoza, and Descartes. The above two volumes continue the series. Since together they contain nearly thirty individual contributions, only a very summary notice is possible.

The volume on Hegel is devoted chiefly to a survey of the spread of Hegelianism in Europe, by scholars of the several countries, each (with one exception) writing in his own tongue. The non-Italian articles show a big crop of misprints. C. Mazzantini (*Lo Hegelismo in Italia*) has the most "actual" task since he is tracing the development of the only living Hegelian school. In opposition to Gentile, he finds no Hegelian elements

in Rosmini, but notes some in Gioberti. The relatively small result of Vera's long advocacy of Hegel in Naples is attributed to his treating the Idea as transcending phenomena rather than realizing itself in them, so that he failed to meet the demand for concreteness which, by reaction against a misty romanticism, was coming to the fore, finding expression not only in positivism but also in the idealism of Bertrando Spaventa. The derivation of Croce and Gentile from Spaventa is, of course, dwelt on. A. Forest (*L'Hégélianisme en France*) has a less familiar field and a less easy task, and is obliged to admit that there have been no French Hegelians. German influence on France came largely through Schelling, despite Cousin's personal acquaintance with Hegel. Dr. Forest has therefore had to content himself with showing the partial influence, often indirect and as much negative as positive, of Hegel on such prominent writers as Taine, Renan, Vacherot and Renouvier, and with working out the view that Hegel set for French philosophy the problem whether it is possible for any dialectic of reason to lead to the contingent facts of experience. E. Przywara (*Der Hegelianismus in Deutschland*) avoids history, and much too briefly contends that recent Hegelianism in Germany has divided itself into a new sort of gnosticism on the one hand, and a religious socialism on the other (as in Paul Tillich, now in America). L. J. Walker (*Hegelianism in Great Britain*) gives a characteristically perceptive and sympathetic account of what is to us a familiar story but on the Continent almost unknown. His entirely right emphasis on the services of our Hegelians in the defence of the religious outlook calls forth an odd apologetic note from the anonymous editor, who remarks that "the English mind is not concerned to abstract the inner spirit of the Hegelian transcendental metaphysic, the speculative character of which makes it the extreme opposite of the simple viewpoint of empiricism". By a slip, John Caird's little book on Hegel is twice attributed to his brother Edward. J. H. Ryan's article (*Hegelianism in America*), the shortest of all, is also the most superficial, a hasty bit of journalism intruded into a learned book. L. Gancikoff (*L' Hegelismo in Russia*) writes a limpid and attractive essay. In Russia, it appears, philosophy began under German influence, Hegel appealing to the Westernizers, Schelling to the Slavophiles; an initial enthusiasm for Hegel's idealism being followed, both in the general line and in almost every individual disciple, by disillusionment. The last three articles are purely critical. J. Engert (*Die Grundprobleme des philosophischen Denkens und Hegel*) considers Hegel's relation to Kant, and examines from an Aristotelian standpoint his panlogism and the problem of the relation of Ideas to the factual temporal process. G. Gonella's abundantly documented study (*I dualismi nella dottrina etico-giuridica di Hegel*) finds unresolved the antithesis of liberty and authority, and detects a corresponding dualism in Hegel's personal reactions to the political events of his day. V. La Via concludes the book with an oversubtle and rather tenuous essay on contemporary Italian idealism (*L'autocritica dell' idealismo*), claiming that its attempt to resolve the known wholly into the constructed, being into being thought, involves a contradiction and goes back to Descartes' invention of the modern "critical" point of view that seeks an objectivity which, after all, is given from the start and which cannot be restored once it has been brought seriously into doubt. Throughout the volume there runs a natural vein of criticism against the features incompatible with Scholasticism—the *a priori* method, the logic of the synthesis of opposites, the metaphysics of becoming, the immanentism humanistically conceived, and the consequent denial of an abiding, realized and transcendent divinity ;

but the criticism is informed by real learning and by an acute understanding of the terminology and spirit of Hegel's writings.

The volume on Malebranche is no less critical. Thomists cannot condone a thinker who hitched his wagon to the Cartesian star. This is the burden of a paper by A. Del Noce (*La veracità divina e i rapporti di ragione e fede nella filosofia di Malebranche*). The opening essay, however, by P. Tavecchio (*La spiritualità berulliana e la filosofia di Malebranche*) argues that Malebranche's theory of knowledge and his occasionalism cannot be exhibited as a development of Cartesianism, and tries to explain them by reference to the spiritual atmosphere and interests of the Oratory as determined by its founder, Cardinal de Bérulle. G. Ceriani (*Il concetto metafisico di realtà in Malebranche*) fastens on the concept of intelligible extension: it is an idea without an *ideatum*, a meaning hypostatized, the consequence of regarding knowing as entirely passive. Malebranche's real world thus leaves out all physical particulars, just as it leaves out all finite spirits. This taking of an idea in nothing but its logical content, ignoring, as Arnauld pointed out, its intentionality, is singled out by P. Rotta (*Il platonismo nel Malebranche*) as the authentically Platonic note in the system. It is regarded by G. Bontadini (*Il fenomenismo razionalistico da Cartesio a Malebranche*) as the distinctive root of Malebranche's philosophy: consistently developed, it would require causation to stand only as a logical relation, and then the divine cause would appear as Spinoza conceived it to be. Causality is the central theme of an acute and suggestive paper by R. Amerio (*I teoremi della causalità inefficace nella metafisica di Malebranche*). He finds in Malebranche three reasons for the doctrine of the causal impotence of all creatures—(a) the disconnectedness of cause and effect when clearly conceived; (b) the position and motion of a body being what they are by divine sustenance, any force the body has is the Creator's and therefore cannot be imparted by the body itself; (c) God has no need of intermediary causes. The doctrine construes all causality after the analogy of the operation of grace and involves a thoroughgoing physical pluralism, the denial of human freedom, and the blurring of the distinction of the natural and the supernatural. M. F. Dal Verme (*Di alcuni rapporti fra Malebranche e Hume*) writes on the same theme, his main point being that from Malebranche's denial of natural causality and of any necessity in the causal relation, Hume only needed to draw the consequences. Causality again comes up in a paper by C. Giacon (*La cosmologia di Malebranche*), who criticizes Malebranche's mechanism, and also his assumption that ideas are not abstracted but given. C. Mazzantini (*Intorno alle dottrine gnoseologiche di Malebranche*), in sentences cluttered up with parentheses, claims to expose some inconsistencies. On the historical side, A. Lantrua (*Malebranche e il pensiero italiano dal Vico al Rosmini*) says that Malebranche was esteemed in Italy until about the middle of the eighteenth century, when the influence of the Enlightenment began to be felt, though much later Gioberti was exalting him as the greatest philosopher of France. A. Dal Sasso (*Malebranche e l'illuminismo*) makes the reaction of the Enlightenment to Malebranche's system his sole subject, but treats it disappointingly. Del Noce, besides the paper already noticed, contributes a survey of accounts and criticisms of the Oratorian's philosophy (*Note sulla critica Malebranchiana*), and also a very useful systematic bibliography of his writings and of writings on him. There are five further articles, but not of strictly philosophical interest.

T. E. JESSOP.

*Preface to Faith.* By LOUIS ARNAUD REID, D.Litt. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1939. Pp. 214. 6s.

THE purpose of Professor Reid's book is to show how much of traditional Christian doctrine can be maintained when all needful concessions have been made to science, philosophy and historical criticism, and to do this in the language and from the point of view of an intelligent, sympathetic inquirer rather than of the professional philosopher or irreligious critic. Religion, he holds, cannot be understood without sympathy, a new religion is not required, and, even if it were, an "intellectual" is emphatically not the person to produce it. Convinced of the supreme importance of religion, and that for us religion must mean Christianity, Professor Reid claims that critical scrutiny "has convinced me more and more of the absolute, unassailable truth in the permanent elements (or what seem to me to be the permanent elements) in Christianity."

Since adjustment to reality demands an ideal, and a satisfying ideal demands self-transcendence, at its best love, it demands Christianity, inasmuch as "This spirit of love is the spirit of Christianity". Nevertheless religion is not merely lovingness but "intuitive apprehension of a spiritual reality". This "spiritual reality", Professor Reid explains, "is something to which the individual's spirit can and does respond, but whilst it is in this sense akin, the relationship is not one of equality, of simple affinity, of the discovery of a reality corresponding to the reality of the human spirit." And later, "The finite individual grows and gains by drawing from a Source which is not himself, or is not, anyhow, his mere finite self"—does this mean not the merely human self as we commonly take it to be? If so, it is a far-reaching concession, but Professor Reid makes no further reference to it. Had he done so he might perhaps have found the gospel saying, "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect", less difficult than he does. His main concern, however, is not with the nature of God—broadly speaking he takes the traditional concept for granted—but with the relation of man, and in particular of Christ, to God. Christ, he argues, cannot possibly be God; it is doubtful whether intelligent Christians have really believed that he was, and in any case, theories of the incarnation which attempt to show that Christ was both God and man always turn out to be explaining away one or other of the two terms. Though Christ may be called divine, it is in a special sense analogous to the relation of a picture to its subject. If, as Professor Reid thinks probable, human minds are body-dependent they cannot survive death, and Christ does not now exist. Professor Reid does not regard either this naturalistic view of man or the inference as regards Christ as fatal to Christianity.

After pointing out the moral objections to the doctrine of the atonement, and attempting to reconcile the claim to forgive sins with his view of Christ—naturally a difficult task—Professor Reid briefly discusses faith which he holds to be a belief, not an emotion, but one falling short of certainty and requiring action, and, therefore, involving a risk; emotionally grounded faith is unstable as well as irrational. The ground of religious faith is to be "sought not in philosophy or science but in the intrinsic quality of religious truth itself, tested out through the whole of experience by the religious mind". As the problem is, by what tests, if any, can a religious belief be shown to be true, the above statement, lacking discussion of the character of the tests, does not seem to throw much light on the subject.



Professor Reid is emphatic that "of clear and certain knowledge of God we have none." What then is "the absolute unassailable Christian truth" of which he is convinced? It is, he tells us, "the immediate certainty of the value of Christian love as exhibited in the life, teaching and death of Jesus and in the meaningful texture of common experience." But it is, surely, plain that we have here not one immediate certainty but a value-judgment with regard to love together with judgments, presumably many more than one, with regard to historical facts about Jesus; and these latter can hardly be more than takings-for-granted or beliefs of indeterminate probability. The value-judgment by itself is obviously not Christianity, and even taken together the beliefs seem hardly enough. All this detracts less from the value of Professor Reid's book than might be supposed. He is explaining himself to the orthodox quite as much as seeking to convince the unorthodox, and he has, therefore, many things of value to say which do not call for notice here. Candour, good sense and perception are for his purpose great merits, and these, though not, of course, only these, Professor Reid's work shows.

E. W. EDWARDS.

*Reason and Intuition and other Essays.* By J. L. STOCKS, late Vice-Chancellor of the University of Liverpool. Edited with an Introduction by DOROTHY M. EMMET. Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xxii, 259. 12s. 6d.

THIS volume is a collection of the essays and addresses that the late J. L. Stocks wrote during the last five or six years of his short and active life. Miss Emmet, the editor, contributes a skilful and sensitive introduction, and there is a note by Sir David Ross about Stocks's publications on Greek philosophy. Almost all the essays (if not quite all, I can't be sure) are re-published.

The book reflects, as of course it was bound to reflect, the catholicity of Stocks's interests and the unity of his philosophical purposes. The characteristic ethos of philosophy, he believed, showed itself, and, properly understood, could not but show itself, in all the major departments of human thinking activity. Philosophy was a spiritual activity that brought balance and comprehensiveness into all knowledgeable pursuits. It was therefore required by them all. The title of the first essay (selected to name the volume) is an indication. It investigates the relations of "total" and not irrational "intuition" to item-by-item reasoning, i.e., to "reason" in that narrower sense. (The author admitted an aporia regarding the priority of either when the two are regarded as complementary.)

In a more general metaphysical way, Stocks's intention was, as Miss Emmet shows, to defend and re-interpret the Aristotelian Formal cause. His fullest expression of this belief was given in his lectures on *Time, Cause and Eternity*, published about a year ago, but a valuable short account of his views is given in the fifth essay in the present volume, and the theme recurs with greater or with less emphasis in many of these essays.

I need not tell readers of MIND that Stocks was a very good writer. As I have said, Stocks's general conception of philosophy had a very wide application; and his own interests were extensive. Religion, ethics and politics are the chief subjects of the present collection, sometimes but not usually with a special historical reference. Essays II-IV (Riddell

Memorial Lectures at Durham in 1934) discuss "belief" (largely religious belief), and theology was the subject of Lecture XV (a contribution to a symposium at Bedford College). The last essay, reprinted from *Philosophy*, may be the beginning of a projected work on ethics. It deals with the analysis of will and of action and is subtle, although (being unrevised) it is rather diffuse. Essay XI on (Aristotelian) leisure is an interesting discussion of practical ethics reprinted from the *Hibbert Journal*.

Political philosophy, however, seems to have been the most present and the most pressing interest in Stocks's mind during its last quinquennium. He had too much interest in human action for the thing to be otherwise, and the central *bloc* of these essays (VI-X) is a valuable indication of the circumstance. The subjects were: "Materialism in Politics", "The Philosophy of Democracy", and the like. Stocks, although he never thought that government was a department of metaphysics, was not afraid of the metaphysics of government. Philosophy, for him, had to permeate, unobtrusively but genuinely, whatever needed thinking and was near the top. According to Stocks, materialism in politics (and he was not thinking of Marx only, although he thought quite a lot about, and of, Marx) had the defect of all materialism. It forgot everything except the efficient cause, *i.e.*, it was the doctrine that the parts unilaterally determine the whole and do so by a series of itemised pushes from the just-past. In Stocks's view the final cause (especially in history) and the formal cause had also to appear in the reckoning. The philosophy of democracy should similarly be saved from excessive itemisation or "materialism".

I have mentioned Stocks's scholar's interest in the history of ideas. He was a liberal Aristotelian fully prepared to revise as well as to adapt and to interpret the master's teaching; but the scholar in him was very active in other fields. In particular he had a long, a close, and a very sympathetic acquaintance with British empiricism—Hobbes, Locke, the utilitarians and J. S. Mill. It is to be hoped that the work on Mill with which he was engaged for many years was sufficiently advanced to give us instruction. I have long known, from correspondence, about the faithfulness of his knowledge of Hobbes, and there are many incidental instances in the present book. The book, however, contains more substantial treatment of Locke (the political theory: a centenary oration at Oxford), of Bentham (a Manchester centenary oration, the first part of which is a delightful short biography), and of Mill's Empiricism (at the last International Congress at Oxford).

JOHN LAIRD.

*Modes of Thought.* By A. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge University Press, 1938. Pp. xii + 241. 7s. 6d. net.

THIS last book by Prof. Whitehead is a series of reflections on certain aspects of his organic philosophy. In *Process and Reality* he made a sustained attempt to present that philosophy in a systematic form. Here, however, the emphasis is not on system so much as on suggestions as to new modes of thinking, and on the vague hinterland beyond any formulated system which still awaits penetration. There is therefore a certain sense of release from the strain which sometimes characterised *Process and Reality*. The book is made up of two series of lectures in which similar themes are pursued. There is thus a certain amount of repetition; but there is no harm

in this, for since Whitehead's statements are at times elliptic rather than direct, the same point may come clearer when we meet it said again in a different way with different shifts of emphasis. The whole book is very compressed and repays several readings.

My general impression is that in this book the Platonic affinity is much less and the affinity with certain elements in Idealist Logic much more in evidence than in *Process and Reality*. (I say "Logic" advisedly, and not "Metaphysics," since Whitehead might be said to be developing a suggestion thrown out in the Introduction to *Process and Reality*, that he has sought to transpose certain main doctrines of Bradley on to a realistic basis.) It would seem that there are two main angles from which Whitehead approaches metaphysics—on the one hand, his interest in mathematical forms led him to a type of Platonism in which he sees the road to metaphysical truth in the attempt to generalise concerning the formal properties of types of order; and on the other hand he seeks persistently to make philosophy a characterisation of concrete processes of becoming, from which "laws", "order", "matter of fact", "sense data" etc., are abstractions. He tries to bring these two together in his conception of the method of philosophy as "descriptive generalisation". The data of experience are to be assembled, described, and examined with a disciplined imagination in order to discern co-ordinating general ideas with widening scope of application. Such ideas order our outlook in patterns or perspectives relevant to certain selective interests, which are based on judgements or feelings of importance. This method, as outlined in these lectures, bears a certain resemblance to the methods of phenomenology. But whereas the phenomenologists would hold that such a method discloses primarily certain root attitudes of mind appropriate in certain ranges of experience, Whitehead holds that it may also gradually disclose certain fundamental characterisations of the world itself. These characterisations are not inferred or proved, but must in the end commend themselves by their self-evidence to civilised minds. (Whitehead's *obiter dicta* as to the qualities and emotions which go to make a civilised mind are worth pondering at the present time when we are faced with a possible relapse into barbarism.) There are some interesting remarks on pp. 65-69 about the meaning of "self-evidence" in this connection; as also in the first lecture on the meaning of "importance" and "relevance"; the last two being notions with which formal logic has been notoriously unsuccessful in dealing. But all these call for fuller and closer discussion. It was not Whitehead's purpose to undertake such full discussion within the scope of this present book. But the suggestions he throws out, sometimes provoking, sometimes revealing, should surely stimulate it.

I have noted one clear misprint: "finitude" on p. 28, line 14; and on p. 105, line 25 "to" should presumably be "the" or "its". Any comments on the philosophical doctrines of the book I can only offer tentatively; but there is one point where I can venture on a correction with assurance. On p. 59, the well-known rhyme

"I am the Master of this College,  
And what I know not is not knowledge"

is fitted on to Dr. Whewell, the Master of Trinity. But of Jowett alone may it be spoken; is it not written in the Masque of Balliol?

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

*Religion in Essence and Manifestation.* By G. VAN DER LEEUW, translated by J. E. TURNER. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938. Pp. 697. 25s. nett.

IN this competent translation of Dr. van der Leeuw's *Phänomenologie der Religion* (Tübingen 1933)—a work which was, with perhaps more enthusiasm than accuracy, hailed in Germany as a fitting companion to the *Golden Bough*—we are given a markedly original and widely comprehensive study by an authority who has already made contributions of the first importance to the continental literature on the subject. Professor of the History of Religions in the University of Groningen, the author, in his short but brilliant *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (1925), promised us the fruits of his further researches in a larger work, which now, through the generosity of the Sir Halley Stewart Trust, appears in English with a wealth of new material and copious bibliographical notes.

One is, perhaps, tempted to wonder whether the author's field has not been too large, his survey too wide. For while it is true that the manifestations of religion must be presented from every possible viewpoint (and here, surely, the translator's comparison of the work with James' most limited and one-sided classic breaks down!) one's first judgment of this vast, albeit well-marshalled, array of facts from the realms of anthropology and sociology, history and psychology, is incoherence and lack of purpose—a feeling which this English version aggravates by its division into extremely short chapters (110 in 690 pages) between which, at first sight, there appears no real connection. Yet, despite a tendency to linger over all sorts of problems highly interesting in themselves, the author does throughout observe his own rigid canon of phenomenology—to confront chaotic "reality" in such suppleness of spirit that from it he can construct totality and orderliness hindered neither by historical nor psychological presuppositions. Thus, while he wisely refuses to be bound by any fashionable theory, and knows nothing of any historical "development" of religion, still less of an "origin" of religion, he seeks to penetrate beneath these varied facts of the religious life to the underlying spiritual attitude.

No form of religious experience, it is submitted, must be regarded as a mere tendency; on the contrary, it is God, in one mode or another, who is the active agent in every situation. All phenomena, that is, from their most primitive types to their culmination in Christianity, are shown (in a masterly analysis of religious "forms" which is the high light of the book) to be sustained by a Divine activity which "meets man on the road", a strange and nameless element which is not to be found in the prolongation of man's own path, yet which is essential to his pilgrimage.

That strict analysis of this common factor in all religious experience is impossible, Dr. van der Leeuw strongly insists; this strange, wholly-other Power "obtrudes into life", and it is with its results rather than its elements that he is concerned, for the extremely interesting reasons given in the closing chapters on the "credentials" of the phenomenology of religion—chapters, incidentally, which really should be read before anything else, outlining as they do the author's standpoint in regard to his otherwise bewilderingly copious material. There is an excellent Index, each chapter has a Bibliography which the translator has brought up-to-date, while the footnotes materially assist the text without (as is too often the case) forming irritating interruptions. As a brilliant and sugges-

tive exposition of the fundamentals of religion, from a refreshingly original standpoint, we know of no work at present more fascinating and provoking than this.

J. DOUGLAS JOWETT.

*The Nature of Self.* By A. C. MUKERJI. Allahabad, The Indian Press, 1938. Pp. xii + 359. Rs. 5.

THIS book is written from the idealist angle in refreshingly clear and incisive language, and it should be valuable to the student of idealism, whether eastern or western. The theme is an important one, especially as the great idealist philosophers did not deal with it at all fully—they were usually content to elaborate one or two categories of the self without attempting an exhaustive treatment of the self as a whole. Mr. Mukerji's recognition of the problem from the idealist angle is therefore welcome and long over-due. How far he contributes to the body of idealism or its defence is less easy to judge, especially at a time and in a country where idealist philosophy is at a discount. The author displays immense erudition regarding Indian thought and British philosophy up to the beginning of the present century, but he makes little attempt to meet objections to idealism that come from realist and analytic sources. Though he may have regarded this—and probably rightly—as outside the scope of his book, the absence of such an attempt will not help the cause of idealism, at any rate in England.

It would seem that it is as a work in comparative philosophy that Mr. Mukerji's book is most likely to be important. To know the work of the east and west as he does must be very rare, and it is to be hoped that he will write further works on subjects in this field. One or two suggestions from a European of what a European reader might expect and find helpful may not prove amiss. It would be well to quote equally from the east and west. It is difficult to decide how much knowledge the reader should be assumed to possess, but westerners should certainly not be credited with over-much familiarity with eastern writings. If a comparative study is to be readily grasped, the views compared should be expounded in the idiom of their authors, plentifully stocked with quotations. Mr. Mukerji has often quoted western authors fully, and then contented himself with brief references to Indian thinkers, remarking that they held similar views; but we should be glad to read the particular ways of putting themes adopted by Indian philosophers. But probably Mr. Mukerji had an Indian audience in mind when selecting his quotations.

In a comparative work, moreover, it would seem to be specially helpful to give the place, and particularly the date, of the publications mentioned, and it would even be useful if chapter and verse were cited in connexion with expositions that contained no quotations.

Now there comes an important consideration, about the matter to be compared or studied. Mr. Mukerji spends a great deal of time pointing to *likenesses in argument*. The tentative suggestion may be made that it might be more valuable if Mr. Mukerji were to concentrate on pointing to likenesses in tenets, giving the broad grounds on which they are held so far as doing so contributes to the meaning of the tenets, but rejecting detail of argument. Again it might be well to distinguish between the main contentions of a philosopher and the subsidiary speculations to which he is driven in order to give a logical justification of his major point of view.

It is difficult to escape the impression that, owing to these—from a western point of view—defects, the merit of Mr. Mukerji's book is impaired for the westerner more than it need have been; and one feels that he could, even with the material of the present book if it were amplified and perhaps slightly reoriented, give us a work that would fill an important gap in our library of comparative philosophy.

J. O. WISDOM.

*Philosophie de la Religion.* Par PAUL ORTEGAT, S.J., Professeur aux Facultés N.-D. de la Paix, à Namur (Museum Lessianum, Section Philosophique No. 20). Brussels, Édition universelle, 1938. Pp. 475.

THIS is one of the more irritating examples of a type of literature—the Roman Catholic philosophical text-book—which has acquired a new interest among philosophers in recent years. It is no doubt very salutary that philosophers should let themselves be reminded that the epoch when the Catholic Church dominated Europe was not, after all, a completely unfruitful one, and that Aquinas has a right to be taken at least as seriously as Hegel. It is a pity, none the less, that such writers as Father Ortegat are incapable of understanding this new “fairness” towards Catholic philosophy as anything other than a “return” to it, and are unwilling to respond by taking equally seriously the philosophical developments that have occurred since the close of the Middle Ages.

“La Philosophie de la Religion” neither attempts nor claims to discuss objectively the range of problems indicated by its title, but simply to give an “Introduction Critique” in the form of a statement and appraisal of the principal modern views—empiricism, agnosticism, pessimism, Kantianism, etc. The writer certainly grants to each of the systems he is considering a “measure” of the truth of which the whole is contained in the *Philosophia Perennis*; but he makes much too easy a task of dismissing them as valid criticisms of, and real advances upon, the viewpoint which still remains the officially sanctioned one in the Church to which he belongs. It may very well be questioned whether it is ever legitimate or fruitful to consider the Philosophy of Religion, or any other branch of philosophy, in so purely historical and polemico-apologetic a manner as that adopted here—whether, in other words, it is possible to write convincingly about philosophy as a conflict and interchange of *views* without dealing with it at the same time as an attack on quite real *problems*. (I should like here to mention an illuminating discussion of this point by Prof. John Anderson in a review in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* for December 1937.) Father Ortegat fails to do justice to Kant, Freud and his other victims because he sees them too much as the bearers of “views” and not enough as wrestlers with “problems” which he himself can no more afford to ignore than they can.

A. N. PRIOR.

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## VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Vol. xxxvi (1939), 2. **Evander Bradley McGilvary.** *Relations in General and Universals in Particular. II.* [Compares his theory of universals with those of Platonic realism, and Aristotelian realism, with Prof. Sellars' nominalistic view, and with the views of Principia Mathematica and Mr. Dewey.] **Newton P. Stallknecht.** *In Defense of Ontology.* [Criticises Professor C. I. Lewis's view that "The meaning of 'real' appears to be relevance to the realm of discourse in terms of which the judgment of reality is made". Claims to rescue reality from the relativists and gives the following summary of his position: "We have seen that all purposive activity, whether theoretical or practical, includes reference to both form and thinghood, to possibility and actuality. Now, let the term 'reality' indicate the interplay of these two orders, of a compact, concrete world which comprises a realization of some possibilities and the exclusion of others." Goes on to suggest that there is no context in which "this entity just defined could prove irrelevant or unreal."] 3. **Felix S. Cohen.** *The Relativity of Philosophical Systems and the Method of Systematic Relativism.* [Puts forward the "thesis or hypothesis of systematic relativism. Applied to the field of systematic philosophy, this viewpoint suggests that the differences between philosophic systems are not differences to which the categories of truth and falsity are relevant, that we are dealing here rather with differences of logical structure or perspective, and that philosophies which have been regarded as contradictory may turn out on analysis to be compatible—or even identical—in content, though differing as to form." Illustrates this view in connection with various philosophical disputes; shows, for instance, how Spinoza qualified his monism by admitting the existence of an infinite number of things, and how Leibniz qualified his pluralism so that it approached monism. Makes other interesting points related to his thesis.] 4. **Arthur E. Murphy.** *Concerning Mead's "The Philosophy of the Act"*. [Seeks to justify the following conclusions. "The fundamental difficulty in *The Philosophy of the Act* arises from the attempt to specify the philosophical meaning of statements about perceptual and physical objects by referring them to a context which is incongruous with their actual meaning in use. The choice of this context is determined not by an independent survey of the situations described, but by a desire to avoid certain theories about 'reality' and to establish another."] 5. **Henry A. Myers.** *Scholasticism in Modern Thought.* [Claims that four bad characteristics of scholastic philosophy are prevalent in modern philosophy. Firstly the ancillary fallacy: Just as the medieval philosopher was often the hand-maid of theology, so for many modern thinkers "philosophy is handmaiden to mathematics and the natural sciences, and the function of the philosopher is to play the sedulous ape to these disciplines". Such a thinker, among his other failings, does not see "that the function of the metaphysician is to deal with the metaphysical

object. . . ."] **William Barrett.** *Logical Empiricism and the History of Philosophy.* [Seeks to show that logical empiricism does not involve a complete rejection of the history of philosophy. A study of the humanistic aspects of the history of philosophy is not only of cultural interest to the logical empiricist, but may be of considerable use in helping to solve the philosophical problems of the present, although we must bear in mind that complete logical analysis is the only safe guide to these problems. Insists, however, that "not even in the field of the history of philosophy is there room for the Philosopher, if this latter conceives that he has some special and appropriate field above and distinct from these other (i.e., logical, philological and sociological) analyses".] 6. **Albert C. A. Balz.** *The Indefensibility of Dictatorship—And the Doctrine of Hobbes.* [Holds that "from the standpoint of political theorising, dictatorship is not a theory of the state and of government. . . . The dictator, if one may judge from the practices of dictatorships, suspects the theoretical impossibility of his own existence."] 7. **Arthur F. Bentley.** *Sights-Seen as Materials of Knowledge.* [Defines "sights-seen, etc." by saying that when these "are specified, a comprehensive naming of the phenomena of consciousness has been given. . . . When we specify sights-seen, and the rest (i.e., "etc."), we shall regard ourselves as having exhaustively specified all that the word 'consciousness' covers. . . ." Claims that "when sights-seen, etc., are taken in direct view . . . concentered oppositions of the type of knower and known lose their microcosmic pretenses". Also claims that taking sights-seen etc., in direct view heightens the prospects of success of psychological inquiry, and says that "To adopt sights-seen etc., as materials of knowledge brings no interference whatever with the procedures of the established sciences. . . . Only the physicist who craves to orate over God and Nature, and the physiologist or psychologist who, with similar futility, burns to instruct us of Man and Society, will fall victim; and they only as respects these particular splutterings of their linguistic energies."] **Hugh Miller.** *The Dimensions of Particular Fact.* [Suggests that "if philosophy has failed in its defense of theoretical knowledge it has failed because of . . . the identification of general fact with conceptual fact, and of particular fact with sensible fact." Finds this confusion continually occurring in the history of philosophy, and to some extent in the sciences.]

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, V, 3 (July, 1938). **C. H. Prescott, Jr.** *The Scientific Method and its Extension to Systems of Many Degrees of Freedom.* [Uses mathematical symbolism to describe such general features of scientific method as errors of observation, the divergence between theory and experience, and the relation of less accurate to more accurate laws.] **J. E. Boodin.** *A Revolution in Metaphysics and in Science.* ["Metaphysical materialism and metaphysical idealism have both neglected history." "There is no stuff but energy and energy exists only in space-time systems in which the future is a determinant of the present and past. Those that have attempted to reduce reality to the past and to the simplest past, that of matter, are proved to be one-sided, because, although the past is real, its reality is bound up with the future." "The real substance, the true meaning of nature, is not mind or matter but the space-time structure of history to which mind and matter are adjectival."] **W. M. Urban.** *Symbolism in Science and Philosophy.* [Defends metaphysics against positivism and naturalism. Metaphysics is a "*Naturanlage*", which all men practise, knowingly or not. Its main characteristics are, first, "that

it makes statements about met-empirical objects—such as life, the world, the cosmos—things which themselves are not immediately experienced but are in some fashion the necessary co-implicates of experience and its expression”—and, secondly, that the subjects of discussion “are always of the nature of ‘wholes’—either partial or total”. Criticism of the possibility of metaphysics (notably that of Kant) assumes the validity of scientific method. Now “the conception of science has changed (*i.e.*, since Kant’s day) in the sense that . . . science itself has become metaphysical”. For all sciences deal with “met-empirical wholes”, whether cultures or epochs, as in history, species or organisms, as in biology, or “the physical cosmos” in thermodynamics. “The individual sciences claim to make meaningful propositions about partial totalities only; metaphysics, however, about the totality of totalities, about reality as a whole”; yet the objects of scientific discourse “are as empirically unverifiable as the object of metaphysics”. Urban concludes that “science is possible *only* if metaphysics is possible”. A novel turn is given to this not unfamiliar type of argument by an examination of “the symbolic character of scientific knowledge”. Whereas “the antimetaphysical tendencies in modern science and philosophy arise out of the supposed literal character of all scientific knowledge”, physics, to take an example of one science which has become more metaphysical, now works with “intuitively unverifiable hypotheses”. Metaphysics differs from science in using “fundamental metaphors”. When we use metaphysical predicates “we know full well that we are not using such notions as will, mind or what not literally—that we have moulded, stretched, or redesigned our concepts in order to make them applicable to ‘all that is’—and that in so far as they are thus moulded, they are symbols—but this is also true of the scientific concepts”. To be “fundamental” a metaphor must contain reference to *value*.] **E. Vivas.** *Nature, Common Sense and Science*. [“The claim that the structural features of nature which any science discovers make up its exclusive or its real reality (*sic*), involves, it would seem, two errors. The first could be called the Platonic prejudice, for it consists in the belief that the transient or the perishable is less real than the relatively fixed or permanent. The other might be called the analytic fallacy, and this paper could be considered an effort to expose it.” It “consists in assuming that the terms of the relational complexes at which analysis stops at any given time are the sole constituents of the things from which that analysis started”.] **R. Lepley.** *The Verifiability of Facts and Values*. [Argues “that facts and values are verifiable in much the same manner and degree”.] **R. K. Merton.** *Science and the Social Order*. [“There exists a latent and active hostility toward science in many societies, although the extent of this antagonism cannot yet be established. The prestige which science has acquired within the last three centuries is so great that actions curtailing its scope . . . are usually coupled with affirmation of the undisturbed integrity of science or ‘the rebirth of true science’.” (An interesting paper containing, *inter alia*, detailed reference to restrictions on scientific activity in contemporary Germany.)] **T. S. Harding.** *Science at the Tower of Babel*. [A lively plea for scientists to improve their use of language.] Discussion (Correspondence). Reviews and Notes. V, 4 (Oct., 1938). **L. A. White.** *Science is Sciencing*. [“Science is not merely a collection of facts and formulas. It is pre-eminently a way of dealing with experience . . . one sciences, *i.e.*, deals with experience according to certain assumptions and with certain techniques.” (A stimulating paper, packed with theories and examples—impossible to



summarise.]) **W. M. Malisoff.** *Arranging the Sciences. II. Another Experiment.* [A graphic arrangement of the sciences: "there are chosen three principal activities of application: engineering, eugenics and the life of reason. These three terms are to be taken in their broadest senses. My intention is to create blends of the three interests described by me as 'abstract', 'natural' and 'human', without destroying their continuity." (Should be compared with the earlier article by the same author in *Philosophy of Science*, April, 1937, 261.)] **A. Lapan.** *Preface to a Theory of Nature.* ["Like most other subjects under discussion to-day the theory of nature is largely controlled by considerations of knowledge." "It may be questioned, however, if it would not be more profitable for the theory of knowledge to *begin* with an investigation into nature, and thence proceed to a definition of knowledge."] **M. Taube.** *A Re-examination of Some Arguments for Realism.* [Regards the realist position as very weak. "In all the material examined, I found only two relevant arguments, both patently fallacious, and a kind of historical confusion or blindness." Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* has led realists to suppose mistakenly that *esse est percipi* is the *premiss* of idealism instead of the "conclusion of an elaborate structure of fact, theory and argument". Moore's arguments are largely irrelevant because none of the most famous supporters of idealism (from Berkeley to Whitehead) have confused the act of sensing with the sensed content. Taube gives much of his space to refuting what he calls the "first fallacious argument" against idealism, *viz.*, "that the view that what we see is caused by and is not a part of the external world is self-contradictory since it is based upon regarding some of these things we see as part of the external world". Taube denies emphatically that physiology "is based on the theory of the direct visual perception of external objects". On the contrary, "the physiologist could and does hold that his visual perception of the brain is a modification of his own organism caused by the action of physical objects, including his own body, in the environment". To the objection "If all our sensible experiences are modifications of our own sentience, how can we know anything else such as the cause of such modifications?" Taube maintains that "the answer consists simply in pointing out that all our direct experience is not exhausted in sense-experience. There are other types of direct experience and from them we get our ideas of causation, substance, external existence and the like." (This paper is more vigorous than persuasive. The writer is patently hostile to realism and to any reliance upon common sense. The omission of reference to Moore's *Defence of Common Sense* is curious.)] **A. C. Benjamin.** *Science and the Philosophy of Science.* [Argues that "the relation between the philosophy of science and science is essentially the same as that between any hypothesis and the corresponding data within science itself."] **H. Jeffreys.** *The Nature of Mathematics.* [Criticises the reduction of mathematics to logic attempted in *Principia Mathematica*. "The aim of the logistic school is actual demonstration of the existence of the entities treated." Two, for example, is defined as the class of couples. But according to Jeffreys "the class of couples, far from being indubitable, certainly does not exist." His ground for this surprising assertion is that "a pair of objects can become an individual or a triad", *e.g.*, when drops of mercury coalesce or a married couple "produce a child". "It seems to me that Mr. and Mrs. Smith are a couple, and that the number 2, regarded as a description of a couple, also exists; but that the class of all couples does not." (This part of the argument rests upon a misunderstanding of the procedure of Russell and

Whitehead. Since classes are incomplete symbols, an important point which Jeffreys overlooks, a cardinal number is a predicate of predicates. That a certain predicate (or the corresponding propositional function) has a given cardinal number may be a *necessary* proposition. Examination of the *Principia* would show that cardinal numbers are defined by using only propositional functions of which this is true. To this procedure, whether successful or not, Jeffreys' remarks are irrelevant.) Similar criticisms are advanced against the use of "similarity" in defining cardinal numbers: "it is necessary that two classes, once similar, shall always remain similar, and this requires the permanence of individuals". The paper also contains remarks on the axiom of infinity and the possibility of considering entailment and strict implication as limiting cases of probability. Jeffreys wishes mathematics to be regarded "as the consequences of a set of postulates, assuming the rules of logic, without asserting that there are in fact things in the world that satisfy the postulates". (But he does not meet the familiar difficulty of explaining how mathematics, considered as a set of abstract postulates, receives a *definite* interpretation in practice. Russell long ago emphasised that Peano's axioms, for instance, could be satisfied in infinitely many ways by objects other than the integers. The same is true of all non-redundant sets of axioms.) **R. B. Lindsay.** *The Future of Theoretical Physics.* [An interesting discussion, in non-technical language, of the nature of physics.] **H. Rogosin.** *Telepathy, Psychological Research and Modern Psychology.* ["A revision of psychological thought in the direction of the anti-materialistic doctrine of philosophic idealism . . . is not based upon anything but wish-fulfilment." "The experiments, at Duke University and elsewhere, upon 'extra-sensory perception' and 'supernormal cognition' are based upon faulty assumptions regarding probability theory, the nature of proof, the place of mathematics in the development of science; in short, faulty assumptions regarding philosophy of science."] **O. Neurath.** *Encyclopaedism as a Pedagogical Aim: A Danish Approach.* [Describes Joergensen's very interesting course of elementary philosophy taken by all students in the University of Copenhagen.] **G. J. Whitrow.** *Robert Hooke.* [Based on the Commemoration Speech delivered in Christ Church, June, 1937. Succeeds admirably in giving in a small space an aperçu of Hooke's character, life and importance in the history of science.] VI, 1 (Jan., 1939). **R. Ablowitz.** *The Theory of Emergence.* [An inconclusive survey of the nature of emergence and its relation to determinism, with more particular reference to the question of the number of emergent levels in the universe.] **W. M. Malisoff.** *Emergence without Mystery.* [The term "emergence" is used in excessively ambiguous ways whose common feature is the intention to express mystification about unexpected forms of organisation. Malisoff proposes to restrict the word "to describe the mere fact that we can give alternative descriptions of many systems depending on the degree of organization we wish to attribute to them." The effect of the proposal would be to arrange scientific systems in the order of complexity of the sets of postulates they use. Some examples are given.] **A. Angyal.** *The Structure of Wholes.* [Highly abstract circumnavigation of such topics as "relations," "systems," "aggregates," "wholes".] **W. Peddie.** *The Philosophy of "As If" in Physical Science.* [Discussion of the uses made of postulated entities in Physics.] **C. G. Darwin.** *Logic and Probability in Physics.* [Reprint of the well-known presidential address to the Mathematics and Physical Section of the British Association, Cambridge, 1938.] **H. Margenau.** *Proba-*

*bility, Many-Valued Logics, and Physics.* [As in other papers by the same writer the importance is stressed of theory and symbolic construction in scientific method. "It is idle to say that prediction of facts is the only important goal of science and that theories are of ancillary service in achieving this end, because the striking and *a priori* unpredictable usefulness of theory in ordering and assorting observations is to the open-minded just as significant a feature of reality as the ordered facts." The attitude which views theories "as unimportant by-products of an essentially factual description of the universe is nothing but an affected naivety." Concludes with detailed criticism of Reichenbach's views on the probability of theories.] **S. Ratner.** *Patterns of Culture in History.* ["Historians must break new paths towards a wider and deeper understanding of human affairs." "One central task of history, then, would be to reveal the plasticity of human nature, the way in which the basic human desires have found expression in different complex patterns of culture, the tremendous rôle that custom, institutions, and social norms have played in moulding man's 'instincts'." Discussion (Correspondence). Reviews and Notes. VI, 2 (April, 1939). **W. M. Malisoff.** *Virtue and the Scientists.* ["In the practice of science lies the key to virtue."] **W. H. McCrea.** *The Evolution of Theories of Space-Time and Mechanics.* [Traces "certain aspects of the evolution of theories of space-time and mechanics as revealed by a brief comparative study of Newtonian theory, Robb's theory, general relativity and Milne's kinematical relativity."] **C. G. Hempel.** *Vagueness and Logic.* [Consists chiefly of comments upon a paper by Max Black, "Vagueness: An exercise in logical analysis," *Philosophy of Science*, 1937, 427-455. Vagueness is a three-termed relation involving the users of a language as well as the vague term and its referend. The syntax of any language is an idealised system of rules, abstracted from the empirical behaviour of the users of the language; thus the syntax will in practice be violated by the users of the language, and vagueness is but one among many sources of such violation. There is no relation between terms and their referends, independent of the users of the language (i.e. a 'semantic' relation as opposed to a 'semiotic' one), which is parallel to that of vagueness. Hence the question of the compatibility of vagueness and logic does not arise. Nevertheless, it is possible to replace vague terms by metrical terms having greater precision, and this is a process much practised by scientists.] **I. M. Copilowish.** *Border-Line Cases, Vagueness and Ambiguity.* [Analyses various types of border-line cases and enumerates methods for their resolution. Argues that vagueness is a special case of ambiguity, arising from the conflict of contrary semantic rules.] **V. J. McGill.** *Concerning the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle.* (1) In spite of the popular opinion that all logical principles are interdeducible and so none prior to the rest in any important sense, the traditional "laws of thought" have a special status. For if they do not appear in the formal premisses of the algebra of logic they are nevertheless involved in the proofs. The rule of substitution, for example, involves the law of contradiction. The "laws of thought" cannot, without circularity, be deduced from other principles. (2) In spite of Aristotle, the principles of contradiction and excluded middle are mutually equivalent. Multi-valued logics and the logic of the mathematical intuitionists abandon both. (3) Application of the foregoing to the applicability of the principles of excluded middle and contradiction. They are heuristic principles: "it seems very arbitrary to deny in advance of inquiry, and in the teeth of much evidence, that sequences of dialectical, non-Aristotelian propositions can

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describe the transitional status of the objective world."'] **E. Nagel**. *Probability and the Theory of Knowledge*. [A reasoned criticism of Reichenbach's interpretation of probability and its application to questions of epistemology, with special reference to his last book, *Experience and Prediction*. Nagel rejects the proposal to replace the notion of the truth-value of propositions by that of "weight". His criticism hinges upon the impossibility of evaluating weights in view of an infinite regress which is involved. Further sections attack Reichenbach's views on the probability of theories, on the evidence for the existence of an external world and on basic propositions. (A very penetrating, and not entirely destructive analysis, occupying 45 pages of the journal.)] Discussion (Correspondence). Reviews and Notes.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Tome 42 (Deuxième série, No. 61). Févr. 1939. **A. Berten**. *Quelques problèmes récents de Philosophie des sciences*. [A discussion of the problem, raised by the success of the quantum physics, whether the traditional scheme of "scientific determinism" has broken down. 'We must all recognise that mechanism is at present giving way to a *mathematism* which is constantly being pushed further; on the other hand, a form abstract to the point of being divested of all imagery, if an ideal for science at all, is an unattainable ideal. What then is the place of imagery in the fundamental ideas of science? . . . Physics constantly tends to divest itself of the ideas, images, prejudices or experiences of common sense, and the more it divests itself of them, the more plainly it reveals new signs of dependence on this customary experience. This is very intelligible, since, on the one hand, science has constantly to transcend current experience, while, on the other, scientific experience more and more penetrates human life and modifies our habitual knowledge; the ideas of common sense, no less than the "too abstract" primary concepts, are always relative to the epoch.'] **H. Pouillon, O.S.B.** *Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentes, La "Summa de bono" du Chancelier Philippe*. [The so-called "transcendental" properties of being (unity, truth, goodness)—i.e., those which are "predicated in all the categories" (and also of God, who stands above all the categories)—are elaborately dealt with by all the most prominent scholastics of the thirteenth century, though the only one of them fully and specially discussed in Aristotle's own *Metaphysics* is *unity*. The primary starting-point for the later scholastic elaborations of the doctrine is the *Summa de bono* of Philippe de Grève, whose main concern is with the concept *bonum*. Living, as he did, at the very time of the struggle with the Albigenses, the Chancellor Philip was particularly anxious to insist on the proposition that *quodlibet ens est bonum* in opposition to the 'Manichæan' belief in an 'evil principle'. Dom Pouillon's essay is illustrated by numerous citations from this still unpublished *Summa*.] **R. Feys**. *Fondements et méthodes des mathématiques. Notes sur la réunion d'études de Zurich*. [A short account of the discussions held, on the initiative of M. Gonthier, at the Zurich Polytechnic, Dec. 6-9, 1938.] **Gérard de Montpellier**. *Psychologie*; **P. Hormignie** and **J. Leclercq**, *Philosophie Morale*; **W. Goossens**, *Philosophie de la religion*. [Reviews of recent works in these three departments of philosophy.] *Comptes rendus. In memoriam Pie XI. Chroniques*.

## IX.—NOTES.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

May 13th, 1939.

SIR,

I should be grateful if you would allow me to publish a correction of an inexcusable mistake I made in my review of Prof. C. D. Broad's *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (MIND, N.S., 190).

In a footnote, on page 220, I wrote: 'On page 309, lines 8 and 6 from bottom, "last" should be "first", and "first" should be "last".'

This is a complete mistake. What Prof. Broad wrote was correct. I much regret that I was so stupid as to 'correct' where no correction was required.

Yours faithfully,

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

## AN APOLOGY.

The reviewer of the *Journal of Philosophy* wishes to apologise for misquoting, and thereby misrepresenting, Mr. Ruja's article, "The New Rationalism." As Mr. Ruja points out on page 271 of MIND, April, 1939, the words "who wants novelty" should be inserted between "which will satisfy the philosopher" and "in a world which he can understand."

## ERRATA.

In the last number of MIND the following corrections should be made:—

p. 187, l. 14 from bottom, delete "*Erast. 136a.*"

p. 187, l. 8 from bottom, for "strict" read "legal."

p. 188, note 1, delete "IX. 856b."

p. 189, l. 11, for "certainly" read "probably."

p. 189, l. 28, for "876d, 879c" read "846d, 849c."

p. 192, note 5, second line, for "914d" read "914b."

p. 194, note 1, for "Fr. 39 (Meineke)" read "Fr. 22 and 95 in Kock, *Com. Att. Fragm.*; and Euripides, *Ion*, 854 ff., Fr. 511 and 831 in Nauck's *Trag. Graec. Fragm.*"

p. 197, note 1, for "475-476" read "490 ff."

p. 197, note 3, l. 2, for "266 ff." read "267 ff.", and add "See the author's article 'The Murder of Slaves in Attic Law,' in *Classical Philology*, XXXII (1937), 210-227."

p. 213, l. 6, for "verifiability" read "verifiable."

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF THOMAS HOBBS.<sup>1</sup>

THE circumstances surrounding the publication of the verse and prose autobiographies of Hobbes are a recurrent source of confusion to those who are interested in his personality and works. It seems desirable that some effort should be made to state the facts as clearly as possible, in the hope that students may be able to pass on to more important subjects.

1. Five books appeared in close succession after Hobbes' death. They are listed as follows in the British Museum Catalogue :—

*Thomas Hobbesii Malmesburiensis Vita, Authore Seipso* [Verse] :

London, 1679. 4°.

*The Life of Mr. T. Hobbes of Malmesbury. Written by Himself in a Latine Poem ; and now Translated into English :*

London, 1680. 2°.

*Thomae Hobbes Angli Malmesburiensis Philosophi Vita*

[Ed. Blackburne] :

Apud Eleutherium Anglicum, Carolopoli, 1681. 8°.

2nd Edition :       "       "       "       "       1681. 8°.

3rd Edition :       "       "       "       "       1681. 4°.

2. The first of these is what is usually known as the *Vita Carmine Expressa*. Hobbes wrote the first draught of *Vita Carmine Expressa* as early as 1672. He evidently sent it to Crooke. Later he asked it back, and, at the time of his death, it was believed that he had burned it. It seems likely, however, that the original is still to be found in the Devonshire Collection of Hobbes Manuscripts.<sup>2</sup>

3. Hobbes also wrote a life of himself in Latin prose, which he gave to Aubrey and then asked back from him two years before his death.<sup>3</sup> Aubrey seems to have made a copy of this draught, which is reproduced in his life.<sup>4</sup> The differences between it and the one published in the *Vitae Auctarium* are negligible.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This note was occasioned by a letter about the 1679 edition of *Vita Carmine Expressa* in the January number of *MIND* (N.S. XLVIII, No. 189, p. 122).

<sup>2</sup> Wheldon to Aubrey, 16th January, 1680 : 'I am glad Mr. Crooke has received his life in Prose, which was the only thing Mr. Halleley got possession of, and sent it to him by my hand. Mr. Halleley tells me now that Mr. Hobbes (in the time of his sicknesse) told him he had promised it to Mr. Crooke, but said he was unwilling that it should ever be published as written by himself ; and I believe it was some such motive, which made him burne those Latin verses, Mr. Crooke sent him about that time.' Aubrey, *Brief Lives* (ed. Clark), I, p. 382. In the present catalogue, the MS. of *Vita Carmine Expressa* is indexed A. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Speaking of the Prose Life, Aubrey says : 'This was the draught that Mr. Hobbes first did leave in my hands, which he sent for about two years before he died, and wrote that which is printed in his Life in Latin by Dr. Richard Blackburn which I lent to him and he was careless and not remaunded it from the printer and so 'twas made wast paper of.' Aubrey, *Brief Lives* (ed. Clark), I, p. 395.

<sup>4</sup> Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, I, pp. 395-403.

<sup>5</sup> *Opera Latina* (ed. Molesworth), I, p. lxxxv-xcix.

4. Three weeks after Hobbes's death, *i.e.*, in the latter part of December, 1679, a quarto edition of *Vita Carmine Expressa* appeared in London without any publisher's imprint.<sup>1</sup> It is reasonably certain, however, that this book was published by one of the Crooke family.<sup>2</sup> Although rare, it is mentioned in all the chief bibliographies, probably because there is a copy in the British Museum.<sup>3</sup> The last two verses read differently from those given in Blackburne's edition, but are the same as those given in the MS. in the Devonshire Collection.

5. About a fortnight later a translation was published in English verse, which was not composed by Hobbes.<sup>4</sup>

6. For many years, Aubrey had been collecting biographical material, out of which he intended to make a commentary on Hobbes' Autobiography.<sup>5</sup> It is not clear whether it is the Prose or the Verse work that he has in mind, but the former seems the more probable, in view of the fact that he reproduces it complete in his life of Hobbes. Aubrey was not so good an editor as he was a collector, so he passed over the work of editing to his friend, Dr. Richard Blackburne. The work was already in press by February, 1680, but did not actually appear until November.<sup>6</sup> The complete contents, apart from the printer's designation, are given in Molesworth's *Opera Latina*, so that there is no need to recapitulate them here; but there are two features that call for special comment.

Firstly, it bears the mystifying imprint 'Carolopoli: Apud Eleutherium Anglicum, sub signo veritatis, MDCLXXXI', although we know that Aubrey had given Wood a copy as early as November, 1680, and also, from the penultimate page, that it was printed by William Crooke. There is no explanation for the dating of the work, but we can easily explain why

<sup>1</sup> *Vita Thomae Hobbes, written by himself, in A Lat. Poem.* It was printed at London in qu. about three weeks after the author's death, *viz.*, in the latter end of Dec. 1679, and a fortnight after that, about the 10th of Jan. it was published in English verse, by another hand.—London, 1680, in 5 sh. in fol. The said Lat. copy was reprinted, and put at the end of *Vitae Hobbianae Auctarium.* Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* (ed. Bliss), III, col. 1213.

<sup>2</sup> This conjecture was confirmed by Mr. Marsden, the Keeper of Printed Books at the British Museum, who was kind enough to look into the matter.

<sup>3</sup> Among these might be singled out: *Vitae Auctarium in Opera Latina* (ed. Molesworth), I, p. lxviii; Watt, *Bibliotheca Britannica*, under 'Hobbes'; D.N.B., under 'Hobbes'; Sorley, *History of British Philosophy*, p. 331; Robertson, *Hobbes*, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See note 1, above. Again there was some attempt at secrecy, for Mr. Marsden states that the imprint reads: 'Printed for A.C. and are to be sold in Fleet Street and without Temple-Bar.' A week later—16th January, 1680—Wheldon wrote to Aubrey telling him there was no more material available, but that Halleley had sent the Prose Life to Crooke.<sup>7</sup> This never appeared separately, but was incorporated in Blackburne's work.

<sup>5</sup> 'Aubrey intended his collections to be a sort of commentary on Hobbes' Latin Autobiography, which was in the press in Febr. 1679/80 and was published in Nov. 1680.' Aubrey (ed. Clark), *Brief Lives*, I, p. 17. See note 3, p. 403.

<sup>6</sup> The original authority for this is Wood. See Clark, *Life and Times of Wood*, II, p. 500.

<sup>7</sup> See note 2, p. 403.



Crooke wished to conceal his close connexion with the edition. In the preface to *Vita Carminis Expressa*, Blackburne makes certain strictures on the ethics of the previous publication of the work, the responsibility for which we have every reason to assign to Crooke.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, The last two lines have been altered to read:—

‘Octoginta ego jam complevi et quatuor annos :

‘Pene acta est vitae fabula longa meae,’<sup>2</sup>

instead of:—

‘Octoginta annos complevi jam quatuorque,

‘Et prope stans dictat mors mihi, Ne metue.’<sup>3</sup>

The reason for the change is given by Aubrey. ‘These last two verses Dr. Blackburne altered (because of the quā in quatuor, long) in the copie printed with Mr. Hobbes’s life in Latine, and some other alterations he made, but me thinks the sense is not so brisque.’<sup>4</sup>

#### NOTE ON THE TERM ΣΗΜΕΙΩΤΙΚΗ IN LOCKE.

In his book on *John Locke*, Professor Aaron says: “In [the *Essay*] iv, xxi σημειωτική is said to be that part of philosophy which is logic. . . . The use of the word by Locke in this connection is strange. According to the new Liddell and Scott the word is a medical term meaning a diagnosis, an examination of symptoms. Did Locke come across it in his medical studies and convert it to his own uses? Or again was it linked with the Epicurean doctrine of *signification* and the Epicurean criticism of the Stoic logic? Did the Gassendists use it as a term for logic? I cannot find it used in the works of Gassendi” (p. 207, n. 2).

I would suggest the following as at least part of the answer:

(a) The passage in § 1 of Locke’s chapter should be remembered. There are three sorts of things “that can fall within the compass of the human understanding”, (i) the nature of things, (ii) what man ought to do for the attainment of any end, (iii) “the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated”. The study of (i) for the purposes of attaining “bare speculative truth” Locke calls φυσική. The study whose object is to give man skill in rightly applying his powers for attaining ends “good and useful” Locke calls πρακτική. The third study Locke regards as concerned with signs; he therefore calls it σημειωτική, and since the most usual signs are words, he says it may appropriately be called λογική. One part of his object then in using the word σημειωτική is to interpret the word λογική in the light of the word λόγος, a word. Words are signs of ideas, ideas are signs of things. “The consideration then of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And

<sup>1</sup> ‘Sequens Poemation, ab Authore autem relaxandi gratia confectum, nullo in publicum emittendi consilio, post excessum ejus in librarii manus incedit; qui lucro suo addictior (affectus iste inter hoc genus hominum grassatur vulgo) prout erat imperfectum et mendis insuper deformatum, praelo subjecit.’ *Opera Latina* (ed. Molesworth), I, p. lxxxiii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xcix.

<sup>3</sup> Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, I, p. 363.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than what we have been hitherto acquainted with" (§ 4).

(b) The word *σημειωτική* itself comes from neither medical nor logical writings, but from writings on Greek music.

John Wallis, the friend and old mathematics professor of Locke in Oxford, in his edition of Ptolemy's *Harmonics* (Oxford, 1682), speaking of musical notation as practised by the Greeks, says, "*Quam Adnotandi artem, vocat Aristoxenos* (p. 39) *παρασημαντικήν* et Meibomius ad Alypium p. 66, *σημειωτικήν*." (Appendix, p. 286.)

Thus Wallis seems to attribute the term *σημειωτική* as the art of notation to Meibom. Both his references are to Marcus Meibomius, *Antiquae Musicae Auctores Septem*, 1652, well known to students of Greek music. The first volume of this book is divided into six different sections, each paged separately and followed by notes by Meibom. Aristoxenus is one of the writers included. The reference to Aristoxenus is given by Meibom himself in his note to Alypius, p. 66, whence Wallis took it.

The *Introduction to Music* of Alypius contains only the symbols (*σημεία*) for the notes of the various Greek musical modes. Meibom begins his comment (p. 66) by remarking that some critics think (with reason) that we have only a fragment of the complete introduction; otherwise Alypius might seem open to blame for a misleading title. But he goes on, "*Verum ea ratione excusandum censemus Alypium, quod, cum Harmonices praxin, quae in Notarum cognitione in singulis Modis praecipue consistit, vulgo tradere voluerit, etiam vulgari usu Musices vocabulum acceperit, et particulam, ad canendum maxime pertinentem, generali nomine fuerit dignatus: ac si Musicus haberi possit, qui hanc Modorum doctrinam et σημειωτικήν, at imprimis difficilem et intricatam, perdidicerit. Atque hoc Aristoxeni quoque tempore quidam contendebant, cantos singulos notis suis describere, Harmonicae tractationis finem statuentes. Illum vide pag. 39, versu 4.*"

On page 39 of Aristoxenus in the same volume, Aristoxenus attacks the view just mentioned, and concludes with the words, *δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς εἰρημένης ἐπιστήμης πέρας ἢ παρασημαντική*. Meibom translates "*Quare planum, non esse dictae scientiae finem istam adnotandi artem*"<sup>1</sup>.

This makes clear the source of Wallis's remark. Whether the word *σημειωτική* was introduced by Meibom himself, as Wallis seems to suggest, I do not know. The medical term given in Liddell and Scott is *τό σημειωτικόν* as the science of diagnosis in medicine, with a reference to Galen. As a musical term, *σημειωτική* is not found in the writers included in Meibom's collection—at least it is not in the index either of the edition of *Musici Scriptores Graeci* of Carolus Jan, Teubner 1895, which includes all the writers in Meibom except Aristoxenus, or of Macran's edition of Aristoxenus.

L. J. RUSSELL.

#### COUNCIL FOR ASSISTING REFUGEE PHILOSOPHERS.

AN organization has been established under this name for the assistance of philosophers who are seeking refuge in this country from racial or political persecution. The inaugural meeting on 11th March was attended by representatives of the Aristotelian Society, the British Institute of

<sup>1</sup> For the text see also Macran, *Aristoxenus*, p. 130.

Philosophy, the Mind Association, the Analysis Society, the Philosophical Society of England, the Scots Philosophical Club, the Senior Division of the Cambridge Moral Science Club, and the Oxford Philosophical Society. It is proposed that the Council shall consist of representatives of these and other societies, and of co-opted representatives of institutions where philosophy is studied.

The officers of the Council are Viscount Samuel, President; Professor John Macmurray, Chairman of Executive Committee; and Dr. C. A. Mace, Bedford College, N.W. 1., Honorary Secretary.

A meeting for discussion of the Council's work will be held during the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Edinburgh in July.

The Council has already been able to take effective action on behalf of philosophical refugees. It has under consideration further plans for assisting these philosophers to carry on their teaching and research in this country. In the detailed formulation of proposals to this end it is working in close collaboration with the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning and with the philosophical societies of this country.

#### NEW PERIODICAL.

*Philosophic Abstracts*, a quarterly review of philosophical books and periodicals in form of brief excerpts and synopses, will make its appearance in the early part of October of this year.

The purpose of *Philosophic Abstracts* is not only to present English-speaking philosophy departments and libraries with a bibliography of essential philosophic literature, but also to give them an opportunity to keep abreast with the principal philosophic theories as presented by their respective authors. Editorial offices are at 884 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.

#### MIND ASSOCIATION.

Those who wish to join the Association should communicate with the Hon. Secretary, Mr. W. C. KNEALE, Exeter College, Oxford; or with the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. J. I. MCKIE, Brasenose College, Oxford, to whom the yearly subscription of sixteen shillings should be paid. Cheques should be made payable to the Mind Association, Westminster Bank, Oxford. Members may pay a Life Composition of £16 instead of the annual subscription.

In return for their subscriptions members receive *MIND* gratis and post free, and (if of 3 years' standing) are entitled to buy back-numbers both of the Old and the New Series at half-price.